Iran has been a strategic and ideologic target of Israel for nearly 50 years, and arguably before that, considering that the political leadership prior to the Islamic Revolution in 1979 was heavily influenced and almost controlled by the United States of America (hereinafter: the USA). Under the pretext of developing nuclear weapons, Israel used diplomatic means and media networks since the mid-1990s to gather support against Iran. This stems from Israel’s “Begin Doctrine”, which clearly underlines the nation’s readiness for pre-emptive strikes against other nations that are believed to develop nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction. The recent war between the two nations was initiated by Israel within this framework of the Begin Doctrine on 13 June 2025, and has intensified over the last week. We already predicted a soon escalation of the decade-old tensions in one of our analyses in April 2024. Although we concluded that Israel would provoke a first strike by Iran, which ultimately did not turn out this exact way, the result of the analysis remains the same. Unlike earlier tensions and conflicts, the extent of this recent war between the two nations indicates further intensification and bears the danger of expanding into the broader region. In this article, we will explore the strategic options and developments in this war.

Motives and Backgrounds

In September 2002, the current Prime Minister of Israel gave an expert testimony in front of the Upper Chamber of the USA’s parliament. At the time, he just finished his first term but would come back seven years later for a twelve-year term. He strongly expressed his wish for different governments in Iraq and in Iran. As regards Iran, he gave strategic tips that let us see through his approach. Because of its technical infrastructure and closed, religious societal setup, the best way, for Benjamin Netanyahu, would be to influence the population by spurring desires of wealth and hedonistic lifestyles. He, however, gave no insights into where his desire for a different Iranian government comes from. Even further, he casually assumed that this is not even a question that should be debated, effectively formulating a doctrine. Prior to this insight into his thinking, he started accusing Iran of developing nuclear weapons since 1992. With a first address to the Israeli parliament that year, he claimed that Iran will have developed an atomic bomb within a couple of years. This was reiterated in 1995 in his book, also as part of his expert testimony in 2002 and also in 2012, where he presented a cartoon of a bomb at the United Nations General Assembly claiming that Iran will have developed a nuclear bomb within a couple of months. Within the current war, this justification of attacking Iran due to the assumed development of nuclear weapons has resurfaced and is used as pretext for attacking Iran. This approach is informed by the “Begin Doctrine” of Israel that has developed into a state policy over the decades. This doctrine, first expressed by former Prime Minister of Israel, Menachem Begin, in 1981, asserts that Israel should pre-emptively attack other nations when there are suspected to possess weapons of mass destruction. In the context of this doctrine, Israel also lobbied the USA to attack Iraq in 2003 and is now attacking Iran, even though Iran does not possess nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction. It follows that Isreal has the ambition to attack Iran for a long time that there is a systematic approach to destabilise the nation in the long run. The exact reason cannot be clearly identified as Israeli politicians themselves discredited the main narrative of Iran possessing nuclear weapons. One, very likely, assessment is that with the transition to a democratic theocracy in 1979, Iran was no longer under the influence of the USA, and by extension Israel. Before the system transition, the ruling Shah of Iran was basically a vassal of the USA, providing cheap resources and a political stronghold. When looking at the USA-led coup in Iran in 1953, we can further substantiate that the control of this nation seems to hold some importance to the USA. The coup was motivated by the productive reforms that the former Prime Minister of Iran, Mohammad Mosaddegh, introduced during his two-year term, including the nationalisation of the oil industry. Further, the normative foundation of much of Israeli (foreign) politics is informed by religious works that oblige them to pursue the rule of many territories in the region, including Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, Palestine, Jordan, Türkiye and Iran. More insights into the religious background of Israeli politics can be found in our works from 29 January 2023 and 23 October 2024.

Strategic Considerations

When examining (foreign policy) strategies of states, there are some dimensions that need consideration before policies are designed. States will analyse their strategy in light of their relative power within certain core dimensions that are important to the issue at hand. The number and importance of the policy dimensions changes from issue to issue, as well as from state to state and time to time. Here, we identified four simplified dimensions: military, culture/religion, territory, legitimacy. Surely, there are other factors as well but in terms of predicting Israeli state behaviour and assessing the probability, these are sufficient. With the goal of a “Greater Israel” in mind, the state of Israel is faced with a multitude of other states that are naturally unwilling to hand over their territorial sovereignty. Israel, therefore, needs to understand its relative power in terms of the abovementioned dimensions. The military dimension comprises the military capabilities of a state in terms of technology, manpower, military history and organisational experience, as well as mentality factors that are primarily informed by purpose and history of a state. Culture and religion are also very important to consider. Those factors indicate the depth of a society, which, in turn, affects its ability to survive, state effectiveness, national support and societal progress – latter affects a variety of developmental factors, such as technology, art and science. The territorial dimension allows us to assess the difficulty of conquest; also in terms of available resources to the counterparty. Finally, the legitimacy dimension is very important in the diplomatic context and external support. Every political act requires a certain degree of legitimacy to produce sustainable results. In the context of wars, the jus ad bellum is important to justify military action on the international stage. In diplomatic terms, or in terms of the normative strategy of Israel, legitimacy is also assessed against cultural, religious and territorial claims.

Below, we broadly assessed Israel’s relative strength against the other nations it probably wants to conquest. If Israel happens to assess its situation similarly, then it is likely that it will act in accordance with our forecasts, which are indicated in the overview in colour (indicated as coloured arrows and texts under Strategy Moving Forward). We used a simplified form of our analysis and forecasting model to assess the relative strength of Israel against the other states (indicated as percentages under Status Quo Assessment). Our forecasts, including the probabilities (indicated as coloured percentages) are the result of the previous Status Quo Assessment, paired with historic analysis of Israeli state behaviour.

The Iran War: Triggers

As it already followed from the historic background, Israel has pursued a strategy of cultural demise in Iran. Especially the systemic difference between theocratic Iran and secular political systems has been emphasised over the past decades, as already outlined by Benjamin Netanyahu more than 20 years ago. In our analysis from 18 February 2023, we examine the cultural imbalance Iran has experienced over the years, underlining that this cultural aspect is a sensitive one within this nation. When there is a multitude of extremely varying ideas on how a society should be structured, a nation will quickly face increased political transaction costs in terms of communications, compromise and hybrid-solution policymaking. Such elements are progress-hampering and, even more so, deepening systemic political risk. The reason for that is that transaction costs take away time and energy for better policymaking and societal rifts disperse political power, making external and internal blows to the systemic more likely. Further, Israel managed to utilise its proxy state, the USA, to diplomatically isolate Iran. The USA furthered the narrative of suspected nuclear weapons development and used it as a pretext to pressure other states into cutting diplomatic ties with Iran. Over the last two decades, this diplomatic move led to the establishment of a status quo that has been accepted not because of legitimate reasons but through time and coercion. This diplomatic isolation led to a weaker military because of less interaction with other states in this field, as well as decreased diplomatic standing as the remaining diplomatic ties are too weak to secure support in the event of war. Finally, the diplomatic isolation of Iran was also accompanied by economic warfare; again, executed by the USA. Through the application of embargoes, Iran’s economy could not operate at maximum efficiency which makes the national land use necessary but more ineffective. Moreover, this slows down the expansion of military capacity and increases societal pressure due to potential economic hardship.

Combining those factors and assessing their effects on a timeline of 20 to 30 years, it becomes realistic that Israel has reached a point where it now assesses its relative strength towards Iran quite favourably, paired with potentially supporting intelligence from within Iran. The strategy pursued here, therefore, is a long-term strategy that has been expanded over the last decades to increase chances of victory over Iran in a conflict that seems it had been planned for even a longer period. As the perceived relative power discrepancy between the stronger Iran and Israel decreased, war became more likely. When Israel ultimately attacked Iran last week, there must have been a careful calculation of power to ensure, or at least increase chances of, victory. Another factor is surely also the involvement of individual considerations of the Prime Minister of Israel. In this analysis, we looked into the individual plans of Benjamin Netanyahu a bit deeper. In short, he does seek to fulfil broader societal desires of Israel but also wants to be the person who does is and not merely play a small part in it. With already many terms in office and his high age, it was predictable that Netanyahu intensified operations in Palestine, Lebanon, Syria and now Iran.

The Iran War: Future Developments

When we move closer to the detailed developments of the war, we see that the first strike of Israel on Iran was specifically targeted towards military targets in Iran. Only later attacks were also directed towards the civilian population. This is one element of increasing legitimacy claims by portraying the attack as a pre-emptive strike. Further, current media coverage of the war is one-sidedly focusing on the missile attacks of Iran. Both positively and negatively, especially on social media, the missile attacks of Iran on Israel are much more broadly discussed, which is another potential method to increase legitimacy. When positioning one side prominently within the discussion, the perception of right and wrong of the general public can be influenced. By positioning oneself as the victim, Isreal might want to try to justify their military operation in Iran. At the time of writing this article, the casualties on the Iranian side are 224, while only 24 Israelis lost their lives. Therefore, it follows that the current media coverage is not representative of the intensity and intent of both sides. One interesting to mention is that Iran has gathered considerable positive support from the global public, so the focus on Iranian attacks is more positive than negative. This is due to Israel’s recent foreign policy radicalisation in Palestine, Lebanon and Syria. However, even overly positive reactions and concentration on one side of the conflict might produce the perception of only one party being active, which would then increase the perceived, or even constructed, legitimacy of the counterparty.

Legitimacy, in fact, might be the biggest obstacle for Israel to sustain military pressure against Iran for the time necessary to gain the upper hand in the war. Also, if Israel truly intends to conquest Iran or sustainably damage it, missile attacks will not suffice, and the involvement of ground troops is inevitable. This means that there is an even further increased need for legitimisation. As Israel has experienced severe damage to its reputation over the last decade, it will be difficult for it to sufficiently legitimise even further aggression in the region. Not even vassals, like the USA, could sustain financial and military support to Israel if public opinion further deteriorates – at some point, the international state community will intervene. Therefore, it is very likely that Israel might allow Iran to deal significant damages to the civil population. Even sustained provocation to do so might be thinkable. The strategic consideration is to produce a clear pretext through self-victimisation for more radical military action. Israel has used this element several times to initiate conflicts or intensify it, regardless of whether directly or through proxies. One of the most recent examples is the Hamas attack in October 2023, which is said to be coordinated by Israel itself. Surely, to fully confirm this assessment, we would need intelligence grade information; therefore, we can base our assessments only on context analysis, which is nonetheless very reliable.

The probability of Israel being able to conquest Iran is below 40%. This is due to Iran’s deeper societal and political structure, its stronger military force and primarily because the international state community seems to be wary of the repeating methods applied by Israel directly and indirectly through the USA. With the global power shift, the Israel-USA axis is losing relative power and with it diplomatic leverage. Iran, on the other side, has proven to respect international laws and best practices of international political conduct. Its utilisation of delf-defence rights is supported and accepted more widely than the narrative of potential nuclear weapons. This will more likely lead other nations into convincing the USA to stop supporting Israel. Its disproportionate actions for solely furthering national normative interests stand in no relation with the negative repercussions on the region and stability of international political development. On the other hand, however, there is a chance that Israel and the USA assess the situation completely differently and continue their policy course. Although fully irrational, both actors have proven in the past that they can and will push for reaching their goals, regardless of the implications for others. Moreover, this war is only a couple of days old, and the aggression strategy pursued here was planned more than 20 years ago. Probably, the aggressors ran many different models and scenarios and considered all possible paths before engaging in this first attack and provoking Iran into retaliating. Next to the legitimacy aspect, there might be maybe more profound events that await us, such as the use of weapons of mass destruction by Isreal itself, diplomatic surprises or extensive ground operations. In the light of the above, mainly due to the legitimacy factor and a more conscious international state community, it is unlikely that Iran is going to lose this war. However, the radical but very structured nature of this war does leave considerable room for erratic behaviour of Israel’s leadership.