Yaba: The Drug That Is Shaping Geopolitics In Southeast Asia

In 2023, a record 190 tons of methamphetamine was seized in Southeast Asia, according to a report by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (hereinafter: UNODC). This methamphetamine-based stimulant, known as the “madness drug” or “Nazi speed,” has swept through Southeast Asia like wildfire, leaving a trail of addiction, crime, and political turmoil in its path. Meaning “crazy medicine” in Thai, Yaba has emerged as a key figure in the complicated interplay between politics, economy, and security in the region.

This article provides an examination of the Yaba crisis, taking into account its historical background, socioeconomic effects and geopolitical ramifications. In the first section of the study, a historical review of the Yaba production is provided, followed by an examination of the institutional issues that Southeast Asian nations are confronted with in battling the Yaba trade, with an emphasis on systemic corruption and its effects on legal and law enforcement procedures. The evaluation of several policy proposals intended to resolve the Yaba crisis is presented in the final section of this work.

Historical Context

Yabas origin dates back to World War II when soldiers used methamphetamine to boost their alertness and combat tiredness; it is believed that Yaba originated from leftover methamphetamine stocks developed during World War II. The German military was among the first to publicly distribute the methamphetamine-based narcotic “Pervitin” to its soldiers. This was made possible by the fact that post-war military surplus materials, including drugs, frequently ended up in underground markets and that unemployed people who had learned how to make methamphetamine during the wartime period told locals about their firsthand knowledge. The illicit drug trade changed and expanded throughout Southeast Asia in the decades that followed the conflict, especially in the so-called “Golden Triangle” area that connects Myanmar, Thailand and Laos. At first, the Golden Triangle was famous for producing opium, which was a major source of heroin for the entire globe. But in the 1990s, there was a noticeable shift toward the manufacturing of methamphetamine, with Yaba emerging as a well-liked and extremely profitable substitute. Numerous reasons contributed to this shift, such as the intensified attempts to end opium cultivation, the ease of producing methamphetamine and the rising demand for stimulants in both urban and rural regions.

Over the past years, the Golden Triangle has experienced a substantial transformation through a series of significant political and economic reforms. This process of reform has been particularly pronounced in the areas of economic liberalisation and financial sector restructuring. While these changes have improved living standards, they have also led to an increase in illegal activity, particularly the drug trade. In the 2010s, for example, Myanmar started to open up its economy after decades of military control and isolation. Increased cross-border trade was made possible by this development, but it also gave drug traffickers additional ways to operate under the cover of lawful trade. Also, the communist states of Laos started implementing market reforms in the 1980s and has been gradually assimilating into the world economy. Although this integration has been beneficial to the nation’s economy, it has also increased its vulnerability to transnational crimes, such as drug trafficking. This issue has become worse as Southeast Asia’s transportation infrastructure has generally improved. In addition to facilitating lawful trade, improved ports, airports and road systems have given drug traffickers more effective ways to move their illegal products over international borders.

Southeast Asian states have been severely affected by the widespread use of Yaba, which has escalated to crisis proportions in the region, due to intense tax evasion and societal damages through the use of the drug. Because this synthetic drug is so widely available and affordable, it is quite extensively used throughout all socioeconomic groups. Yaba addiction causes serious issues regarding physical and mental health, including aggression, paranoia and cognitive decline, which puts more strain on the already overburdened healthcare system, not to mention the long-term effects on education and the economy. In addition, the crisis has fractured family bonds, undermined community cohesion and increased crime rates because of addicts resorting to violence and stealing to feed their addiction, which diminishes public safety in general. Both addiction and incarceration cause significant productivity losses in the workplace, leading to lower economic growth in the long term. Next to not being able to engage in genuine knowledge production themselves, addicts and traffickers have a massively negative influence on the systemic achievement of genuine knowledge production.

The Socioeconomic Impact Of The Yaba Crisis

The increasing Yaba trade has significant economic implications for both producing and consuming countries in Southeast Asia. In 2019, the UNODC estimated its value between 30,3$ billion and 61,4$ billion. Given the consistent growth trend, the UNODC has estimated that by 2024, the value will increase significantly, between 70$ billion and 100$ billion. Traditional state-centric paradigms of governance and security have been put to a test by the illicit drug trade, which has resulted in significant changes in regional power relations. This phenomenon aligns with the explanatory framework of realism international relations, which holds that anarchy in the international system correlates with security and power considerations. Analogous, Maslow’s pyramid of needs can be looked at to draw a parallel to the personal level. As the drug trade is extremely profitable, bringing in billions of dollars a year, non-state actors have become more prominent and established semi-structured governance systems, which has led to a heightened sense of urgency for international action. Emerging non-state actors frequently function in transitional areas with weak state authority, and this has resulted in the development of de facto autonomous areas that serve as self-governed regions within states. Moreover, the drug trade exacerbates existing socioeconomic inequalities, perpetuating cycles of poverty and dependency. While a small elite of traffickers and corrupt officials accrue substantial profits, poor farmers and labourers in production areas often find themselves coerced or economically pressured into participating in the narcotics industry. Surely, this dynamic complicates attempts at economic development and poverty reduction by creating a complex structure of interdependent economic relationships across national boundaries.

The geopolitical dynamics in Southeast Asia have seen a notable change in power dynamics and interstate relations due to drug production. Myanmar, in particular, has been impacted since it has become a vital hub for the region’s narco-economy. Neighbouring states, particularly China and Thailand, have increased their diplomatic and economic pressure on Myanmar to reduce drug production to safeguard their citizens. Thailand, as one of the principal markets for Yaba, has experienced severe socioeconomic and public health repercussions due to the influx of narcotics from Myanmar. In response, the Thai government has implemented stringent anti-drug policies, characterised by a combination of law enforcement measures and demand reduction strategies. These policies, while aimed at mitigating the domestic impact of drug abuse, have also had significant implications for Thailand’s diplomatic relations with Myanmar. Thai authorities have repeatedly called for more consequent action from Myanmar to suppress drug production, occasionally resorting to unilateral measures such as temporary border closures to stem the flow of narcotics.

Furthermore, the surge in drug trafficking through China’s Yunnan province, which shares a border with Myanmar, has prompted Beijing to intensify its border security measures and exert diplomatic pressure on Myanmar. China’s significant economic influence in the region, particularly through the Belt and Road Initiative (hereinafter: the BRI), a massive infrastructure development plan, has provided it with additional leverage to push for stronger anti-drug measures. China has made significant investments in Myanmar’s industrial, energy and infrastructure sectors through this initiative and utilises the infrastructural influence to achieve change in the detrimental societal situation of Yaba trafficking. Beijing has deeper economic integration with Myanmar than other nations, which usually use economic sanctions or conditional aid as leverage, whereas China has been encouraging the crackdown on illicit activities by offering increased investment in legitimate industries in drug-producing regions, adopting a more constructive approach. Therefore, China can push for proactive changes without straining diplomatic relations and craft a long-term solution with increased future resilience.

Cross-Border Tensions and International Relations

The Yaba issue has also affected the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (hereinafter: ASEAN) cooperation. Although ASEAN has a strong anti-drug commitment, as demonstrated by its Drug-Free ASEAN 2015 goal, which aims to enhance drug laws and establish efficient prevention and treatment programs, the organisation has had difficulty implementing these policies into practice on a regional scale. ASEAN lacks strong mechanisms to ensure compliance with regional agreements, relying largely on voluntary cooperation. The principle of non-interference in member states’ internal affairs, a cornerstone of ASEAN, has led to limited collective action against drug production and trafficking. However, the failure of ASEAN to successfully address the spread of Yaba in Southeast Asia can be ascribed not only to the organisation’s non-interventionist principle but, more importantly, to the widespread problem of corruption among its constituent nations. If all member states would unanimously agree on constructively tackling the issue, coordinated action by ASEAN would certainly follow suit quickly. As the topic is the production, distribution and use of a dangerous drug, the stance of the member states should be clear and being outspokenly in favour of battling the drug is more than agreeable, we must follow the economic and political considerations of member states lead them to covertly keep operations going. It has become easier to develop intricate networks of political patronage thanks to the enormous amount of money generated by the illegal Yaba sector and some of these networks have even gone so far as to directly fund political campaigns. Drug traffickers and political organisations have a mutually beneficial relationship that creates a protective cycle that progressively integrates the drug trade into the political and economic systems of the states involved.

Empirical evidence suggests a concerning pattern of compromised integrity within law enforcement and judicial systems, especially regarding evidence tampering. Evidence tampering in drug prosecutions and incidents where important evidence materials disappear or are altered without explanation is extremely common. These cases point to senior law enforcement officials or judges participating in the tampering. Such incidents cast serious doubt on the impartiality and effectiveness of these actors in the fight against the drug trade. Furthermore, there is evidence of systemic corruption due to the pattern of selective enforcement, in which authorities target smaller operators disproportionately while seemingly avoiding action against larger, more politically linked trafficking networks. In addition to undermining the legitimacy of anti-drug initiatives, this selective use of law enforcement strengthens the hierarchies of power, which allows the Yaba trade to continue growing.

Moreover, inadequate systems for accountability and transparency are among the other institutional corruption issues that many ASEAN members face. Several member states have weak laws protecting whistleblowers, which acts as a major disincentive to people who otherwise might come forward with important information about corruption. This gap in the law effectively muzzles possible intelligence sources that could be useful in breaking up corrupt networks and stopping the drug trade. Additionally, the effectiveness of internal affairs divisions and anti-corruption organisations is frequently jeopardised by a lack of true independence or enough funding. When investigations include high-level corruption involving politically significant individuals, this institutional weakness is more evident. This leads to an environment of impunity, further entrenching the systemic corruption that supports the Yaba trade and making it impossible to adequately investigate and punish cases of corruption at the highest levels of authority.

Policy Suggestions to Mitigate the Yaba Crisis in Southeast Asia

The proliferation of Yaba in Southeast Asia has emerged as a critical challenge, posing significant threats to social structures, economic development and regional security. This concluding section presents an analysis of a series of proposed interventions aimed at addressing this issue.

Firstly, enhancing ASEAN’s role is paramount in combating the Yaba epidemic. The establishment of a dedicated ASEAN Drug Control Agency with enforcement powers is crucial. Here, a one-time power transfer in the realm of combatting the production, proliferation and use of drugs must happen to shield the agency from constant interference by various states. This entity would facilitate the implementation of binding regional agreements on drug control and information-sharing, transcending the current model of voluntary cooperation. Given the transnational nature of the Yaba trade, a regional task force should be instituted to coordinate cross-border operations effectively. Moreover, the expansion of international partnerships is imperative, including deepened cooperation with organisations such as UNODC and INTERPOL, as well as the development of bilateral agreements with key partners like China for intelligence sharing and joint operations.

Nevertheless, a comprehensive strategy that aims to address the entire system that promotes corruption is needed to address the issue of Yaba proliferation in Southeast Asia, since traditional anti-corruption approaches alone are insufficient in this regard. Conducting a comprehensive inquiry into those who benefit from drug-related corruption within government agencies and law enforcement is imperative. The investigation would make clear the intricate connections and money transfers that underpin the illegal actions associated with the Yaba trade. In this way, policymakers can create targeted and successful interventions by identifying important players and recognising their modus operandi. For example, tracking ambiguous financial transfers would give authorities the ability to spot questionable patterns of public official income and spending. Strong asset recovery procedures would be combined with this kind of system to guarantee that gains obtained through fraud can be effectively confiscated and used for the benefit of society. This strategy works as a deterrent and aids in eliminating the financial incentives that fuel corruption. Furthermore, this policy could be complemented with the creation of tailored amnesty programmes for corrupt officials. These programmes would offer corrupt officials an opportunity to disclose their involvement in drug-related corruption without facing the full severity of legal consequences; rather than granting blanket immunity, this approach advocates for a carefully managed accountability process that prioritises systemic reform over individual retribution. This method acknowledges that corruption is not always the result of moral failings but rather structural factors and a sense of lack of options.

Additionally, economic development and the provision of alternative livelihoods are critical in addressing the root causes of drug production and trafficking. Substantial investments in alternative development programs are crucial, providing subsidies and technical support to facilitate farmers’ transition to legal crops. Also, efforts should be made to develop local industries and job opportunities in drug-producing regions. These initiatives must be integrated into broader poverty reduction strategies and improved access to education and vocational training in vulnerable communities.

Finally, expanding treatment and rehabilitation services through increased funding for addiction treatment programs and community-based rehabilitation initiatives is paramount. Furthermore, the decriminalisation of drug use can shift the focus from punitive measures to treatment, more effectively addressing the health-related aspects of Yaba consumption.

In conclusion, the Yaba issue demonstrates both the potential and limitations of international cooperation. On one hand, it has led to joint declarations, information sharing and some coordinated law enforcement efforts. On the other hand, it has exposed the weaknesses in existing regional institutions and the challenges of aligning different national interests. Addressing the Yaba problem requires a comprehensive approach that goes beyond simplistic enforcement-led strategies. It calls for regional cooperation, innovative policy thinking and a careful balancing of competing interests and ethical considerations. However, if the circumstances remain the same, there is little that would incentivise corrupt political actors to change just like that. As it is with nearly all political change systems, they need to address the elimination of detrimental incentives and personal interests to shift the focus to productive measures in resolving issues and fostering effective national development. The way Southeast Asian nations and the international community respond to this crisis will have far-reaching implications not only for regional stability but also for global approaches to drug policy and transnational challenges. If the right measures to eliminate detrimental interests are adopted, an important step of importing this approach into international customary law will be taken.