A crucial essence of social science in general is to raise questions about the Why?. For the conscious development of our societies, diving into the sociogenetic and developmental processes of societies to understand how social structures, values or power relations emerge and evolve is more than significantly important. Every scientific answer to these questions allows us to evaluate our societal status quo and helps in finding suitable solutions to sometimes abstract problems. Furthermore, while analysing and researching questions about the Why? from several perspectives, it also has another benefit: Sometimes hidden problems, e.g., in the form of inefficient societal dynamics, can be captured, as it allows the identification of underlying issues and inefficiencies within societal dynamics that might otherwise remain unnoticed. Two of those phenomena are the concepts of individualism and modernity.
In Modernity – a term used to describe the current time period – there are various discussions and analyses that capture inefficient societal structures, self-destructing social dynamics and a huge developmental capacity that remains unfulfilled as long as societal paradigms do not change. These debates are summarised under the term Critical Theory, within which my analysis finds its place as well. More concretely, my analysis examines the emergence of (Western) modernity’s main paradigm, namely individualism, and highlights potential structural factors that set the basis on which modern paradigms developed. Secondly, the analysis observes how new structural necessities shape societal behaviour, which, when institutionalised, defines the socio-cultural habitus. Consequently, this work does not present a new theoretical framework to explain structural deficits of modernity. This work presents an in-depth analysis of the nature of social paradigms, which constitutes the root cause of modernity’s paradoxes. The historical roots of individualism show, so I hypothesise, that modern self-realisation is to a significant extent a product of structural constraints and, therefore, inherently involves a permanent conflict of free will and structural pressures.
The analysis is divided into three chapters. The first section is an introduction to Critical Theory in general, to the most influential and also most recent theories and their authors, which provides the conceptual framework within which the analysis operates. The second chapter delves into the historical context, particularly into the structural and material constraints of the High and Late Middle Ages, uncertainties that led to a developmental process of social structures. The last chapter evaluates the changes in the socio-cultural habitus through the lens of cultural expressions and, last but not least, through the difficulties that constitute today’s reality.
Socio-Theoretical Concepts Within Critical Theory
Since the topic of this analysis is individualism as (Western) Modernity’s predominant societal paradigm, the socio-theoretical approach, therefore, focuses primarily on the individual as the subject, in order to examine the potential effects arising from a paradigm shaped by individualism. Other theories that examine societal development, such as the System Theory by Niklas Luhmann or Claude Levi-Strauss’ Structuralism, for example, examine societies independently from the individual, focusing on the collective whole. While these approaches remain inherently relevant in scientific debates, to interpret the effects of individualism, the fundamental social theory employed in this essay engages with the conceptual cosmos, focusing on the individual. Therefore, the Resonance Theory of Hartmut Rosa, who summarised several aspects of critical theory under a new definition, constitutes the framework for this analysis. Nonetheless, the insights of other social researchers, who were influential to Rosa´s work, are embedded in this analysis as well.
Resonance Theory
Hartmut Rosa’s theory of resonance broadly addresses the being-in-the-world of an individual. According to him, establishing resonant relationships with the world constitutes the primary driving force of human existence, with the attainment of such resonance representing the guiding principle of life. In his eponymous work “Resonance”, situated within the tradition of critical theory, Rosa systematically examines the problem of consistent resonance loss in contemporary society. Resonance, to define it with his own words, is a form of world-relation shaped by affectivity and emotions, intrinsic interest and the expectation of self-efficacy. It is not merely an echo but a responsive relationship; it entails that both sides, the subject (individual) and the object (worldly things), speak with an inaccessible voice. In a choir or orchestra, for example, individuals do not merely coordinate their voices technically, but also enter into an affective and bodily synchrony (e.g., in the measurable synchronisation of heart rhythms). In the classroom, resonance becomes tangible when a class comes alive, questions arise, and the material is experienced as meaningful. While hiking, resonance can be felt in the echo, the landscape, or nature itself as a response of the world. Prayer, too, constitutes a resonant act: the subject calls into the world in the expectation that it will answer – whether through God or through one’s own inner voice. The common core of these experiences is a condition in which subject and world no longer appear as separate, but enter into mutual frequency. Resonance, then, does not signify an escape into mysticism but rather describes an empirically observable quality of the relationship and connectedness. Such relationships are only possible when the individual attributes significance to the other voice, shaped by cognitive frameworks and social structures. Resonance, therefore, is neither an emotional state nor an esoteric perspective, but a mode of relating that is neutral with respect to content. In physics, resonance describes the observation that one system or object oscillates most intensely when it is stimulated by an external force matching its natural frequency. Rosa deploys this mechanism on society by setting the quality of the relationship between subject and object as the natural frequency. The affectivity a subject experiences lies in its relationship with the object. Furthermore, resonance is not limited to a specific realm and can be experienced in all areas of life. Nonetheless, resonance in modernity tends to emerge in specific oases that are mostly found in art, religion and nature.
Those oases emerge precisely due to modernity’s main point of criticism: the alienation of the world. Rosa illustrates this with the image of a mute world, standing in opposition to a speaking, resonant world. Alienation, in his terms, describes a mode of being-in-the-world in which the subject experiences its own body, its feelings, the material and natural environment or social interactions as disconnected and non-responsive. This finds expression, among other things, in increasing burnout and depression rates, which are ultimately defined as disconnection from the world. Erich Fromm, another German sociologist, emphasises that the deepest fear of modern individuals is precisely this lack of resonance. Individualisation shifts societal relations from primary (communal), into secondary, more abstract relations. This becomes possible only because the individual understands itself as a self-standing subject, positioned in the world. Yet this self-conception results in the anxiety of being unable to connect with the objects of the world. To be cut off, for Fromm, means to be helpless: unable to realise one’s self-expectations in relation to things and other people. The position one possesses in the world is no longer given (communal) but must be achieved dynamically in contingent processes of competition (secondary). This means that the subject understands itself as relatively cut off from the world; one cannot stay openly bound to it if one must constantly redefine its position. Such reflexive distance is often framed as a gain in freedom and self-determination, and thus as an improvement in life chances. Yet, as Karl Marx, a German economic scientist as well, pointed out, these possibilities of self-realisation remain limited by social conditions and structural constraints. For him, as well as for Fromm and Rosa, the calculability and controllability of the world are the crucial necessities of the rationalisation process. This process is the final consequence of the individualistic paradigm, since it depends on the expansion of the world’s reach to steadily influence the dynamic position one possesses. Yet resonance can only emerge between two independent and self-standing voices; thus, the attempt to master the world prevents the possibility of a resonant relation. Trying to capture and rationalise the world, to make it fully available, blocks any form of genuine experience and thus produces the very condition we call alienation.
The being-in-the-world of an individual defines one’s perception, and is, in this traditional line of Critical Theory, stated to be modernity’s fundamental problem. The essence lies in rationalisation, which is a consequence of the logic of escalation. Based on the above, my main hypothesis is that those effects and the individualistic paradigm can be traced back to structural conditions in the Middle Ages. To frame this hypothesis more clearly, we must first distinguish between a pathic and an intentionalistic stance toward the world. This distinction provides the basis for examining the critique of modernity, specifically, the mechanisms driving its logic of intensification.
Definition: Pathic and Intentionalistic
The distinction between a pathic and an intentionalistic worldview, or also how individuals experience the world, helps to identify and to describe when shifts in the socio-cultural habitus occur. Pathic describes an individual disposition that is primarily reactive: it is characterised by receptivity and responsiveness, and life appears as the outcome of external forces, divine providence or fateful events. As outlined above, from Fromm’s perspective, a pathic world is constituted through primary relationships, in which the subject understands himself as an integral part of the world. In this sense, existence is defined less by intention and control than by receptivity and belonging. In contrast, intentionalism is characterised by seeing the world as a field full of tasks, quests and possibilities, where active decision-making, planning and calculating, as well as taking responsibility for oneself, shape the subject’s worldview. Max Weber, for instance, drew a similar distinction in his typology of social action: traditional and affectual action can be aligned with the pathic worldview, whereas purposive-rational and value-rational actions are intentionally structured, since they are guided by a conscious orientation toward goals, means or values.
Several social researchers, for example, the French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu, are highlighting that those different modes of experiencing the world, with pathic and intentionalistic just being the most relevant for this analysis, are not mere ideas, but are constituted in the socio-cultural habitus. The habitus – understood as society inscribed into the body – translates objective structures into lasting dispositions. Pathic or intentionalistic orientations are thus not expressions of individual freedom of choice, but internalised responses to social conditions. Conversely, the social habitus is the internalised relation to the world, embedded in social structures, that continuously reaffirms itself.
Adaptation of the Socio-Cultural Habitus through structural changes
Pierre Bourdieu provides a theoretical tool with his concept of habitus to understand the connection between social structures and cultural expressions. For Bourdieu, habitus is a system of dispositions produced by social conditions that simultaneously structures the actions of agents. He describes it as ‘incorporated history,’ a lasting influence that shows itself in the way people stand, perceive, judge, taste and practice culture. Habitus is not a conscious set of rules, but a form of ‘practical sense’ that allows people to take part in societal processes without explicitly knowing their rules (Distinction, 1979). According to this, the transformation from a pathic into an intentionalistic being-in-the-world cannot be connected to a specific date, event, perhaps not even to a single age, but rather a slow and steady process that cannot be captured in one time period. Furthermore, it is necessary to mention that the analysis focuses on the adaptation of the social structures. There were always individuals who were rather intentionalistic than pathic, but, and this is the essential aspect here, the structural changes in the High Middle Ages were laying a foundation for a constitutional change in the structures. Therefore, the following section will examine the structural necessities that can be historically contextualised.
The primary structural changes in the High and Central Middle Ages will be captured in the historical analyses of the German sociologist Norbert Elias. His insights reveal the transformation of the warrior aristocracy into a pacified courtly aristocracy, which is a transformation of the social structure, driven by mechanisms that were not the result of deliberate action by any single authority. In addition to Elias’s research, there is another essential factor that supported the structural shift toward an intentionalistic relation to the world, namely the rise of legal pluralism, which will also be captured in this section.
Monopolisation as a Driving Force
The transformation of the warrior aristocracy into a pacified courtly aristocracy was not the result of an elaborated plan, but rather the result of long-term structural dynamics. In Early Medieval society, the aristocracy secured its position through territorial expansion, settlement, and a subsistence economy. Land constituted the central resource, as it guaranteed both the supply of food and the possibility to provide for retainers. In times of war, the aristocracy functioned as protectors for dependent lords and peasants within their sphere of influence, while at the same time, they relied on their military support. In return, the aristocracy distributed captured land and other resources as rewards for loyalty and service. Through this practice, a system of mutual dependencies emerged, in which military protection and economic foundations were closely connected. Those dependencies shifted in times of peace, as the urgency for the protective function of the aristocracy for the lesser lord was no longer required. Moreover, the possibilities for acquiring new land were limited in peaceful times. For the dependent class, there was hardly any social advancement, since the ruling aristocracy possessed only limited resources to distribute. This led to an increase in eccentric forces, as Elias calls them, which is the tendency towards independent interests and conflicts within the nobles’ sphere of power. In order to maintain the status quo and to respond (pathically) to these tensions, many ruling lords of this turned to outward expansion, which is named after the warrior aristocracy.
This logic sets the fundamental structural dynamic during this period, and therefore logically results in increasing conflicts between continuously growing principalities. Competition over territories intensified, with numerous smaller principalities struggling for influence and recognition. In the long run, this process emerged in what Elias describes as monopolisation: power and rights of rule, along with access to key resources, became increasingly concentrated in the hands of a few princes and kings. Through this development, the aristocracy needed to secure its position and influence not primarily through military expansion or land acquisition, but rather through loyalty to the court and the ability to navigate through a web of increasingly complex courtly rules. These rules were not the result of a conscious codification but, as Elias emphasises, arose from social practice itself. Minor disputes, struggles for rank and dependencies at court emerged standards of conduct that were gradually institutionalised. Direct use of violence was strictly sanctioned and was replaced by symbolic or socialised competition, for example, through etiquette and refinement in manner and speech. Becoming influential in this new situation now depends on mastering this practice in order to gain recognition from the ruler and the court in general. In this way, behavioural norms shaped into a being-in-the-world that enforced self-constraint: no longer external force, but inner self-control determined rank and status. Thus, a new logic prevailed, a logic of escalation, in which prestige and social status could only be maintained through the continuous refinement of conduct. The nobility’s relation to the world thereby shifted towards an intentionalistic worldview.
Sociogenetic Change of Habitus in the Courtly Context
At this point, the argument could arise that the warrior aristocracy also behaved in an intentionalistic manner when they conquered land to maintain their power position. This could be true to a specific degree, but the essential aspect lies in the transformation of the general being-in-the-world, which inherently differs from the developed pacified aristocracy. The Early Medieval warrior nobility acted with purpose, yet its intentionality was reactive. Expansion arose from the necessity of securing the status quo and did not serve an imperialist purpose. Securing resources was the only way to stabilise one’s power, and they were often gained through local border wars or short-term raids, as in the case of the Normans. Here, the concerns were not limited to the lord himself, but also the lesser lords and peasants in his area of influence. This form of intentionalism was primarily a response to structural constraints. On the other hand, the courtly aristocracy’s intentionalism became the long-term strategy that had to be practiced within complex social orders. Access to the ruler, mastery of etiquette and self-control replaced open combat; the pacification led to different expressions of conflicts over power. Whereas the warrior nobility responded reactively to external necessities, the court nobility had to orient its behaviour proactively in order to secure status and influence in an intentional manner – marking a transition from a pathic orientation to an intentionalistic relation to the world.
This transition is not only reflected in the structural preconditions but also in cultural expressions. The Minnesang, for example, is a poetic and sung expression of a knight’s love and desire at court. Therefore, it is not only an example for the pacification at court, as a knight can no longer take a woman as he pleases – at least a woman from a higher rank (which is also a consequence of the described structures) – but also trains the nobility in mastering their emotions and adhering to complex rules of self-presentation. Prestige is no longer earned through martial assets, but through the ability to navigate the courtly code of honor, moderation and symbolic distinction.
While this observation supports my thesis of transformation for only one social group, the aristocracy, this process occurred next to – and was also influenced by – the transformation of economic structures. The shift from an economy primarily based on natural goods to a money-based economy increased the importance of cities and of the second social class, namely the citizenry, which I will analyse now.
Cities – Plurality of Law and Codification
The development of cities and the citizenry lay the foundation for an understanding of structural changes in the High to Late Middle Ages. The monarchy based its power on balancing the strong economic development of the citizenry on the one hand and the traditional position of the aristocracy on the other hand. Most influential were the economic disruptions at that time: the development of a money-based economy led to the central significance of cities, while the nobility’s position declined, since their power was based on land and natural resources. This also explains the nobility’s necessary access to the king. These mechanisms created the conditions under which an increasingly intentionalistic being-in-the-world could be institutionalised, which we will examine in detail below. The development of cities, especially inland cities, is a lengthy process of several economic, technological, scientific and cultural developments, which would not fit in this analysis in their comprehensive form. For this reason, I will highlight the most important aspects of the subject matter.
Crucial for the development of cities and towns, which initially started as organised and concentrated marketplaces, was the increase in population from an estimated 40 million inhabitants in Europe in the 10th century to between 70 and 100 million by the early 14th century, combined with the climatic conditions known as the Medieval Warm Period. These factors led to better harvests and a surplus in production. However, it was not only climatic conditions but also agricultural innovations, such as the heavy plow and improved harnesses for draft animals, that increased efficiency and productivity. An increasing population and a more efficient economy systematically produced surpluses. These consistent surpluses had to be distributed in an organised manner, which led to the first documented permanent marketplaces (e.g., in Champagne in France). The marketplaces initially started for exchanging natural goods, but when surpluses persisted, these markets enabled the specialisation of non-agricultural activities, such as crafts. Furthermore, these markets, once permanently established, also led to an easier organisation of long-distance trade and resources like salt, wine and cloth, that came along with it. With the growing division of labour and long-distance trade, the economic practices of exchanging natural resources became inefficient and money, in the form of a universal medium of exchange, became necessary. In short, money replaced the exchange of goods because it simplified transport, calculation and fiscal centralisation. Even further, the growing markets led to impersonal exchange relationships, whereas a universal medium of exchange became even more relevant.
Following this, in the 12th century, more standardised coinage systems were developed; the peasants began to pay their rent and debt (just as merchants paid their market fees) increasingly with money instead of goods. The monarchs now had a greater flexibility to finance their military machine by hiring mercenary armies (with money) rather than the warrior aristocracy (with land). As mentioned earlier, this led to a structural loss of power among the warrior aristocracy, whose economic strength had been rooted in the possession of land and natural goods, and enforced them into the more pacified courtly aristocracy. With the declining viability of a subsistence economy and the growing significance of money as a universal medium of exchange, the economic balance of the Middle Ages shifted. The aristocracy, whose power base had traditionally rested on landownership and payments in kind, lost influence, while towns rose to become crucial centres of trade and financial circulation. This development granted cities a new strategic role within the power structure. Economically, they were of crucial value to kings and ruling lords, as taxes and dues could be collected more directly and reliably than through the often proud and resolute nobility. In return, cities could negotiate privileges, liberties and forms of autonomy; they began strengthening their independence. To protect themselves against external threats or competing powers, they were also allowed to build fortifications and organise civic militias. Their capacity to mobilise collective force made them serious political actors in their own right.
The monarchy was now able to manifest its power through its politics of power between the two rival social groups. While the citizenry gained economic relevance, their self-perception and readiness to overcome feudal structure had to grow internally for the next centuries. The courtly aristocracy, on the other hand, was too weak to overcome the ruling monarch, yet it continued to regard itself as superior to the citizenry, which can be observed in courtly etiquette and codes of conduct. Yet, the consolidation of monarchical authority also generated new tensions within the social order, within which the necessity to create new legal structures capable of addressing the increasing complexities of trade, taxation and political order arose. The Church played a crucial role in this process. It constituted a decisive counterweight to the strengthening monarchies by establishing, with the codification of canon law (Gratian’s Decretum, around 1140), a transregional normative system that tried to relativised secular power. Simultaneously, the rediscovery of Roman law at Italian universities (especially in Bologna) provided a toolkit to navigate through the complex questions, e.g., contractual and property relations, that came along with the economic transformation. This led to an increasing plurality of laws that was not driven by intellectual interest in Roman law in the first place, but through the necessity of creating a structure that balanced the tension between monarchy, aristocracy, citizenry and church. The rediscovery and finally the codification of law in the High and Late Middle Ages mark the first major rationalising process in Europe, which structured social action (Weber) and laid the foundations for enduring legal pluralism (Berman).
Increasing plurality and codification of law, especially that of canon and Roman law, led to the recognition of cities, guilds or universities as autonomous legal persons. Moving a web of various legal persons institutionalised the self-understanding of an acting subject not only at the individual level, but also collectively. Citizens participating in guilds, universities, or municipal corporations now understood themselves as subjects with rights, duties and responsibilities within these structures. This interdependence construct enforced a being-in-the-world that was rather intentionalistic than pathic. Although the newly constituted legal system lacked the depth of modern legal systems, it enabled more strategic and thoughtful action: conflicts could no longer be endured or ended forcefully, but had to be negotiated before various authorities. Here lies the essential transformative character: a legal system that is dominated by the authorial decision-making of an aristocratic ruler will be experienced subjectively as fateful and irreversible, namely in a pathic manner. In contrast, the pluralised legal system forced a subject to plan, calculate and justify. It transformed the being-in-the-world from reactive, tradition-bound passivity into an intentionalist orientation. To come back to Bourdieu, the socio-cultural habitus follows social structures. Christianity already provided a normative framework that legitimised and gave meaning to these developments (e.g., canon law); it was the institutionalisation of new legal structures, the writing of contracts, guild statutes or university regulations, that shaped a habitus oriented toward intentionality, reflection, and strategic action.
Following a brief outline of the structural transformations of the High and Late Middle Ages, the corresponding changes in habitus become visible, particularly in shifts in cultural expressions. These cultural forms, ranging from manners and etiquette to law and literature, reflect the underlying social and legal transformations of the period.
Cultural Expressions of Structural Transformation
Social structures do not merely reproduce themselves through institutions or law, but also through cultural norms and expressions. As already mentioned, the habitual practices of the aristocracy changed with the ongoing pacification and their increasing dependence on the monarch. As a result, cultural expressions like the Minnensang or etiquette were established. Especially the etiquette became more relevant, as it was also a tool to elevate themselves from the citizenry, as this was no longer possible through mere difference in power. Consequently, this led to the development of rules for table manners, clothing and personal hygiene, as well as language and gestures, or, in short, the civilising of society (Elias). At the same time, in the cities, structural necessities such as legal pluralism and economic competition led to an intentionalistic self-understanding of the subject. That this habitable transformation of the citizenry, primarily expressed in legal texts, is a natural consequence. In the German states, for example, the Sachsenspiegel was written in the 13th century, which serves as the first codification of general social practices. While this might seem non-intentionalist in terms of lawmaking, the intentionalist dimension lies precisely in the act of codification itself: the deliberate organisation, systematisation and essentially the public presentation of legal norms. The Sachsenspiegel remained authoritative law for centuries, its influence extending over thousands of kilometers. This necessity of having a codified law arose from a transformation of habitus. Yet, this change was not solely connected to the legal sphere, as other literary works of the period also reflect the spirit of the age.
A particularly illustrative example of cultural transformation in the High Middle Ages is the Arthurian romance interpreted by Chrétien de Troyes in the 12th century. This new interpretation of this romance builds around the concept of the Aventiure – originally meaning ‘that which befalls one’ (ad-venire). In the Arthurian romances, this meaning shifts decisively: Aventiure no longer means the passive experience of fate, but the active pursuit of challenges that can only be fulfilled through the hero’s personal proving. The subject undertakes the quest, seeking trials and adventures to earn honour, glory and recognition. This narrative directly reflects the emerging intentionalist worldview, as the world is no longer viewed as a place determined by fate or divine will, but as a challenge in which the subject must prove one’s own value. This shift was a crucial turning point in European cultural history, from a predominantly pathic to an intentionalistic being-in-the-world. While the reinterpretation of the romance still contains elements of a pathic orientation, it perfectly fits in the tension between enduring and intention, and this, however, is not an argument against habitual transformation, but rather a marker of the transformative character of the period.
Similarities can be found in other literature of this period. The romance of Tristan and Isolde presents a classical love tragedy, in which the affection of the two protagonists is hindered by political and moral circumstances. What is decisive, however, is that love is no longer pictured as mere fate, but as an intentional conflict. The characters must consciously choose their actions and negotiate between duty, passion and social order. Love thus becomes an arena in which the individual must test and define themselves. It is not simply a feeling anymore that befalls one, but something one must willingly fight for, thereby directing one’s actions intentionally towards the goal.
The last example I want to introduce here is the religious works of Hildegard von Bingen in the 12th century. In her major writings Liber vitae meritorum and liber divinorum operum, she describes the interplay of virtues and sins on the one hand, and, on the other, the order of creation as conceived in the medieval worldview – a structure in which body and soul, world and Church, nature and grace are placed within human responsibility. This marks a turning point at which transcendence itself becomes subject to processes of rationalisation. The mysterious becomes accessible, fixed in texts and integrated into a system of doctrine. Hildegard’s work illustrates that the habitus of intentionalism manifested not only in legal forms but also within the sphere of religious culture. The transformative character of this period becomes evident here as well: while transcendence was partially rationalised, it retained an element of inaccessibility.
These examples, though only a few, illustrate the transformative shift in cultural perception and reveal the emergence of a foundation upon which intentionalism and rationalisation could continue to evolve. A key insight is that neither this habitual development nor the structural transformations within which it unfolded were the result of forced planning or individual achievement. Rather, they emerged from sociogenetic processes of unintended structural consolidation. Consequently, the socio-theoretical perspective once again becomes relevant. As it defines the analytical framework of this essay, the next step is to examine the dynamics arising from the ongoing processes of intentionalism and rationalisation.
Structural Constraints of Individualism
The preceding analyses have shown how the individual being-in-the-world shifted from a pathic to an intentionalistic orientation. Thus, they were necessary to provide the foundation for the main thesis of this essay, namely that European individualism, with its paradoxical tension between freedom and constraints, is a result, or at least heavily influenced by, the material and social constraints of the High Middle Ages. As the historical sociogenetic process has now been completed, the necessary object of the analysis must be the particular definition of the tension between freedom and constraint. Whereas the preceding observations pointed only to the necessity of analysing the social framework, offering a broad definition of the modern condition, the next step is to understand why these issues emerge from an intentionalistic conception of the world. This requires a return to the perspective of Critical Theory, and especially, to stay in line with the essay’s core perspective, through the lens of Rosa’s theory of resonance.
An intentionalistic orientation presupposes that the subject itself understands itself as distinguished from the world in order to actively shape and transform it. In order to do so, one must actively render the world available, as one cannot shape what one cannot understand nor control. Once multiple subjects (social structures) begin to act within this logic, a structure emerges that can only stabilise dynamically: each individual must accomplish the necessary resources, social standing and even moral recognition in continuous competition, and social order stabilises only dynamically – through constant movement. The logic of escalation in modern societies consists of the paradox that stability can be maintained only through continuous expansion and acceleration. Whereas premodern societies also valued efforts that served the preservation of what had already been achieved (traditionalism), modernity values only what is new. Science, for example, no longer measures its success by the preservation of an inherited canon, but by the number of newly produced discoveries, publications and theories. Those who fail to increase their output lose connection and recognition. Progress thus ceases to be an option; it becomes a structural necessity. This logic intensifies as the pace of escalation continuously increases. What counted as innovation yesterday becomes the standard today and obsolete tomorrow. Dynamic stabilisation, therefore, implies not only permanent movement but also increasing speed, concluding in a drive toward constant intensification. The success of today immediately becomes the benchmark by which tomorrow’s success is measured. Therefore, the promise that individualism provides a foundation for cultivating one’s personality and directing one’s own life reveals itself as a downward-moving escalator, on which standing still means falling into social irrelevance.
With this acceleration comes a structural loss of resonance. Resonance, as Rosa defines it, denotes the experience of being affected by the world, of entering into a communicative relation that transforms the subject. Yet within the logic of availability, there is no space left for resonance. Where the world must be rendered permanently accessible and controllable, its unavailable and responsive character disappears. While the logic of escalation is recognisable in all branches of capitalistic market structures, the structural loss of resonance becomes evident in jobs that naturally require a resonant atmosphere. Teaching professions, for instance, do not rely merely on an informative exchange of knowledge, but knowledge must also be experienced, shared and emotionally processed. Under conditions of strict curricula, standardised examinations and, most evidently, metric evaluations, education becomes an administrative task: teachers are required to deliver content and assess performance rather than enter into resonance with their students. A profession designed to foster resonance is thus structurally denied. The constant push for higher productivity and efficiency leads to exhaustion. Burnout, which is closely linked to depression, is not just an individual problem but reflects a social structure where resonance is blocked and the world is reduced to control and availability. Alienation, in this sense, is the experience of no longer being able to feel the world.
In conclusion, modern society, which is primarily based on the individualistic paradigm, naturally enhances competitiveness in nearly all realms, resulting in a mode of dynamic stabilisation. Ultimately, this leads to a continuous loss of resonance. The logic of escalation forces individuals and institutions into permanent intensification, systematically blocking resonant relationships. Freedom appears to enable self-realisation, but in fact becomes a structural compulsion. Modernity is thus grounded in fear, in the fear of falling behind, losing connection or no longer experiencing the world in resonance. As Erich Fromm put it, fear is the flip side of the loss of the world, which increasingly slips away from us within an intentionalistic relation to the world.
The dynamic of escalation described by Rosa does align with a long tradition of societal analysis. Max Weber, for instance, already described modernity as an age of rationalisation, in which all areas of life are evaluated in terms of calculability and efficiency. This process of the disenchantment of the world implies that fate, magic or divine providence loses significance, and the world instead appears controllable and available. Weber further linked this process, in his eponymous writings, to the Protestant Ethic, which established self-discipline, work and continual performance enhancement as moral imperatives. In doing so, Weber identifies a root of the structural pressures that Rosa later describes as dynamic stabilisation in modernity. Georg Simmel, a German sociologist as well, also highlighted similar issues in his writings, The Tragedy of Culture. Modern societies create increasingly complex systems (science, technology, institutions) that drift away from people’s everyday experience. Most individuals can hardly understand or participate in these structures, which leads to overload and a sense of alienation.
From these different perspectives, a common picture emerges: modernity is shaped by a logic of escalation that pushes individuals toward self-discipline while at the same time producing experiences of alienation. Still, it’s important to see modernity from more positive perspectives as well. Sociologists like Jürgen Habermas point out that rationalisation has not only enabled control and domination but also created the conditions for democracy, the rule of law and a critical public sphere. Niklas Luhmann sees in the functional differentiation of modern society not just alienation, but an expansion of individual freedom: people can act in multiple roles at once and are no longer rigidly tied to tradition. Charles Taylor emphasises that modernity has also made a new form of authenticity possible, in which individuals can develop beyond traditional collective structures.
Nonetheless, there are voices that temper the positive ideas of modernity without viewing them as entirely negative. Even the young Marx, before framing his critique around the class struggle between capital and the citizenry, emphasised that the individualistic idea of freedom to develop is always limited by existing social structures. This insight can be connected to Habermas’ concept of an unfinished modernity: modernity is not a completed project, but continuously opens up new possibilities for self-realisation, as long as its institutional structures are not directed by a one-sided logic of escalation. In other words, modern social orders could also produce forms that are less alienating if they were not solely based on constant growth and competition. At this point, it becomes clear that a paradigm shift is necessary: only in this way can the positive aspects of an intentionalistic relation to the world (autonomy, self-determination and diversity) be fully realised, while merely continuing current lifestyles will steadily decrease the relationship to the world.
Final Thoughts
This final reflection, looking at modernity through the lens of critical theory, highlights the essential point. The aim is not to deny or downplay the achievements of modernity, whether social, societal, technological or scientific, but rather to understand that the same mechanisms embedded in its social structures are responsible for its flipside. This essay has two main intentions. First, and this is by no means a claim of my own, it demonstrates that a societal paradigm shift is necessary. Second, and this is the primary purpose of this essay, it seeks to show that existing social structures and prevailing paradigms are by no means the result of perfect, absolute planning. They are not inevitable – they can be transformed. The method to achieve this lies in reshaping the structures themselves.
A paradigm shift implies a transformative process toward a post-modern society. Concrete models of how a post-modern society might look, and which paradigms would serve as better alternatives to current ones, must be explored elsewhere in depth. The approaches are diverse: Rosa, for instance, with his theory of resonance, offers a perspective beyond the logic of escalation. Similarly, Charles Taylor, a Canadian philosopher, in A Secular Age, emphasises that even amid rationalisation and secularisation, modern societies continue to seek experiences of transcendence and connection. The approach followed at Essydo Politics aligns with this perspective as well. Emre Sentürk’s normative framework, Devlet, presents a post-modern societal concept that identifies the most effective structural transformation in the orientation toward genuine knowledge production. The common thread in all these theories lies in their transcendent character: the subject is affected through the creation of knowledge, thereby connecting with the world, or, to put it differently, inhabiting a resonant relation to the world.
Modernity reveals both its strengths and weaknesses, yet the mechanisms underlying its structures are not set in stone. By consciously questioning and transforming our social paradigms, a path opens toward a post-modern society, one that enables new forms of connection and orientation, a vision that is actively explored and expanded upon within Essydo Politics.
