2025 BRICS Summit in Brazil

This article examines the outcomes of the 2025 BRICS Summit in Brazil and assesses what they reveal about the bloc’s role in shaping global governance. It analyses the expansion of BRICS into a broader coalition of emerging economies, the internal challenges reflected in the absence of key leaders, and the implications for multipolarity and the Global South. The BRICS organisation (short for Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa) has evolved from a mere acronym into a significant political coalition, serving as a platform for multipolar governance. Established in 2009 in response to demands for a more equitable global order, BRICS has progressively broadened its purpose and, more recently, its membership. The 17th BRICS Summit underscored both the bloc’s growing importance and the obstacles it faces. Critical considerations include the absence of China and Iran at the leadership tier, the potential role of Türkiye as a candidate state, the participation of entities such as the African Union (hereinafter: the AU) and the United Nations (hereinafter: the UN), and the implications of these developments for the Global South’s increasing influence.

Outcomes of the Last Summit in Brazil

The latest BRICS Summit was significant in multiple aspects. Scheduled for July 2025 in Brazil, it will be the inaugural summit to incorporate additional member nations beyond the original five. The 2023 Johannesburg Summit unexpectedly announced the expansion of BRICS, inviting six nations: Argentina, Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, Saudi Arabia and the UAE, to join the group. This growth signified the bloc’s increasing aspiration to encompass a wider segment of the developing globe. During the 2025 Rio de Janeiro conference, leaders embraced the inclusion of new members, expanding BRICS from a five-member organisation to an eleven-member coalition. The enlarged coalition now collectively represents roughly fifty percent of the global population and twenty-five percent of worldwide gross domestic product (hereinafter: GDP), according to its own assessments. These figures highlight BRICS’s self-perception as “a forum for cooperation between nations of the Global South and a counterweight to the Group of Seven (hereinafter: the G7), (Al Jazeera, 2025)” which is the coalition of European and Neo-European powers.

Summit Declaration and Key Themes

The summit produced a joint declaration titled “Strengthening Global South Cooperation for a More Inclusive and Sustainable Governance.” This document reaffirmed many longstanding BRICS priorities and outlined new areas of collaboration. Chief among the outcomes was a call to reform multilateral institutions – a recurrent BRICS theme since the first summit in 2009. The Rio declaration reiterated demands to restructure the United Nations system including expanding the UN Security Council to give permanent seats to nations, such as Brazil and India, and to re-weight global financial institutions; namely the World Bank and International Monetary Forum (hereinafter: the IMF), to reflect today’s economic realities. BRICS leaders emphasised that global governance must become more inclusive and fair, echoing their long-standing grievance that European and Neo-European nations have “obstructed reforms” in institutions like the IMF that would give less affluent nations a greater voice.

Beyond institutional reform, the summit communiqué touched on pressing global issues from a Global South perspective. In the realm of climate change, BRICS agreed on a framework for joint action and signalled a coordinated stance ahead of the United Nations Climate Change Conference (hereinafter: the COP30), emphasising that more nations need to be involved more deeply in climate governance. On emerging technologies, the members advocated more inclusive global discussions on artificial intelligence governance, noting that many nations are often underrepresented in such debates. Notably, the declaration also addressed current conflicts and security concerns: it called for peace in Gaza amid turmoil in Sub-Anatolia and condemned recent aggressions on Iran, one of BRICS’s new members, as well as attacks on Russian infrastructure. This solidarity statement underscores how BRICS is positioning itself as a champion of global security concerns, in contrast to European and Neo-European silence or complicity on some of these issues.

Tangible Initiatives

The latest summit did advance at least one significant new project. Leaders agreed to explore creating a BRICS investment guarantee mechanism, inspired by the World Bank’s Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (hereinafter: the MIGA). This proposed “BRICS Multilateral Guarantees” initiative would offer political risk insurance to investors funding infrastructure and global development projects. The aim is to facilitate more globally diversified investments by reducing risk, which is a role usually played by Neo-European institutions. By building such parallel institutions, BRICS continues its strategy of creating an alternative architecture for global finance and development. Indeed, since its founding, the bloc has launched the New Development Bank (hereinafter: the NDB) and a Contingent Reserve Arrangement, both intended to reduce dependence on the IMF/World Bank system. The new guarantees agency, if realised, would further solidify BRICS’s capacity to provide development support outside existing institutions’ channels.

Importantly, no discussion of a BRICS common currency or immediate “de-dollarisation” breakthrough was announced in Rio, despite much speculation beforehand. The idea of a BRICS currency or reducing reliance on the currency of the United States of America (hereinafter: the USA), the dollar, has gained attention, especially with Russia and Iran facing European and Neo-European sanctions. And indeed, de-dollarisation is high on the BRICS agenda, led by China and Russia. For years, BRICS statements have called for diversifying the global currency system and settling more trade in local currencies. At the 2025 summit, however, internal disagreements kept any dramatic currency proposal off the table. The members are not yet unified on how far to go in challenging the dollar’s dominance. Instead, the summit likely focused on incremental steps: expanding bilateral currency swaps, promoting the use of alternatives like China’s currency, the Yuan, in trade, and strengthening institutions like the NDB and Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank. This cautious approach reflects recognition of BRICS’s internal diversity. In fact, the USA had issued stern warnings: USA officials, under the first government of now re-elected President Donald Trump, openly cautioned BRICS against “anti-dollar” moves, with the President even threatening tariffs on any state aligning with BRICS policies to undermine the dollar. Such external pressure may have tempered BRICS’s public actions on monetary reform, even as members quietly work on reducing dollar dependency.

In summary, the last summit’s outcomes balanced bold ambition with pragmatism. There were strong declaratory commitments, urging a multipolar order, reforming the UN and Bretton Woods institutions and championing the Global South’s interests in areas from climate to digital governance. There were also concrete steps: expanding membership, launching an investment guarantee plan and coordinating policies. Yet, the absence of headline-grabbing initiatives like a new currency indicated a careful, consensus-based approach. As the declaration’s title suggests, BRICS 2025 was about “strengthening cooperation” and laying the groundwork for more inclusive governance, rather than announcing revolutionary changes overnight. The true test will be whether the bloc can translate these commitments into actions in the coming years.

Notable Absences and Internal Challenges

A notable aspect of the 2025 BRICS Summit was who was not in the room. For the first time since its establishment, two founding presidents of BRICS did not attend a summit in person. Chinese President Xi Jinping’s absence from the Rio meeting, officially attributable to a “scheduling conflict,” is largely interpreted as indicative of China’s internal concerns. Indeed, Beijing has been contending with domestic economic pressures, and Xi’s absence indicated that his focus was directed inside. It was the first occasion in more than ten years that Xi did not attend a BRICS summit, even in a virtual capacity. The Chinese delegation was led by Premier Minister Li Qiang. Russian President Vladimir Putin, similarly, did not visit Brazil in person. Potentially owing to an International Criminal Court (hereinafter: the ICC) arrest warrant for alleged war crimes in Ukraine, he participated only via video link. As an ICC signatory, Brazil would have been duty-bound to arrest him had he set foot in the country. Notably, a comparable situation occurred in Mongolia: although it is also an ICC member, when Putin conducted a state visit to Ulaanbaatar on 3 September 2024, Mongolian authorities did not detain him, despite the global court’s binding arrest warrant, citing energy dependence and a policy of neutrality. Consequently, Russia was represented on-site by Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, while Putin participated in the session virtually. The notable omissions obviously prompted inquiries regarding the coherence and credibility of BRICS. When two of the most influential members are absent, people speculate about internal tensions and the extent of dedication.

Alongside Xi and Putin, other leaders from the newly admitted member states were also absent. The President of Iran did not participate in the Rio summit due to a period of political transition in the state. Similarly, Egypt’s President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi and the President of the UAE, Mohammed bin Zayed, did not attend the meeting, delegating high-ranking deputies in their stead. The sole new members completely represented by their heads of state were Ethiopia, with Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed in attendance, and Indonesia, whose President Joko Widodo participated as a new BRICS member. The African representatives, South Africa’s President Cyril Ramaphosa, and Brazil’s President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva were present and engaged, albeit also “preoccupied” with preparations for significant forthcoming events: South Africa’s G20 summit in 2025 and Brazil’s COP30.

The pattern of absences indicates internal difficulties among BRICS’s enlarged membership. It emphasises that BRICS is not a cohesive coalition with stringent commitments; participation is voluntary and may be influenced by domestic or legal considerations. China’s situation indicates that even a prominent advocate of BRICS may occasionally favour internal stability or bilateral engagements above international summits. The situation in Russia illustrates how external geopolitical elements, such as sanctions and legal prosecutions, can impede comprehensive participation. The inconsistent attendance of the new members indicates that those states are still acclimating to the bloc.

The omissions reveal a fundamental contradiction within BRICS: the organisation aims to reform global governance to benefit the Global South, yet its members possess varied interests and occasionally conflicting obligations. Xi’s absence, attributed to domestic economic challenges, suggests that China’s priorities may diverge from its advocacy for BRICS, as it must first address its decelerating economy and strained relations with the USA. Putin’s legal challenges highlight a dichotomy in values: BRICS members advocate for international law and sovereignty, yet one of their principal leaders is sought worldwide for aggression, placing partners in uncomfortable situations. Simultaneously, India and China persist as strategic adversaries within BRICS, as do Iran and several Gulf Arab nations; these rivalries may hinder cohesion. The increasing variety of BRICS, although a source of strength, also engenders internal inconsistencies that hinder a cohesive stance on certain problems. Fractures have arisen about the de-dollarisation agenda; China and Russia are keen to diminish the dollar’s prominence, whilst India and others exhibit caution due to India’s fraught relations with China and its integration into the European and Neo-European financial system. Likewise, divergent foreign policy orientations result in BRICS frequently encountering difficulties in reaching consensus on substantive security or human rights stances beyond vague declarations.

The absence of China’s and Iran’s senior leaders at the recent meeting, coupled with Russia’s virtual attendance, indicated significant strain, yet not an indication of collapse. Instead, they underscore the pragmatic reality that BRICS nations prioritise national interests above all. In the future, the legitimacy of BRICS will depend, in part, on the extent to which its principal leaders reaffirm their strong personal engagement (reinforcing the perception of unity) and whether systems are established to guarantee consistent high-level participation. The assessment of internal cohesion will intensify as the organisation expands and addresses more significant matters of global reform.

BRICS and the Global South: Rising Importance and Recognition

The expansion of BRICS and its recent summits underscore a broader phenomenon: the rising importance of the Global South in world affairs. BRICS has become both a symbol and an instrument of this trend, as developing nations seek greater agency in a multipolar international system. The inclusion of states like Iran, Egypt, Ethiopia and others has bolstered BRICS’s claim to speak for the Global South at large. In particular, African and Middle Eastern participation has increased, addressing earlier criticisms that BRICS was too “Asia-centric” or limited in representation. South Africa’s President Cyril Ramaphosa, when chairing the 2023 summit, explicitly framed the event around Africa’s interests – the theme was “BRICS and Africa: Partnership for Mutually Accelerated Growth, Sustainable Development, and Inclusive Multilateralism”. Ramaphosa invited the leaders of dozens of other states (67 nations were represented) to attend the Johannesburg BRICS summit as observers or guests. This outreach reflected a conscious effort to make BRICS a platform for the Global South, not an exclusive club. “We want to use this opportunity to advance the interests of our continent,” Ramaphosa declared, emphasizing that BRICS would focus on helping to develop Africa. Indeed, one tangible result was the decision at that summit to bring Ethiopia – Africa’s second most populous state – into BRICS, alongside Egypt, which straddles Africa and West Asia.

The active involvement of the African Union and other regional bodies has further cemented BRICS’s role in South-South cooperation. The AU, representing 55 African states, has been participating in BRICS-Plus meetings in recent years. While not a BRICS member (the bloc’s membership is nation-based), the AU is increasingly treated as a partner. One important detail is that the AU regularly attends BRICS annual summits, as it now does at the G20. This became reality in 2025: the AU Commission Chairperson was invited to the Rio Summit’s sidelines, signalling that Africa’s voice is heard in BRICS deliberations. Far from choosing between forums, the AU seems set on engaging with both Neo-European groups, such as G20 and BRICS, to maximise Africa’s influence. This dual approach can be mutually reinforcing: by leading platforms of regional organisations in BRICS-Plus, the AU can strengthen its hand in the G20 as well. In short, African participation in BRICS is part of a larger strategy of the Global South to build coalitions and demand a seat at the table of global decision-making.

The presence of the United Nations Secretary-General at the 2025 BRICS summit also speaks to the bloc’s increasing recognition. UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres attended the Rio meeting, which can be considered a significant gesture, given that the UN does not usually involve itself with non-universal groupings. Guterres’s participation and address to BRICS leaders signified an acknowledgment that BRICS is a key stakeholder in international issues, from development to peace and climate. It also reflected BRICS’s clout: with 11 members, including two permanent UN Security Council (hereinafter: the UNSC) members, namely China and Russia,  and major contributors to UN programs, the bloc’s consensus can influence UN outcomes. Notably, BRICS has consistently advocated UNSC reform, seeking to include more states from the rest of the world (Brazil, India, and now arguably an African seat) as permanent members. The UN chief’s outreach to BRICS may indicate a willingness to listen to these calls. Additionally, by engaging BRICS, the UN acknowledges the need for inclusive multilateralism – a theme BRICS champions. Guterres himself has spoken of the need to reform the global financial architecture and address the inequities that developing states face. In a way, BRICS provides a political backing for such reforms, acting as a collective voice of the Global South within and alongside the UN.

From a theoretical lens, the ascent of BRICS and the Global South can be seen as part of a power transition in the international system. Power Transition Theory posits that as rising powers gain relative strength, they will challenge the status quo set by the dominant powers. BRICS embodies a collective power transition: China and India’s rapid growth, along with others, is shifting the economic centre of gravity eastward and southward. Already, by some measures such as purchasing power parity GDP, the BRICS core five have surpassed the G7 in share of world output. This gives weight to their demand for greater representation. Neo-realist scholars, like John Joseph Mearsheimer, would interpret BRICS as a balancing coalition, which is a group of states banding together to limit the dominance of the hegemon. Indeed, dissatisfaction with US hegemony in financial systems, for instance, dollar dominance and sanctions; and governance structures has been a strong motivator for BRICS cooperation. Even soft-power theorists, such as Joseph Nye, might note that BRICS projects an attractive narrative of “South-South cooperation” and a fair multipolar world, which draws other states toward it not by force but by persuasion and example. The bloc’s emphasis on principles like sovereignty, equality and non-interference resonates with many developing nations that have historical grievances about European and Neo-European intervention and conditionality.

However, the true test of rising importance is effectiveness. Critics point out that beyond statements, BRICS must deliver results for the Global South, whether in providing development financing, reforming rules or coordinating policies on trade, health and technology. So far, the record is mixed. For example, on one hand, intra-BRICS trade has expanded and mechanisms like the NDB have funded dozens of projects, from renewable energy in South Africa to transport infrastructure in India. On the other hand, BRICS has not yet fundamentally altered global economic governance; European and Neo-European powers still hold sway in the IMF and World Bank, and the dollar remains dominant in trade and reserves. Moreover, the social and development performance of BRICS states themselves has been uneven – only China and India have substantially improved their economic standings in recent decades, whereas Brazil, Russia and South Africa have struggled. China’s advances are particularly tied to its Belt and Road Initiative, which has bound an increasing number of nations into infrastructure projects and yuan-denominated financial transactions, thereby internationalising its currency and gradually reducing reliance on the dollar. At the same time, the surge in commodity exchanges operating within China has given Beijing greater influence over global pricing, especially in strategic sectors such as energy and metals. Together, these developments have positioned China as the economic engine of BRICS, enabling it to project financial leverage and reshape aspects of international trade dynamics even if systemic reforms at the IMF or World Bank remain elusive.

Türkiye’s Potential Role

Türkiye attended the 17^th BRICS Summit in Rio de Janeiro as a partner nation, with Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan representing Ankara in light of its candidacy for full membership. At the summit, Türkiye emphasised its dedication to multilateralism, showcasing its initiatives in global health, climate action and digital innovation as contributions to collaboration within the Global South. Although Türkiye has not yet attained official membership, Fidan asserted that the nation will maintain a strong involvement with BRICS, emphasising the bloc’s role in international reform, regional stability and an inclusive economic framework.

Türkiye distinguishes itself among nations pursuing closer relations with BRICS due to its distinctive geopolitical position. Türkiye, a longstanding NATO member and EU candidate, has adopted a progressively autonomous foreign policy under President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, aligning more closely with the goals of the Global South. Erdoğan initially expressed interest in BRICS during the 2018 Johannesburg conference, humorously suggesting the rebranding of the bloc to “BRICST.” Subsequent to the 2023 expansion of BRICS, which included the admission of Egypt and Iran, Türkiye officially submitted its membership application at the 2024 Kazan summit, attended personally by Erdoğan.

Türkiye’s motives arise from Erdoğan’s aspiration to elevate it to a “global power” by the centenary of the Republic in 2053. Aligning with BRICS provides economic diversity and access to emerging markets, while politically, Türkiye might become the inaugural NATO member within the bloc, acting as a conduit between East and West. Turkish officials emphasise that BRICS membership would not contradict NATO commitments but rather enhance Ankara’s multi-faceted diplomacy. However, Türkiye’s journey towards complete membership encounters challenges. Notwithstanding Erdoğan’s assertive diplomacy, some BRICS members remain wary. India allegedly opposed Türkiye’s accession, presumably due to Türkiye’s affiliations with Pakistan and ongoing conflicts concerning Armenia and Cyprus. China harbours apprehensions regarding Türkiye’s historical backing of Uyghurs, while Russia exercises caution due to divergent interests in Syria and previous military engagements. Brazil and others may perceive Türkiye’s ideological trajectory as partly compatible but not entirely aligned with their own national contexts. These geopolitical tensions have engendered mistrust within BRICS, despite the recognition of Türkiye’s strategic significance.

As a result, BRICS granted Türkiye the designation of “partner state” in late 2024, allowing for participation in summits without voting privileges. Turkish Trade Minister Ömer Bolat characterised this as a “transition process,” although Ankara maintains that full membership is the objective. Officials privately acknowledged that partner status “does not meet Türkiye’s demands,” although the nation persists in constructive engagement, aiming to alleviate worries among core members. If Türkiye ultimately attains full BRICS membership, the ramifications would be substantial. As a geopolitical link between Europe and Asia, and a G20 economy, Türkiye might enhance BRICS’ worldwide legitimacy. Its presence may also motivate other middle powers, such as Nigeria or Mexico, to perceive BRICS as an inclusive alliance rather than only a consortium of non-European states. Türkiye might potentially mediate between BRICS and the European nations, due to its connections with both Russia and NATO, as demonstrated by its involvement in the Ukraine grain corridor negotiations.

Nevertheless, Türkiye’s admission may also reveal problems within BRICS. NATO obligations may limit the alliance’s forceful stances, while Ankara’s transactional diplomacy, which is navigating relationships with Russia, China and the West, could raise concerns regarding its dependability.  Türkiye’s involvement in BRICS eventually signifies a wider trend: the emergence of intermediate powers exercising strategic autonomy or “multi-alignment.” Similar to India and Saudi Arabia, Türkiye rejects binary geopolitical classification, seeking to enhance its global influence. The impact of this approach on BRICS’ cohesion is still to be determined; nonetheless, Türkiye’s participation will certainly influence the bloc’s developing character and the multipolar framework of the 21^st century.

Future Directions and Implications for Global Power Dynamics

As BRICS moves forward after its latest summit, several future directions and their broader implications can be discerned.

1. Deepening Economic Integration and De-dollarisation: A key trajectory for BRICS is to enhance economic cooperation among members in order to reduce dependency on European-dominated systems. This includes efforts toward de-dollarisation, promoting the use of local currencies in trade and financial transactions to bypass the US dollar. Over the past decade, BRICS has built critical financial infrastructure toward this goal: the New Development Bank to fund projects without dollar-based loans, the Contingent Reserve Arrangement to provide emergency liquidity in lieu of the IMF, and initiatives like the BRICS Cross-Border Payment System and local currency swap lines. At future summits, we expect BRICS to continue working on a framework for greater use of national currencies. For instance, Russia and China have already shifted a majority of their bilateral trade to Ruble and Yuan settlements following sanctions, and India has explored rupee trade arrangements with partners including Russia and Iran. A BRICS digital payment network is reportedly under discussion, leveraging technologies like blockchain to facilitate cross-border transfers outside SWIFT. Some members (notably Russia) have even floated the ambitious idea of a common BRICS currency for international trade. While this is unlikely in the short term, given economic disparities and political trust issues, its mere consideration signals an appetite for bold alternatives to the dollar system. The pursuit of an “optimum currency area” among BRICS, as some scholars term it, faces steep challenges, but continued research and pilot projects like linking digital payment systems can be expected. The implication of successful BRICS financial integration would be significant: it could erode the dollar’s global dominance over time, limiting the West’s ability to use sanctions and financial leverage, and possibly giving rise to a more multipolar monetary order.

2. Institutional Evolution – “BRICS Plus” and New Mechanisms: The expanded membership of BRICS is likely to spur the evolution of the BRICS+ concept. Rather than a rigid expansion to dozens of states, BRICS seems to be adopting a hub-and-spoke model: a core group of members, plus various layers of partnership such as the “strategic partners,” “observer states,” and the new “partner state” status. This flexible geometry allows BRICS to widen its influence without losing manageability. We will likely see annual BRICS+ outreach forums continue, where regional organisations (like ASEAN, the African Union, CELAC in Latin America, etc.) are invited to dialogue. It positions BRICS as the centre of a network of Global South cooperation. Another expected development is the strengthening of BRICS’s own institutions. The New Development Bank may expand its membership further as Bangladesh and UAE joined as shareholders, and increase its lending capacity, potentially issuing bonds in local currencies. The proposed BRICS Guarantee Agency will be refined, aiming to be operational by 2026. There are even discussions of collaborative ventures like a BRICS ratings agency to counter European and Neo-European credit rating oligopoly or a BRICS research network to share technological innovation. Each new institution or framework under BRICS adds to what was discussed as an emerging “parallel order” – not meant to overthrow the existing one, but to pressure it to reform by the European Union.

3. Continued Push for Global Governance Reform: BRICS will persist in championing reforms at the United Nations, Bretton Woods institutions, and other frameworks. A near-term focus is likely to be on the United Nations Security Council. With Brazil, India and now potentially South Africa aspiring to permanent UNSC seats, BRICS as a bloc gives weight to their case. China and Russia have already endorsed both India and Brazil’s bids in principle, as noted in multiple BRICS declarations. We can expect BRICS forums to coordinate positions on UNSC reform and perhaps rally support from the broader Global South to press the issue at the UN. Similarly, at the IMF and World Bank, BRICS finance ministers will likely continue to voice demands for quota reforms to increase non-European states’ voting power. If European and Neo-European resistance persists, BRICS might intensify efforts to use their own financial institutions as alternatives. Notably, even climate governance has come under BRICS’s purview now, with a coordinated BRICS stance for COP30 being prepared. This could be significant: by speaking in unison, BRICS can influence global climate deals, pushing for equity and technology transfers.

4. Expansion vs. Cohesion – Striking a Balance: The future of BRICS will also hinge on how it manages the trade-off between expanding membership and maintaining cohesion. The 2023-2025 enlargement is a test case. If the eleven-member BRICS operates smoothly and demonstrates added value from the newcomers, it could embolden the bloc to consider admitting other major applicants like Nigeria (Africa’s largest economy) or Mexico (a leading Latin American voice) down the line. On the other hand, if internal divisions grow, BRICS may hit pause on further expansion. BRICS’s agenda has become bloated, and its normative consensus is thin as membership grows. A “back-to-basics approach” may be needed to solidify the core cooperation before adding more members. Therefore, one likely future direction is consolidation: focusing on a few deliverable initiatives that benefit all members, to cement the group’s relevance. South African International Relations Minister Naledi Pandor has spoken of prioritising “practical cooperation” in areas like vaccine research, energy security and skills development among BRICS states, which directly impact their populations. Delivering on such fronts would strengthen internal buy-in. Only then would an expanded BRICS be attractive and credible. Thus, the expansion question remains open-ended; a calibrated, slow growth is probable, balancing geopolitical inclusivity with functional coherence.

5. Implications for Multipolarity and the West: Finally, in terms of global power dynamics, BRICS’s trajectory is both a product and accelerator of multipolarity. The unipolar moment of American dominance after the Cold War is clearly receding, and a more multipolar order – with multiple centres of power – is emerging. BRICS, along with forums like the G20, Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (hereinafter: SCO), and others, is a manifestation of that change. The success of BRICS in any of the above endeavours would further tilt the influence towards non-European states. For instance, if BRICS states and their partners increasingly trade in their own currencies or through new institutions, the leverage of the USA and EU will diminish. This could constrain European and Neo-European ability to unilaterally impose policies on others, requiring more negotiation and compromise in international economic relations. In geopolitical terms, BRICS provides diplomatic cover for its members’ interests: China and Russia can claim they are not isolated superpowers but part of a broader consensus; India and Brazil can leverage BRICS to amplify their voices on the world stage. Over time, this could lead to a “concert of powers” style global governance, where no single bloc can dominate, forcing a more pluralistic dialogue on global issues.

Conclusion

The 17th BRICS Summit signified a pivotal moment in the bloc’s development and the overarching ascent of the Global South. By means of expansion and unified demands such as advocating for UN Security Council reform and promoting stronger South-South cooperation, BRICS has positioned itself as a force aiming to transform, rather than merely critique, the global order. The absence of the leaders of China and Iran, along with Russia’s virtual involvement, highlighted the challenges of coordination within a heterogeneous alliance. BRICS showed resilience and strategic foresight, indicating its increasing significance in multipolar geopolitics. The future influence of BRICS will hinge on its capacity to sustain unity, achieve significant results, and uphold its ideal of inclusive global governance. If successful, it might foster a more pluralistic world order, characterised by equitable power distribution and the genuine inclusion of developing nations’ voices.