This work is the Bachelor Thesis by our founder Emre Şentürk, submitted in May 2017 at the Faculty of Arts of the University of Groningen. The thesis was submitted within the core module “Thinking the International in Historic Context” as part of the “International Relations/International Organisation” Bachelor programme, and received a passing grade of 3,3/4.
I. Introduction
One of the more puzzling events of the 20th century was the emergence of the state of Israel. Jews merely constituted an approximately 10% minority in Palestine, while the rest of the population was Arab in 1914.[1] However, the Zionist movement was somehow able to ultimately establish a nation-state in Palestine, where they were highly underrepresented. Further, a huge part of the population that constitutes today´s Israel immigrated from abroad (especially Europe) to Israel. How was that possible? There are many different opinions and views on this phenomenon. Central to all the approaches is the importance of the role of Great Britain in the state-formation process. During the First World War, it quickly became clear that the Ottoman Empire was severely weakened and not capable of surviving this war. At the same time, Great Britain was already concerned with the partition of the Ottoman lands, an issue which has become known as the so-called ‘Eastern Question’.[2] As regards the region of Palestine, there are many dimensions to be considered when analysing the state-formation of Israel in that region. First, why did the British assume that there would be a partition of the Ottoman lands? Second, why did the British assume that they played any role in this partitioning? Third, what interest did the British have in the region? Fourth, why did the original inhabitants of this region, the Arabs, not gain sovereignty? And finally, why was the territory ultimately granted to the Jews?
The state-formation process of Israel has received a great deal of scholarly and public attention ever since. Although the focus today has shifted increasingly from state-formation to the Arab-Israeli conflict, which has emerged after the founding of Israel, the process leading to the founding of Israel has never lost any of its controversy, both in the public as well as in the academic sphere. Throughout the debate, there are many different arguments that are brought forward to explain the founding of Israel under these unusual circumstances for a nation to establish a state. Among them are structural arguments, which suggest that the strong institution-building of the Jews was the main factor that led to the founding of the state. Others have adopted a propagandist view on the issue, arguing that the propaganda made by the Zionist leaders affected the British government so much in its decision-making that it ultimately led to the formation of Israel.[3] Yet another view emphasises the inner-political divide among two factions in British politics, in which the “reformist” faction of former Prime Minister Herbert H. Asquith favoured preserving the Ottoman Empire, whereas the “radical” faction under the leadership of Lloyd George aimed at dismantling the Ottoman Empire and partitioning it.[4]
All these arguments are valid and have played their roles, to a greater or lesser extent, in the process that eventually made the founding of Israel possible. However, this work will argue that there is another, overriding factor that can account for the developments from 1914 to 1948. Racism has played a crucial role in the decision-making process that ultimately produced policies that favoured the Jews over the Arabs on the issue of who is to be granted power over Palestine. The increasing amount of research on race and utilising the racial lens has shown that many phenomena can be understood better and in more depth with an attentive attitude towards race relations in politics.[5]
This work treats the early phase of the founding process of Israel from a racial perspective. At its core is this research question: “What racial underpinnings of the British government have influenced the state-formation process of Israel”? Asking and answering this question aims at filling a gap in the academic debate about a crucial, but often overlooked, dimension of the state-formation process of Israel. Most of the arguments within the debate focus on the three aspects that I have mentioned above. Therefore, it is important to constructively expand the debate beyond the mainstream arguments and widen the view on the issue.
Beginning with the exploration of the concept of race in International Relations (hereinafter IR), this section is intended to establish a better understanding of this concept. This is especially important due to the recent establishment and low prominence in the academic discipline of IR. Being familiar with the concept enables one to develop an attentive attitude towards race relations. Additionally, I will also establish what I understand by the concept of race, because the following analysis will be based on this understanding. With this attentiveness, a racial reading of texts and events becomes possible and enables us to find new and sometimes more accurate accounts for questions that arise out of the texts and events. Further, I will provide an overview of the academic debate about Israel´s state-formation process and where this work can be placed in it. This will further illustrate the importance of this work to the understanding of the process leading to the establishment of Israel.
In the next part, the research design and argument will be explained in detail. This work´s methodology consists of a racial reading of two historic texts, in combination with the historic events that accompanied the creation of those texts. Due to the considerable amounts of primary sources from that time that are available, I have limited the timeframe to the period between 1915 and around 1919, instead of examining the full period from 1915 to 1948. More importantly, however, the limitation to the early phase of the policy process leading to the state-formation also has a methodological advantage. As it is with every political decision that has to be taken, the options in this case are closer to an equal consideration in the beginning, rather than in the later course of policy-making. Limiting the scope of analysis to the early phase is, thus, a least-likely approach, which utilises the so-called Sinatra-Inference: “If it can make it here, it can make it everywhere”.[6] This means that, if it is able to identify racial underpinnings from the outset, then it can be strongly assumed that the same and maybe additional racial underpinnings shaped the policy process throughout the whole period up until the founding of the Israeli state in 1948.
Finally, findings are explained. In this part, the events between 1915 and 1919 are put into perspective. There were many conferences, statements and relationships that can be looked at with a racial lens. At this point, a strong theoretical basis will already exist based on the previous parts of the work. Serving as the foundation of the actual research, these concepts and structures will help to develop a different understanding of the policy process of the examined period. An important part of this analysis is going to be the comparison between the Hussein-McMahon Correspondence of 1915/16 and the Balfour Declaration of 1917. These two authoritative documents, addressed to the Arabs and Jews respectively, contain promises of administrative rights of Palestine to both sides. The wording of the two documents is going to be analysed on the grounds of race.
The core argument of this work is that the British government favoured a Jewish rule over an Arab rule, due to racialised conceptions of the two groups.
II: Theoretical Framework and Academic Debates
II.1. Debating Israel´s Establishment
Apart from the problems and conflicts that arose after Israel´s founding, its very establishment itself has received a great deal of scholarly attention in numerous attempts to make sense of its founding. The circumstances under which Israel became a state in Palestine differed significantly from most other states´ road to their own autonomous state. Prior to 1900, the Jewish population of Palestine constituted less than 10%.[7] However, it was during the last decade of the 19th century when the Jewish immigration waves to Palestine (Aliyahs) started, and the Jewish population of Palestine started to grow.[8] Paired with increased Zionist activism, Jews started to increasingly voice demands to settle in Palestine and establish an independent Jewish state. The striking characteristic of this process is that the state-formation process was initiated from abroad and aimed at a territory which was already populated by another ethnic group for many centuries. Although this scenario already sounds unusual, the Jews were ultimately able to form the state of Israel in Palestine.
Many scholars have looked at this event in the history of Palestine from different perspectives. Among them, there are an inner-political argument, a structural/institutional argument and a propagandist/lobbyist argument. Trying to explain why the Jews formed a state after the partition of the Ottoman lands, as opposed to the Palestinian Arabs, the inner-political perspective argues that the power struggles within the British government at that time led to different policy preferences in many areas, including the approach towards the ‘Eastern Question’. The liberal government of then Prime Minister Herbert Henry Asquith (1908-1916) favoured the preservation of the Ottoman Empire and its lands.[9] However, his war secretary at that time, David Lloyd George, took a different stance towards the ‘Eastern Question’, supporting a partition of the lands and aiming at a great proportion under British control.[10] The inner-political argument emphasises the declining popularity of Asquith´s government due to its wartime setbacks and the growing popularity of the conservative populist Lloyd George at that time, who favoured the partition of the Ottoman Empire.[11] Without this inner-political struggle, the argument goes, the formation of an Israeli state would have been significantly more difficult for the Zionists.
However, due to the change in the inner-political dynamics, the Zionist movement gained momentum and shifted from a passive to an active approach in the Palestine question. Due to the uncertain situation in Britain, the issue of Palestine only occupied a secondary point on the Zionist agenda. It was not until late 1914, when the ‘wait and see’ politics of the Zionists turned into a lobby that was pressing for increased Jewish settlements and a Jewish state in Palestine.[12] This was triggered by Turkey´s entry into the war, because the Zionists considered it to be too weak to survive the war. Many believe that the intensive lobbying by the Zionists was the main factor in pushing the Zionist agenda of a Jewish state.
A third argument holds that the Jewish settlers from abroad had significantly more money than most of the local Arab population and organised themselves better. Proponents of this argument believe that the Jewish settlers conducted effective institution-building in Palestine because they utilised their knowledge and expertise from abroad (mostly Europe) on the one hand, and were driven by a common purpose and, thus, had an ideological basis for their organisation on the other hand.[13] From this perspective, the Jews were ultimately more successful in building a stable and functioning political order in Palestine. Paired with their internal ideological coherence provided by Zionism, the Jews outpaced, according to the argument, the rural, traditional, loosely-organised Palestinian-Arab population in their mission to gain independence from the British.[14]
II.2. Race in International Relations
While all these arguments are acknowledged to have influenced the state-formation process and eventually the founding of Israel, I want to emphasise another factor that has influenced the process to an extent, I argue, exceeding the influence of the previously outlined arguments. I want to discuss the influence of racial underpinnings by the British that might have shaped the political preference of one group over the other. It is important to note at this point that the British government has promised the Arabs autonomy over the Ottoman lands populated by Arabs, and they have later promised the Jews their own independent state in Palestine, which is within the territories promised to the Arabs. In order to make sense of all this, it is important to explore the concept of race and racism in International Relations in more detail.
Race studies in IR are increasingly gaining prominence within the field. Depending on the research at hand, racial analyses are conducted by post-structuralist, post-colonialist, constructivist and even feminist scholars. Mostly, analyses that contain race as their pivotal point in their research involve the identification and dismantling of certain types of power relations that came into existence by, or reinforce, racial preconceptions.[15] In most cases, scholars identify great harms experienced by the (involuntary) party to that power relation that is acted upon. Further, scholars often include a critique of these power relations on material and ethical levels. The critique, in turn, is mostly intended to raise the attentiveness towards these power relations, but in some cases, research is even conducted to uncover hidden race relations. The topics of race studies can, therefore, be various. Many scholars – for example, Krishna, Davenport or LeMelle – were concerned with racialised conduct of research and knowledge production in IR.[16] Additionally, the case study method is widely used in race studies, looking at certain phenomena like Apartheid segregation, discourse in politics, the aftermath of colonisation and many other forms of power relations that are based on racial discrimination. However, “no consistent analysis has been applied to the problems of international racial conflict and integration”, although “race has become a central problem of international politics”.[17] Part of this problem of racial analysis is that race relations come in many different forms and, accordingly, are treated differently. Christian Davenport, for example, attempted to draw attention to racial problems and dogmas within the study of IR by putting his own experiences as a scholar into perspective.[18] He explains how racial assumptions shape the research that is conducted, as he says that “it was assumed by most of my fellow students and professors in graduate school that as an African-American I would study African-Americans”.[19] At the same time, he encountered that Africa itself in all its aspects was suffering the label of unimportance within the scholarly world and was therefore often overlooked and left for the Blacks to research it.[20] Correspondingly, African-American scholars were perceived to be unimportant. Robert Knox, on the other hand, focused on a very different form of race and racism in IR: he looked at it from a legal perspective. He argues that the military interventions of powerful white nations in the rest of the world are often portrayed as “’civilising mission[s]’, in which the role of law is to racialise peripheral territories in such a way as to justify the intervention of advanced capitalist powers”.[21] The states that are invaded are seen as underdeveloped and their citizens as victims, and this view constitutes a legal justification for the white invader to justify the intervention, not to the invaded state and its citizens, but to their own citizens and other powers that it regards on ‘eye-level’.[22] “International legal personality was linked to ‘civilisation’,” which is in turn linked to the racial preconceptions of the invading white states.[23] Although in a different context, Tilden LeMelle and George Shepherd give a possible explanation for the dividing parameter between civilised and uncivilised. They argue that one of the reasons is the higher technological capabilities of white nations, compared to the rest of the world, which is, in contrast, non-white.[24] These nations “perceive themselves to be dominant internationally” and utilise the “high technical capability with which they subordinate other groups perceived as non-white”.[25] Further, they identified value assumptions that reinforce and strengthen the racial conceptions.
“The centripetal white dominance system is best characterised by its values assumptions, which are messianic and ethnocentric. Virtue is assumed to exist primarily in what is white and Western, and evil is equated with blackness and the assumed irreligious ways of non-white societies.”[26]
As a result of the two assumptions that racism on the international political level attaches legal standing according to the civilised/uncivilised divide and that this divide stems from superior value and technology assumptions of one’s own race, the white race practically divided the world into two mutually exclusive groups: whites and non-whites. However, while the rest of the non-white world is not a culturally and politically coherent entity, the white world is “united in a common bond of whiteness to dominate the black, brown, and yellow peoples of the world”.[27]
Although there are many more facets to race studies than I have outlined above, these are some core concepts that will be utilised to analyse Israel´s early state-formation process.
III. Methodology
Analysing events and phenomena from a racial perspective is often a difficult task. First and foremost, because people usually do not identify themselves as racist, nor do they use racist vocabulary very explicitly. In fact, many times people are not aware of the fact that certain types of behaviour are racist, discriminatory or excluding. It is even possible that victims of racism become racist or act in a racist manner. Because it is very difficult to know the genuine intentions of people, analyses in race studies tend to assume that the racist behaviour is unintentional and unconscious. The aim of these analyses is often to expose these racialised power relations. Similarly, the aim of this work is to identify racialised thoughts and patterns of behaviour. In order to do that, I am going to utilise the notions outlined in the previous part.
First, I am going to put the broader situation in context. Therefore, the ideas of Knox are going to be of much help in understanding why the British saw an intervention as necessary or natural in the first place. What is it that made the British believe they were entitled to intervene in the Middle East and assume control over territories after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire? What does the assumption or idea of intervening in affairs of people that are totally unrelated to the own people stem from? Answering these questions from a racial perspective can show that racism exists in the first place, or not. If the questions cannot be answered by drawing upon the abovementioned notions, then it will be very difficult to analyse all the events following the decision to establish control over Palestine. If, however, the answers to these questions are to be found by adopting a racial lens, then the likelihood of racism being existent in Britain´s relationship with Palestine is considerably increased and paves the way to look at specific racist rhetoric and conduct that ultimately led to a more favourable attitude towards the Jews and eventually to the founding of Israel. This approach can be categorised as a least-likely approach, because it is applied on the logic that if racism can be found in the outset of any conduct with Palestine, then it is more likely that it was also existent in the later course of interaction.[28]
Similarly, the least-likely approach is also going to be applied to the following part of the analysis. Continuing with analysing primary sources and the social context from the early phase of British conduct with Palestine from 1914 to the early 1920s, the idea is again to argue that if racism towards the Palestinian Arabs is to be found in the early phase, then it is more likely to find racism in the later developments up until the founding of Israel. First, the Hussein-McMahon Correspondence and the Balfour Declaration are going to be compared to each other. Then, the rhetoric of government officials is going to be the focus of the analysis to understand the preference of the Balfour Declaration over the Hussein-McMahon Correspondence. In the last instance, the social context is going to be analysed, because it can supplement the understanding of the previous findings.
A useful tool to extract meaning from both texts and social context is discourse analysis. However, because there are many forms of discourse analysis, it is important, for the purpose of this work, to utilise only one form of it. Since one of the central themes of this work is the concept of race and racism, and because these are, as defined earlier, forms of power relations, it makes sense to utilise a discourse analytical tool that includes power relations in the analysis. Foucauldian discourse analysis does just that. He argued that language is a vehicle of power relations to exercise power and shape the reality.[29] Therefore, discourse can never be detached from its social context, according to Foucault. This use of this type of analysis makes especially sense in this work, because the primary sources from that time do not necessarily show a rhetoric that is undisputably racially biased. However, if the social context is added to the analysis of the texts and if there are overlaps between the rhetoric and the social context of the British government of that time, then these racial underpinnings are less contestable and, thus, pose a stronger justification for continued racialised behaviour. Further, the Foucauldian discourse analysis focuses on power relations as well. Race studies itself is a field that explicitly focuses on one specific form of power relation, which is race. Accordingly, the Foucauldian discourse analysis is a theory that also covers the power relational part of the analysis.
Conducting this type of discourse analysis, the rhetoric of government officials and authoritative texts of the time between 1914 and the early 1920s will be analysed, aiming at extracting meaning from them that shows racial underpinnings. Additionally, the social context will be put in perspective. Here, the relationships between high-ranking government officials and Zionists and Zionist involvement in the policy-making process are going to be analysed. This can be especially helpful to support earlier findings from the rhetoric. Giving meaning to the social context also has the advantage that it shows the embeddedness of certain patterns of behaviour and thoughts, and that the rhetoric is merely the final product of these thoughts in the form of verbal and textual expression.
Generally, the approach adopted in this work can be criticised from various standpoints. Mainly, it can be argued that even the analysis of the general foreign policy, the rhetoric and the social context does not necessarily have to mean that there was racism involved in Israel´s state-formation process, because it is impossible to know the genuine feelings and thoughts of the people involved in the process. However, if that is the only way to identify attitudes and thoughts, then it is impossible to find out anything about the attitudes of people in any case and analysis in that field would become obsolete. It would also be impossible to argue that there were no racial underpinnings at all. Another possible point of critique, however, could be whether a least-likely approach is sufficient to sustain that the racial underpinnings also existed after the examined period. This argument is difficult to sustain due to the psychological nature of racism. As already examined earlier, it is a social construct that affects mental properties or exercises and that is mostly done unconsciously and sometimes even unintentionally, because of the social surroundings and context. Therefore, these patterns of behaviour and thought are deeply rooted in the mental construct, if they are present, and are difficult to overcome, because they are socially reinforced. The possibility exists, but the later course of history has shown that the pro-Zionist attitude of Britain has been sustained and deepened, while antagonism against the Palestinian Arabs has severed. Yet another possible point that can be criticised methodologically is that racism might not be the main factor that led to the establishment of Israel in the end. Many scholars maintain that other developments prevailed, as outlined before. However, I justify that racial argument, from this perspective, overrides the propagandist, structural and inner-political arguments with the comprehensive and deep racial bias that structured the whole discourse and conduct of British foreign policy as a main prerequisite that allowed the other factors to develop further in the first place. Again, I do acknowledge these arguments, but believe that the racial argument can explain this event in history better than the others for the abovementioned reasons. This work aims to add a new dimension to the debate about Palestine and the creation of Israel.
IV. Race, Racism, the British, the Arabs and the Zionists
IV.1. Territorial Arrogance
When looking at the history of Palestine over the last century, one will not come around realising that the British were involved in many matters, especially in the early phase during and after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. From the entry of the Ottoman Empire to the First World War in late 1914, the British realised that the Ottoman Empire was not strong enough to survive the war and made plans for territorial gains in the Middle East.[30] But where does this idea come from? What kind of link is there between the decline and eventual collapse of a political entity and the appropriation of its former territories by others? Of course, there is no natural link. These are two totally unrelated things, until certain conditions are fulfilled that make the latter a logical consequence of the former event. This link or precondition is racism. A racist attitude in this territorial aspect stems from a perception of superiority over the other races of the periphery. White societies from Europe and America perceived themselves as a dominant group and exercised dominance not only within their borders against non-whites, but also internationally.[31] These societies connected their high colour-awareness with material standards and subordinate groups that do not comply or fulfil the standards that are required to be perceived as ‘civilised’.[32] ‘Uncivilised’ societies are often also described as the ‘periphery’, which again emphasises the racial arrogance and self-proclaimed importance of whiteness. Additionally, non-Europeanness or non-whiteness is interpellated with savagery and attaches these societies with the label of passive victims who are not able to free themselves from their savagery, in order to become civilised.[33] Notions like these led the European societies to two different, but often interlocking assumptions: either that these savage cultures must be civilised or that, because they are inferior, there is a natural right to appropriate their land and property. This type of discourse enabled the Europeans to think about intervening in foreign countries in the first place. In the case of Palestine, the intention was not so much to civilise the Arabs and free them from their ‘savagery’, because the strategic consideration to secure the Suez Canal prevailed and will be examined below.[34] However, the notion that the British believed to be superior to the Arabs or non-Europeans and non-whites in general led to their increased interventions abroad. What has become known as colonisation was solely possible because the British and other colonialists believed in their racial superiority and derived a right to intervention from it.[35]
Considerations to intervene in Palestine originate from the notion of protecting India, one of the most important territories that the British have appropriated during the course of their colonisation. India was by far one of the greatest and most important colonies of the British. It was a great economic market overseas and accordingly lifted the British economy in England.[36] The Indian population, however, was oppressed, exploited and discriminated against by the British.[37] This alone shows a clear case of racism. However, this racism did not stop there. In order to safeguard this important colony, the British needed to exercise effective control, which was especially difficult because of the immense distance between the two territories. The Suez Canal in Egypt, however, made it possible for the British to shorten the distance by many thousands of kilometres that had to be travelled by sea route around the African continent.[38] Accordingly, the Suez Canal became a strategic point that the British wanted to control, which they also did, because of their already great influence in Egypt at that time.[39] But the racial logic went so far that the British saw it necessary to also protect the North-Eastern side of the Suez Canal, and there is Palestine. So, the British appropriation of Palestine stems from the strategic wish to safeguard a canal from a specific front, because this canal made it easier for the British to trade and correspond with a region that is several thousand kilometres away.[40] This region, in turn, was exploited, and the population was mistreated by the British, because this led to an increased material gain for British people in England. From this perspective, it seems clear that the very idea of intervening in territories and societies abroad in itself is an inherently racist practice, which has a deep underlying belief of racial superiority at its core.
IV.2. Hussein-McMahon and Balfour
Turning to the events in Palestine that resulted from this thinking, there are two documents that are indispensable in this analysis: the Hussein-McMahon Correspondence and the Balfour Declaration. The former consists of a series of ten letters (July 1915 – August 1916) that were exchanged between the Sharif Hussein of Mecca and Henry McMahon, the High Commissioner in Cairo at that time. In the first letter on 14 July 1915, the Sharif expressed a desire to achieve an independent Arab state, formulated some conditions for this independence and asked for the support of the British government.[41] As a response, McMahon referred to an earlier letter, “in which was stated clearly our desire for the independence of Arabia and its inhabitants, together with our approval of the Arab Khalifate when it should be proclaimed”.[42] From this wording, it is clear that this constitutes an unambiguous expression of a policy preference, namely the rule of Arabs in the region. Further, this unambiguity is emphasised in the letter by McMahon from 24 October 1915. In this letter, he informs Sharif Hussein that the matter was communicated to the British government and that he is authorised to assure the Sharif of independence, with minor reservations.
“[…] I am empowered in the name of the Government of Great Britain to give the following assurances and make the following reply to your letter: 1. Subject to the above modifications, Great Britain is prepared to recognize and support the independence of the Arabs in all the regions within the limits demanded by the Sherif of Mecca.”[43]
This passage is important for several reasons. First, the document is authoritative because McMahon expresses that he is authorised to communicate such agreements. Second, he does not negotiate on behalf of the government at this point, but communicates its standpoint, which means that there was a full process of evaluation and decision-making, and its outcome was the preference for an Arab rule. Third, the British government even assured its support for Arab independence, which means that the government planned to actively advance the achievement of Arab independence. The matter seems to be resolved, and both the Arabs and the British seem to have achieved their goals. Throughout the correspondence, the Sharif ensured close and friendly relations, privileges and economic preference for the British in that region, which practically also secured the British interest in the Suez Canal.
However, merely a year later, the minister of foreign affairs at that time, Arthur Balfour, sent a letter to an influential person within the Zionist movement named Nathan Rothschild. Rothschild was the head of a wealthy international family in the banking industry; at the same time, many family members were active in politics throughout Europe, just as Nathan himself, who served many years as a member of the British Parliament. In this letter, Balfour expressed his support for the establishment of Jews in Palestine.
“I have much pleasure in conveying to you, on behalf of His Majesty’s Government, the following declaration of sympathy with Jewish Zionist aspirations which has been submitted to, and approved by, the Cabinet. ‘His Majesty’s Government view with favour the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, and will use their best endeavours to facilitate the achievement of this object, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country’.”[44]
The declaration is very short and vaguely worded. There is no clearly defined aim or promise, and it is worded very informally overall. However, this declaration quickly became the cornerstone of the Zionist movement, which always saw this as a promise or even guarantee that the Jews could establish a state in Palestine. It is also important to note that the word ‘state’ is not used in the declaration, and words such as sovereignty, territory, integrity and independence are also missing. Comparing these two documents, which are perceived as promises from both Arabs and Jews, the Hussein-McMahon Correspondence is much more authoritative, clear-cut and comprehensive than the Balfour Declaration. Nonetheless, the eventual outcome shows that the Balfour Declaration was valued higher than the Hussein-McMahon Correspondence. Unsurprisingly so, according to David Charlwood, who argued that “for many in London, the Near East [today Middle East] campaign itself was a sideshow and an Arab revolt [against the Turks] a sideshow of a sideshow”.[45] The British did not take the Arabs seriously, and their “prestige and perception of power were key to Britain´s strategy in the region”.[46] Both lack of interest and ethnocentrism are at play here, which underlines the racism that is involved in the decision-making process. Major Gabriel wrote in a special report to the war office that there is a “feeling in London that the Arab movement is unreal, shadowy and vague”.[47]
IV.3. The British discourse on the Arabs and the Jews
IV.3.1. Different Racialisation
It cannot be said that the British openly hated the Arabs or Muslims. However, the argument put forward in this section has at its core that the rhetoric by British statesmen shows that the British certainly did not attach the greatest interest or value to these people and acted like the Arabs just happened to be there without any say in the decision-making about the future of their own lands, which was due to different racialisations of Arabs and Jews by the British. William Mathews came to the same conclusion, saying that “Arabs, by London perceptions, could not be relied on to preserve any self-government granted them”.[48] But why? London was ill-informed about the Arabs at that time, so why did that seem to imply an inability for self-government? Since this work utilised the racial lens, it can be said, basing the argument on the concepts of the previous sections, that the Arab world was viewed as the uncivilised periphery, as opposed to the civilised centre. This is underlined by many government-internal records. For example, the term ‘Mohammedans’ is used frequently in these intern correspondences.[49] This term, however, was and is still perceived as offensive by Muslims, because it degrades the religion with Allah at its core to a movement or sect around one earthly individual.[50] At the same time, the term carries the same connotation for the British, who used this term so often and, thus, emphasised the civilised/uncivilised divide, because the religion is rhetorically downgraded. Additionally, Winston Churchill held for many years that “Jews […] would be much more trustworthy than Arabs as promoters of British interests”.[51] Interestingly, the Palestine Royal Commission Report (1937) or Peel Commission later evaluated the situation as follows:
“[T]he peace of the Middle East has been a cardinal principle of our foreign policy; and for the maintenance of that peace British statesmanship can show an almost unbroken record of friendship with the Arabs …”[52]
This statement is a direct contradiction to the untrustworthiness and inability that were ascribed to the Arabs previously to the report throughout the whole debate about Palestine.[53] As the rhetoric of the British suggests, the exact opposite of friendship seems to be underlying the whole relationship, at least from the British side. For example, a former British diplomat, Hugh O’Beirne, strongly supported the Jewish movement at that time, which can be a valid policy preference without involving any racism or anything related to that, but in addition to his support for the Jews, he also added that they should be “strong enough to cope with the Arab population”.[54] ‘Coping with the Arab population’ carries an inherently negative and degrading connotation, because it means to “deal effectively with something difficult”.[55] In fact, this was not only an individual opinion but a well-established common sense in the British government of the day. At various points, officials expressed their support and, moreover, desire for a Jewish rule in Palestine.[56] One important argument in favour of the Jews was that this Jewish state would be mainly constituted by Jews from Europe.[57] These people, it was held, had a higher standard of development, especially in the political realm.[58] The British had no doubts that the European settlers would be easily self-sufficient and more developed than the Arabs. Again, this is based on the civilised/uncivilised divide that has reoccurred throughout this work. Because the Jews came from Europe (from the centre), they were assumed to be further developed than the Arabs (periphery), who, so it was perceived, were far away from any development, organisation and culture. Especially clear, is this argument, when looking at a statement by the journalist and politician C.P. Scott, directed to the then Chancellor of the Exchequer and later Prime Minister, in 1914, in which he suggested that a Jewish settlement in Palestine would “develop the country, bring back civilisation to it, and form a very effective guard of the Suez Canal”.[59]
IV.3.2. Inclusion and Exclusion
Before the social context is analysed, there is one last aspect in the rhetoric that elevated the status of the Jews over that of the Arabs. Throughout the whole policy process, the closeness between the Jews and the British was emphasised. Churchill, again, asserted in 1920 that a “Jewish state […] would be especially in harmony with the truest interests of the British Empire”.[60] Here, the strongly positive attitude cannot be overlooked; ‘especially’ and ‘truest interests’ are hyperboles to emphasise the high value that he attaches to the Jews. In 1917, Balfour himself stressed “the desirability of winning their [the Jews´] sympathy”.[61] Mostly, the statements have solely an emotional aspect, like the two preceding quotes. At this point, it should also be noted that these statements were made during the First World War and times when anti-Semitism was widely spread throughout Europe. Winning the Jews´ sympathy was therefore also an important way to secure another ally in the war. As stated above, Jews throughout Europe were well organised and families, like the Rothschild family, were influential and wealthy. Nevertheless, Tom Segev described the resulting Balfour Declaration, therefore, as a product of “prejudice, faith and sleight of hand”.[62] Although the British had already promised, even assured, Palestine to the Arabs, there was another aspect to the process that led the British to abandon their promise and issue the Balfour Declaration. As mentioned above, racism does not only have an exclusive character, but is also strongly inclusive. “United in a common bond of whiteness” against all the other races, racism strengthens the closeness between whites.[63] However, the colour divide is not as obvious and decisive, because the Jews were themselves a marginalised group in Europe at that time and, thus, not necessarily equally valued as Christians.[64] At this point, it is important to note that while it is difficult to find out to what extent the Jews were perceived as an inherent part of the European Christians, it becomes clear from the rhetoric of British statesmen that the Jews were at least perceived to be closer to the Christian Europeans than the Arabs.[65] This was due to the many of the Zionist leaders who were wealthy and well-established people, which led the political class of Christian Europe to accept the Jews to be at least on approximately eye-level.[66] This logic is derived from Knox´s argument that the civilised/uncivilised divide is the crucial line that leads to racial discrimination. The divide itself is based to a considerable portion on the advancement of technology and in this point the Jews were much closer (at least it was perceived that way) to the Christian Europeans than the Arabs.[67] Thus, it would be inaccurate to state that the Jews and the Christian Europeans were one people against the Arabs, but it would be more accurate to recognise that Jews were racialised in a different way and that this racialisation moved the Jews much closer to the Christian Europeans, while at the same time distanced the Arabs. This can also explain why the British constantly undervalued the cooperation with the Arabs, while simultaneously exaggerating in their rhetoric towards the Jews, using hyperbolic language. In fact, a high-ranking advisor called the possible abandonment of the Zionist Mandate “an act of perfidy from which it is hardly too much to say that our good name would never recover”.[68] At this point it is important to note, that the mandate at that time was in place for only a year; on the other hand, the British conducted slave trade, colonisation, land theft and broke promises throughout the non-white world, however, only the abandonment of a mandate in Arab lands, which was granted to European settlers, constituted an act of perfidy. Sahar Huneidi explains this state of mind, saying that the British felt in some way obliged or honour-bound to realise the Balfour Declaration and the mandate.[69] Although the land was already promised to the Arabs, the promise to the Jews was of much more value, because of the racial underpinnings by the British that produced the understanding of the Jew being closer to the civilised European Christian. The racial logic led the British to assume that the Arabs are inferior to the Europeans on the one hand, and on the other, that the Jews are European, thus approximately on eye-level with the British, and therefore taken seriously, which is why the promise to them was valued.[70]
IV.4. Seeing Discourse in Context
Finally, I would like to turn to the social context. In this part, the proximity between the British government and Zionist Jews is a striking component. A great number of Zionists were high-ranking officials in the government or military, or were parliament members. Thus, these people had direct influence on the policy-making process of the British government. Naturally, they carried their ideological sentiment from the Zionist movement into their government business, since it is neither possible nor desirable to detach oneself fully from the private interests and thoughts one possesses. For example, Herbert Samuel, the President of the Local Government Board and later High Commissioner of Palestine and Liberal Party leader, was himself a Jew and a member of the Zionist organisation. Therefore, he supported the establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine and actively pushed this agenda forward.[71] Another prominent Zionist was Richard Meinertzhagen. He was a delegate for Britain at the Paris Peace Conference in 1919 and served as a military advisor for the government.[72]
But in addition to the Zionists within the government, there were influential non-Zionist politicians who sustained close personal and professional ties to influential Zionists. The most important person in that regard was David Lloyd George. He was known to have a very strong pro-Zionist standpoint and wholeheartedly supported the establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine.[73] One of his closest contacts was Chaim Weizmann, a Zionist leader, the President of the Zionist Organisation and later the first President of Israel. He was highly influential in the policy-making process, due to his close contacts with the British government, especially Lloyd George.[74] They met each other for the first time in early 1915, a meeting at which Lloyd George expressed that he was “very keen to see a Jewish State established”.[75] Weizmann, in turn, “focused his efforts on promoting radical ideas among British statesmen and leaders of public opinion” in order to support Lloyd George.[76] Interestingly, these two people were brought together by the editor of the influential Manchester Guardian, Charles Scott.[77] Scott himself was not a Jew; however, he also supported the Zionist cause, and his newspaper clearly reflected this standpoint.[78] Weizmann was well-connected to both the government and the press and, therefore, was able to effectively advance the Zionist agenda. The personal contact with Weizmann strengthened Lloyd George´s pro-Zionist attitude and, logically, the idea of an Arab rule became constantly more absurd. The prevalent racial bias was severed, and the racial logic of inclusion of Europeans and exclusion of non-Europeans was strengthened, too. Another actor who influenced the policy process was the head of a Jewish family, which had and still has immense influence on politics, due to their monetary capacity. Nathaniel Rothschild was known and well-connected within the high governmental ranks of Britain. Due to the close contact, he was called ‘Natty’ by the political and societal elite alike, another indicator of British-Jewish proximity and inclusion.[79] Rothschild was frequently invited to consultations, and unsurprisingly, it was found by both Lloyd George and Nathaniel Rothschild that granting the Jews the control over Palestine was the most logical solution.[80] But not only was Nathaniel Rothschild present in government business in Britain. Danny Gutwein stated that the Rothschild formed an integral part of the ruling elite in Britain. Accordingly, the standpoint of the family played an influential role in England and abroad.[81]
Seeing this social context from a racial perspective, the inclusion of Jews into the inner circle of British politics – especially on this matter – stems from the different racialisation of Jews, as opposed to the Arabs. As pointed out before, although it is difficult to find out whether Jews were perceived to be fully equal to the Christian Europeans, it was established that they are at least much closer to the Christian Europeans than the Arabs. This excludes the Arabs, and this exclusion is grounded in the belief of inferiority of Arabs to the European race. Again, both racial inclusion and exclusion complement and reinforce each other. At some point, this internal coherence of the conviction of establishing a Jewish state in Palestine became so strong that the authority on Palestine was moved from the Foreign Office to a new Colonial Office.[82] This move was done because the Foreign Office was led by Lord Curzon, who strongly opposed the establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine.[83] Nonetheless, the responsibility was shifted to the new Colonial Office under Winston Churchill, who was quoted earlier, saying on several occasions how pleased he would be to see a Jewish state established in Palestine.[84]
Conclusion
Ever since the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, Palestine has constantly been a region of international tensions and conflict. An endless amount of research has been conducted, and yet there are many questions unsolved. Focusing on the founding phase is important because the research seeks to show that the circumstances were quite difficult from the outset. As this research has shown, there were many fundamentally ineffective decisions and acts from the side of the British government that caused continued confusion and conflict until today.
As this work has shown, a central factor or cause for the mismanagement of Palestine was race. First, race in International Relations was explored in some of its facets and appearances. The concepts help to understand how broad and far-reaching race can be at the same time. Race is broad because it can be applied and found in nearly all social interactions among human beings. However, it is also very far-reaching, because the word itself is almost never used and therefore research often must dig deep down and analyse social interactions on the smallest level, in order to identify racialised patterns of behaviour, such as intonation, body language, etc. This microsociological type of research was not necessary within the scope of this work, because the racial underpinnings are already visible both in the rhetoric and the actions of the British. Rather, concepts of political power played a greater role in this study. Racialised forms of law, the civilised/uncivilised divide and territorial arrogance that led to appropriation of privileges and land theft were the main concepts that needed to be explored first, in order to make use of them in the later course of this work.
Secondly, the least-likely approach coupled with the Foucauldian discourse analysis was selected as the analytical tool. Justifying this choice with a logic that is based on the Sinatra-Inference, this work sought to establish racial underpinnings in the early phase of the state-formation process of Palestine and argued that if they are to be found there, these underpinnings can also be found in the later course of history and possibly even in a severed form.
Finally, the racial underpinnings were analysed on four interrelated levels. First, a general racial attitude was analysed. It was established that there was – and possibly still is – a belief in the superiority of the white/European race over the other races, because they perceive the non-white world as uncivilised and victimise them, in order to justify intervention. Next to victimising, there is also the logic that consists of the belief that the civilised races have a natural right to intervene elsewhere in the non-white world. So, there is racism at the very basis of colonialism and foreign intervention that led to land theft. On the second level, the two promises made to the Arabs and Jews, respectively, in the form of the Hussein-McMahon Correspondence and the Balfour Declaration, were juxtaposed. Here, the finding was that the Hussein-McMahon Correspondence is formally seen as a much more authoritative and binding agreement than the vaguely worded Balfour Declaration. These documents are rightly taken as promises by Arabs and Jews alike; however, comparing the wording of the two documents showed that, in the end, the promise was kept that had a weaker legal foundation. In the following, the rhetoric by British statesmen was analysed, and this revealed why the Balfour Declaration was valued more than the Hussein-McMahon Correspondence. The general ‘red line’ was that the Arabs were perceived to be incapable, backward and very far from British interests. The different racialisation of Arabs and Jews led to the fact that there was at no point – except for Lord Curzon and the Peel Commission – someone who regarded the needs and aspirations of the Arabs in Palestine. In addition, it was constantly held that the Jews were more capable and civilised than the Arabs and, therefore, deserved the right to establish an own state in Palestine. Fourthly and finally, the social context played an important role in the discourse analysis, since it was designed in a Foucauldian style. Here, it was found out that many Jews were part of the high-ranking government officials´ elite. Additionally, non-Jews sustained close ties to influential Zionist leaders and Jewish families. These relationships were often very close and personal and led to an inner ideological coherence between the parties, within which the opinions were often approved by the parties involved. Accordingly, the resulting discourse on Palestine, Arabs and the future of the region was very one-sided and produced the type of rhetoric that was mentioned before. The social context, therefore, contributed immensely to the production and strengthening of the racial underpinnings towards the whole issue in the first place.
These four interrelated levels, thus, constitute the answer to the research question of what racial underpinnings influenced the British policy towards the state-formation process of Israel. It is important to note that these four levels can well be viewed without constituting an act based on racism. Their appearance together, however, shows that there was a systematic racial bias by the British against the Arabs, while simultaneously constituting a racial inclusion of the Jews, granting them preference on the issue of Palestine.
This work aimed at filling a gap in the literature on the state-formation process of Israel. It offers a different account to the prevalent arguments as to why Israel established a state, as opposed to the Arabs. As shown in this work, the racial aspect of the state formation was extremely strong and exclusive. Considering also the future debate on this topic, the work aimed at establishing the racial dimension of the state-formation process as a valid argument within the debate. Additionally, this could also enhance research on other aspects of Palestine throughout its history, ever since the founding of Israel and advance and enrich the debates related to the topic.
[1] Edward Hagopian and AB Zahlan, “Palestine´s Arab Population: The Demography of the Palestinians,” Journal of Palesrtine Studies, Vol. 3, No. 4 (1974): 34.
[2] AL MacFie, The Eastern Question 1774-1923 (New York: Routledge, 2014), 1.
[3] Danny Gutwein, “The politics of the Balfour Declaration: Nationalism, imperialism and the limits of Zionist-British cooperation,” Journal of Israeli History, Vol. 35, No. 2 (2016): 118.
[4] Idem, pages: 118-120.
[5] Duncan Bell, “Race and international relations: introduction,” Cambridge Review of International Affairs, Vol. 26, No. 1 (2013): 1-2.
[6] Jack S. Levy, “Case Studies: Types, Designs, and Logics of Inference,” Conflict Management and Peace Science, Vol. 25, No. 1 (2008): 12.
[7] Edward Hagopian and AB Zahlan, “Palestine´s Arab Population: The Demography of the Palestinians,” Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol. 3, No. 4 (1974): 34.
[8] International Christian Embassy Jerusalem, Defining Aliyah, https://int.icej.org/aid/defining-aliyah (accessed 28 April 2017).
[9] Danny Gutwein, “The politics of the Balfour Declaration: Nationalism, imperialism and the limits of Zionist-British cooperation,” Journal of Israeli History, Vol. 35, No. 2 (2016): 119, 121.
[10] Ibidem.
[11] Idem, pages: 118-119.
[12] Idem, pages: 121-126.
[13] Sherry Lowrance, “Nationalism without Nation: State-building in Early Twentieth-Century Palestine,” Middle East Critique Vol. 21, No. 1 (2012): 81-82.
[14] Idem, pages: 83-84.
[15] Sankaran Krishna, “Race, Amnesia, and the Education of International Relations,” Alternatives Vol. 26 (2001): 401-404.
[16] Ibidem; TJ Le Melle, “Race in International Relations,” International Studies Perspectives, Vol. 10 (2009): 77-83; Christian Davenport, “The Dark Side of International Studies: Race, Racism, and Research in International Studies,” International Studies Perspectives, Vol. 9 (2008): 445-449.
[17] TJ LeMelle, George W. Shepherd, “Race in the Future of International Relations,” Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 25, No. 2 (1971): 302.
[18] Christian Davenport, “The Dark Side of International Studies: Race, Racism, and Research in International Studies,” International Studies Perspectives, Vol. 9 (2008): 445-449.
[19] Idem, page: 446.
[20] Idem, page: 447.
[21] Robert Knox, “Race, Racialisation and Rivalry in the International Legal Order,” in Race and Racism in International Relations: Confronting the Global Colour Line, edited by Alexander Anievas, Nivi Manchanda, Robbie Shilliam (New York: Routledge, 2014), 176.
[22] Ibidem.
[23] Idem, page: 177.
[24] TJ LeMelle, George W. Shepherd, “Race in the Future of International Relations,” Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 25, No. 2 (1971): 303.
[25] Ibidem.
[26] Idem, page: 304.
[27] Idem, page: 306.
[28] Jack S. Levy, “Case Studies: Types, Designs, and Logics of Inference,” Conflict Management and Peace Science, Vol. 25, No. 1 (2008): 12.
[29] Sally Hewitt, “Discourse Analysis and Public Policy Research,” Newcastle University: Centre For Rural Economy, October 2009, http://www.ncl.ac.uk/media/wwwnclacuk/centreforruraleconomy/files/discussion-paper-24.pdf (accessed 1 May 2017).
[30] Danny Gutwein, “The politics of the Balfour Declaration: Nationalism, imperialism and the limits of Zionist-British cooperation,” Journal of Israeli History, Vol. 35, No. 2 (2016): 121.
[31] TJ LeMelle, George W. Shepherd, “Race in the Future of International Relations,” Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 25, No. 2 (1971): 303.
[32] Ibidem.
[33] Robert Knox, “Race, Racialisation and Rivalry in the International Legal Order,” in Race and Racism in International Relations: Confronting the Global Colour Line, edited by Alexander Anievas, Nivi Manchanda, Robbie Shilliam (New York: Routledge, 2014), 176.
[34] William M. Matthew, “The Balfour Declaration and the Palestine Mandate, 1917-1923: British Imperialist Imperatives,” British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 40, Issue 3 (2013): 237-239.
[35] Robert Knox, “Race, Racialisation and Rivalry in the International Legal Order,” in Race and Racism in International Relations: Confronting the Global Colour Line, edited by Alexander Anievas, Nivi Manchanda, Robbie Shilliam (New York: Routledge, 2014), 176-178.
[36] The National Archives, British Empire: Living in the British Empire – India, http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/education/empire/g2/cs4/background.htm (accessed 1 May 2017).
[37] Ibidem.
[38] William M. Matthew, “The Balfour Declaration and the Palestine Mandate, 1917-1923: British Imperialist Imperatives,” British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 40, No. 3 (2013): 237.
[39] Ibidem.
[40] Idem, pages 237-239.
[41] Sharif Hussein of Mecca, Letter to Sir Henry McMahon, 14 July 1915, Mecca.
[42] Sir Henry McMahon, Letter to Sharif Hussein of Mecca, 30 August 1915, Cairo.
[43] Sir Henry McMahon, Letter to Sharif Hussein of Mecca, 24 October 1915, Cairo.
[44] Arthur James Balfour, Letter to Nathaniel Rothschild, 2 November 1917, London.
[45] David J. Charlwood, “The Impact of the Dardanelles Campaign on British Policy Towards the Arabs: How Gallipoli shaped the Hussein-McMahon Correspondence,” British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 42, No. 2 (2015): 243.
[46] Ibidem.
[47] P. Harding to Director of Military Operations, War Office, 22 November 1915. Note by Major Gabriel on the Arab question. FO 371/2486.
[48] William M. Matthew, “The Balfour Declaration and the Palestine Mandate, 1917-1923: British Imperialist Imperatives,” British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 40, No. 3 (2013): 246.
[49] For example: exchange between Joseph King, Arthur James Balfour, Sir JD. Rees and Joseph Bliss in House of Commons Sitting 15 January 1918.
[50] Oxford Dictionaries, https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/muhammadan (accessed 5 May 2017).
[51] William M. Matthew, “The Balfour Declaration and the Palestine Mandate, 1917-1923: British Imperialist Imperatives,” British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 40, No. 3 (2013): 247.
[52] Palestine Royal (Peel) Commission Report, 7 July 1937, London.
[53] David J. Charlwood, “The Impact of the Dardanelles Campaign on British Policy Towards the Arabs: How Gallipoli shaped the Hussein-McMahon Correspondence,” British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 42, No. 2 (2015): 243.
[54] William M. Matthew, “The Balfour Declaration and the Palestine Mandate, 1917-1923: British Imperialist Imperatives,” British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 40, No. 3 (2013): 248.
[55] Oxford Dictionaries, https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/cope (5 May 2017).
[56] Danny Gutwein, “The politics of the Balfour Declaration: Nationalism, imperialism and the limits of Zionist-British cooperation,” Journal of Israeli History, Vol. 35, No. 2 (2016): 121-124.
[57] William M. Matthew, “The Balfour Declaration and the Palestine Mandate, 1917-1923: British Imperialist Imperatives,” British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 40, No. 3 (2013): 236, 247, 250.
[58] Ibidem.
[59] Idem, page: 247.
[60] Ibidem.
[61] Imperial Conference, 1923. Stenographic Notes on the Meeting of 3 October 1923, CO733/54/5472, NA.
[62] Tom Segev, One Palestine Complete. Jews and Arabs under the British Mandate (New York: Owl Books, 1999), pages: 33, 36.
[63] TJ LeMelle, George W. Shepherd, “Race in the Future of International Relations,” Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 25, No. 2 (1971): 306.
[64] The Norfolk Library Book Group, Anti-Semitism around World War I, 27 June 2012, http://norfolklibrarybookgroup.squarespace.com/the-reading-blog/2012/6/27/anti-semitism-around-world-war-i.html (accessed 7 May 2017).
[65] William M. Matthew, “The Balfour Declaration and the Palestine Mandate, 1917-1923: British Imperialist Imperatives,” British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 40, No. 3 (2013): 247.
[66] Ibidem.
[67] TJ LeMelle, George W. Shepherd, “Race in the Future of International Relations,” Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 25, No. 2 (1971): 303.
[68] William M. Matthew, “The Balfour Declaration and the Palestine Mandate, 1917-1923: British Imperialist Imperatives,” British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 40, No. 3 (2013): 234.
[69] Sahar Huneidi, “Was Balfour Policy Reversible? The Colonial Office and Palestine, 1921-23,” Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol. 27, No. 2 (1998): 34-35.
[70] William M. Matthew, “The Balfour Declaration and the Palestine Mandate, 1917-1923: British Imperialist Imperatives,” British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 40, No. 3 (2013): 247.
[71] Idem, page: 239.
[72] Idem, page: 244.
[73] Danny Gutwein, “The politics of the Balfour Declaration: Nationalism, imperialism and the limits of Zionist-British cooperation,” Journal of Israeli History, Vol. 35, No. 2 (2016): 119, 122.
[74] Ibidem.
[75] Idem, page: 124.
[76] Ibidem.
[77] Ibidem.
[78] William M. Matthew, “The Balfour Declaration and the Palestine Mandate, 1917-1923: British Imperialist Imperatives,” British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 40, No. 3 (2013): 243.
[79] Danny Gutwein, “The politics of the Balfour Declaration: Nationalism, imperialism and the limits of Zionist-British cooperation,” Journal of Israeli History, Vol. 35, No. 2 (2016): 121.
[80] Idem, page: 122.
[81] Idem, page: 121.
[82] Sahar Huneidi, “Was Balfour Policy Reversible? The Colonial Office and Palestine, 1921-23,” Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol. 27, No. 2 (1998): 34-35.
[83] Ibidem.
[84] Danny Gutwein, “The politics of the Balfour Declaration: Nationalism, imperialism and the limits of Zionist-British cooperation,” Journal of Israeli History, Vol. 35, No. 2 (2016): 124.
