Among the most disturbing video footage of recent political history, the murders of Muammar Gaddafi and Saddam Hussein surely rank quite high. While the videos were presented to the global public as the end of illegitimate political rules at that time, we today question the narrative around the murders of the former leaders of Iraq and Libya. The nations and their leaders were heavily criticised and presented as a danger to international peace and security. Today, both nations struggle to regain political, economic and societal power, but questions arise whether it was the states’ and their leaders’ failure or whether they fell victim to a new form of war. Maybe Iran and its current political system will one day also be viewed from a similar perspective. Today, the opinions on Iran are divided into two camps: supporters in the East and South, but opponents in the West.
What all three nations have in common is that they pursued their national interests. They did so rigorously, without compromise and sometimes undiplomatically harsh. In the last quarter of the 20th century, Iran, Iraq and Libya became increasingly aware of the importance of their structurally important natural resources. Global demand rose and with the end of the Bretton Woods system, demand was free to find the cheapest supply. Whereas capital flows, and hence international trade, were regulated heavily by all governments to uphold the fixed exchange rate regime, the 1970s marked the beginning of free trade. All of a sudden, the world went shopping where it was the cheapest. In terms of oil, Sub-Anatolian nations, such as Iran, Iraq and Libya, were and still are the resource-richest nations and could, therefore, offer oil at much lower rates. Unlike Saudi-Arabia, Canada or some South American nations, Iran, Iraq and Libya did not choose to agree with European powers’ extortion efforts. Instead, they all decided to pursue their own perceived national interests. Iran chose to implement a theocratic state system, Iraq pursued territorial expansion and economic development, and Libya created an expansive welfare system and aimed to bring water and currency stability to the African continent. Neither of the three nations interfered with the interests of the United States of America (hereinafter: USA). Yet, all three nations were subject to different forms of North American aggression: Libya was targeted from within through the development of ideological organisations; Iraq was directly invaded; and Iran is still subject to massive economic sanctions. This article is placed at the intersection of national interest, legitimacy and human psychology. It highlights the ambiguity in the cases of Iran, Iraq and Libya, as the USA attacked all three nations in the name of its own national interests – paradoxically because those nations pursued theirs. We will explore some of the core features of the respective nations’ pursuit of national interests before mainly focusing on the findings that arise from the observations at a systemic perspective. The main objective is not to give an account of the three states’ history but to derive an understanding of state behaviour in the context of national interest. Our main hypothesis is as follows: The relative nature of goals in non-devletist systems creates inherently unstable and contradictory value systems.
National Interests in Iran
Iran is one of the oldest civilisations in the world. It needs to be stated that the timeframes that we look at here are not extensive enough to harm the Persian society sustainably. Nonetheless, within the past 70 years, Iran has experienced difficult political situations that ultimately resulted in the Islamic Revolution of 1979. It was at that point that Iran decided to rigorously eliminate external influences from domestic politics. Before, the Anglo-Soviet invasion of Iran in 1941 started a decade-long intervention in Iranian politics. With the British extending influence in Iran and its resources, the missing financial capabilities of Iran went to England. Further, the British presence also led to spillover effects, such as the involvement of the USA. As a close ally and societal successor of Great Britain, the USA used the British presence to also establish itself in the region due to the slowly emerging Cold War with the Soviet Union – this, for example, is a perceived national interest. In 1946, the USA pressured the Soviet Union to withdraw from Iran and in 1953, the USA, together with their British ally, organised a coup in Iran to overthrow the Prime Minister Mohammad Mosaddegh, who nationalised the Iranian oil production, which was previously controlled by the British, who, in turn, gained 80% of the revenue from the oil production. The British and North Americans decided that they did not want to pay regular market prices for Iranian oil – they had an interest in securing a vital developmental resource for a cheap price. As an important additional effect, they received the unconditional loyalty of Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, meaning that the Soviet Union could not exert socialist influence over Iran. In other words, the Europeans and neo-Europeans were strongly invested in gaining political control over Iran for their own national interest. Conflict arose when Iran, in turn, wanted to pursue its national interests, and as a consequence of the conflict, control was even tightened.
The same pattern of state behaviour can also be observed in the later course of Iranian history. After the Islamic Revolution in 1979 led to the establishment of a theocratic state in Iran, the European and neo-European states began to isolate Iran. Through economic and diplomatic means, it was aimed to exclude Iran from the international stage. Even accusations that Iran was developing weapons of mass destruction that it would use against other nations became part of the strategy against Iran. An important point to note here from a systemic perspective is that such state behaviour does not directly further the interests of the USA. With the Islamic Revolution, access to cheap Iranian oil was cut off and buyers of Iranian oil had to pay the regular market price. The USA could have just accepted that as the sanctioning of Iran did not directly add to the funds of the USA (quite the contrary) and only served to harm Iran. When looking at the underlying reason for this, we see that this is a systemic dynamic, stemming from the relative nature of the non-devletist political system of the USA. If furthering one’s own interest is not possible, others need to be harmed to uphold the relative power discrepancy between actors. This is exactly what is happening here and what we will also see in the examples of Iraq and Libya. When a non-devletist state, especially those with loose normative footing, cannot exert influence over the political and/or economic system of a state in a significant form to exploit value for itself, it will turn towards harming that very state so that the other state does not gain power and come closer to the detrimentally acting state.
National Interests in Iraq
The situation in Iraq is much different from that in Iran. While we have to acknowledge the economic talent of former President Saddam Hussein, who uplifted the Iraqi economy to unprecedented levels in 1990, his harsh and egoistic policymaking has also destroyed much of the value he created for his nation. On the positive side, Saddam Hussein protected Iraq’s oil reserves and utilised them to invest in the economy. He was versatile in applying different strategies by investing in a mix of agriculture and infrastructure. Using different methods like privatisations and liberalising measures, the Iraqi economy quintupled under Saddam until 1990 – this level was only matched again in 2011. Even after the economy completely collapsed with the start of the First Gulf War in the early 1990s, it recovered remarkably fast and only turned down again with the Second Gulf War in the early 2000s. We could follow from the above that the foreign intervention in Iraq, similar to Iran, was primarily motivated by the Iraqi pursuit of national interests that clearly improved its economic position in the world. However, Saddam Hussein was rather untalented in the realm of diplomacy. His harsh party politics and the diplomatic conflicts with Iran and Kuwait, as well as violent societal policies, gave international actors enough material that could be used to legitimise intervention in Iraq. This ultimately opened the door to the First Gulf War. Saddam Hussein’s deteriorating reputation also served as a foundation for foreign powers to accuse him of developing weapons of mass destruction, leading to the Second Gulf War.
However, just because Hussein’s missing talent in most political spheres, except economics, led to detrimental politics, it does not follow that foreign intervention in Iraq was solely motivated by containing the brutal President of Iraq. Hussein gave away enough reasons, but the main motivating factor to intervene was, again, national interest. Neither did the USA intervene in Rwanda or the Balkans during the 1990s – there was simply no national interest at stake. The same holds true for recent examples, such as Sudan and Yemen. While Sudan has no economic resources or strategic value that the USA could utilise, Yemen holds a very important strategic position, which is why we can observe the USA’s involvement there. Therefore, the situation in Iraq serves as a good example that uncovers what the main motivation for the two prolonged wars of the USA was.
National Interests in Libya
The most striking example of all is the situation in Libya. Under the leadership of former Head of Government, Muammar Gaddafi, Libya experienced profound phases of economic growth. Gaddafi emphasised the importance of education and healthcare. He introduced free education and universal healthcare, made housing free, as well as water and electricity. Funding for these measures came from the oil revenues of Libya, which increased due to privatisations. Because of that, diplomatic pressures emerged and his person was increasingly viewed critically by Europeans and neo-Europeans alike. Moreover, Gaddafi was a skilled diplomat. His normative foundation emphasised the cooperation of Arab nations, as well as African nations, both regions to which Libya belonged. Next to sharing resources, such as water and oil, as well as building joint infrastructures, Gaddafi proposed the introduction of an African currency based on gold. Such a currency, backed by physical value, would have had profound effects on the economy of the African continent, making it potentially one of the most valuable currencies in the world. As we have indicated above, the relative nature of the non-devletist states in Europe and North America made them view this positive pursuit of national interests in Libya as a negative development, as it weakened the relative power and perceived national interest of such nations.
Additionally, Gaddafi developed the Great Man-Made River Project, a large-scale water supply system that could have meant water autarky of the whole of Northern Africa if managed sovereignly – the world’s most arid region. Naturally, this meant that the relative power of Europeans and neo-Europeans would have further decreased as more than one state would have developed faster. With dramatically decreasing renewable fresh water resources, water dependency has been exploited as a political weapon – especially in regions where water is already scarce. Gaddafi aimed to change that, but with the Libyan price tag. Today, the Great Man-Made River water supply system is intact; however, due to the fragmentation of Libyan politics, it is not efficiently managed, and it is very probable that the factions made resource concessions in return for military support. Further, the system is often subject to sabotage as a strategic aim between the conflicting factions. Ultimately, Gaddafi’s reforms and his long-term vision for his nation could have had significant effects on Libya. Instead, they led to several interventions in Libya, as well as extensive institution-building that fuelled antagonistic ideological streams in Libya. Ultimately, the internal build-up of such movements against Gaddafi resulted in the Arab Spring of 2011, which then expanded to paralyse the whole of Arabia.
Structural Reasons and National Interests
From the above, many inconsistencies become quite clear. However, such state behaviour is not so inconsistent after all when adopting a systemic perspective. The primary goal of non-devletist states is to be relatively better than other states, primarily measured through economic power. At the individual level, we can observe that individuals are in direct competition within the capitalist market to be better than the other, not to be good per se. While absolute value forces us to solely focus on our own development, relative power aspirations, naturally, give us three options: i. Self-centred development, ii. Sabotage others’ development, and iii. Both. Within the contemporary capitalist democracy, the most efficient way to be materially successful is to go with option iii., as the distance towards others is increased the fastest with this approach.
When states are not informed by devletist principles, the same logic is visible. In the case of the leading powers of our time, this is especially visible. States, just like individuals, have the perception that power and material means are the main components of success. The relative nature of these components forces states to view others as competitors in an antagonistic way. For a non-devletist state, the goal is not to be a good state but merely to be better than the others. When states talk about national interest, this is essentially what they mean. Therefore, national interest is not a concept that is universally definable in terms of its content, but in its structure of application. For example, sustainable and innovative economic growth is a universally positive component of statecraft. It is good in absolute terms, which means that states ought to aim for it because it benefits them. However, when we look at it from the perspective of national interest, it is only a positive component of statecraft for the state that is pursuing sustainable and innovative economic growth. For other states, it means that the relative wealth they have, measured against the economically growing state, is decreasing. Within contemporary capitalist democracies, other states’ perceived national interest could be to harm the economically growing state with the sole purpose of upholding the economic and, consequently, socio-political distance towards that state. In other words, national interests are subjective. When pursuing them at home, they are welcome. When others pursue theirs, they are bothering.
In the name of national interests, the USA has destroyed many societies in the past century. However, when we examine the cases specifically, the common denominator of the destroyed societies is that those states pursued their national interests as well, arguably more legitimately than the USA. A common critique here is that European and neo-European states apply a so-called double standard in their state behaviour. This is not true because their behaviour is very consistent with the findings above. It is a misconception to believe that national interests within contemporary political systems are constant and absolute; they are variable and relative. Quite the opposite is the case: European and neo-European states are extremely predictable in their behaviour because of the subjective nature of national interest. Whenever another state is investing in itself to develop, it will intervene due to the perceived danger of loss of power. Iran wanted to structure politics the way its society saw fit. Iraq protected its national economy. Libya furthered Pan-Arabism and Pan-Africanism. All of the states withdrew from external influence. All of them were attacked.
Structural Reasons and National Interests
With the above, we underline that contemporary political systems produce unstable value systems. What is normatively good or bad is not assessed in its absolute value, such as “how does that benefit the citizens or nature?”. Rather, the measurement of normativity is self-centred: “how does that benefit our citizens or state?”. Further, the assessment framework is the power discrepancy between one’s own state and others. This ultimately leads to a dilution of values. All other virtues and principles are undermined and become worthless because they are subordinate to the goal of increased power distance between states. Devletist states, in turn, are quite the opposite.
Because the ultimate purpose of any devletist system is to reach the full understanding of the universe through the process of genuine knowledge production, there are no conflicting national interests. For one, the path to the objective truth through genuine knowledge production is unique for each state, due to the uniqueness of each state’s societal properties. Secondly, devletist systems are inward-looking. They do not concern themselves with other states in terms of power distances. Based on an absolute ontology, its normative framework clearly and reliably differentiates between good and bad. Virtues do not change with perceived national interests. That way, sustainable and innovative economic growth, for example, remains a positive component in every national context. Devletism’s structural strengths allow states to have unique national development paths that, however, are all aiming for one ultimate goal. In other words, there is only one national interest that is true for all states. Since every state is pursuing it from its unique place, the paths converge, instead of intersecting. This is one of the more significant reasons why devletism is a superior state system to contemporary political systems. When politics moves towards the implementation of devletist systems, developments, such as in Iran, Iraq and Libya will be tragedies of the past.
