The recent military escalation of Israel targeting Iran was not just a predictable outcome of the intensifying tension between the two regional powers, but it also serves as a great example of structural predestinations that lead to such conflicts. The direct participation of the United States of America (hereinafter: the USA) in the Israeli attacks on Iranian infrastructure shifts the regional conflict into the broader realm of global power ambitions. The developments in the region enables one to analyse the strategic orientation of developing a superior power position – between Iran and Israel – while this takes place within a global context of the USA trying to maintain their hegemonic position.
In this analysis, I examine the strategic objectives underlying political narratives in a context of interdependent cultural and national goal settings and power incentives. I begin by highlighting the necessity of such narratives and their effectiveness in shaping societal perceptions. Then the focus turns to the mechanisms behind monopolistic power structures within the geopolitical sphere, as well as the inherent consequences of imperial ambitions. Those fundamental viewpoints help broaden one’s perspective on political events by focusing on the technocratic component. Additionally, the analysis of the sociogenetic development of Iran, whose uniqueness in this region further fosters an intensification in this conflict, ultimately allows for strategic assumptions about the ongoing dynamic between the two actors.
The Role of Narratives
Political narratives, as described by thinkers such as Sigmund Freud, function as mass-psychological instruments that generate collective identity. They are not merely vehicles for the transmission of information, but meaning-making frameworks that focus on the emotional significance of information. They create a sense of orientation and belonging within a community (ethnic or religious group, societies or political orientations). Narratives speak to the masses by providing easily accessible explanations for complex realities, reducing ambiguity and offering coherent perspectives. This triggers emotional resonance that can guide perception and action. Ultimately, the central mechanism within this structure is creating a collective identity by classifying and ranking the established concepts into a hierarchy, creating a we versus them dynamic, which is often visualised through the implementation of clear enemy images, the position of the in-group as a victim or the projection of a heroic myth. At their core, political narratives follow a structured pattern. They channel emotions, simplify complex interrelations and, therefore, ultimately aim to legitimise political actions and decisions. This dynamic produces a symbolic hierarchy between the narrative’s protagonists and antagonists, enabling actions that otherwise appear illegitimate to be perceived as justified, at least by those who perceive the narrative as reality. Ultimately, once legitimised, such actions can emotionally mobilise the broader public in powerful and coordinated ways.
This leads to a fundamental question: Why is legitimation necessary at all? The answer lies in the nature of geopolitical interests. States often pursue goals that are absolutist or final in character – goals that do not seek compromise with the interdependent objectives of other states. Such rigidity reveals the self-perception of the state (or its leadership): either it regards itself (or the group) as inherently superior (hierarchical perspective) to the opposing side, or it believes that the necessity for decisive or extreme measures outweighs any incentive for cooperation. This hierarchical perspective intensifies when the narrative’s opposing actor addresses the argumentation of the legitimation. By this reaction – arguably an intrinsic one – he gives explanatory power to the narrative’s protagonist, and by doing so, he is not only validating the existence of the narratives, but he is also reinforcing the hierarchical standing the protagonist introduces. This leads to another crucial aspect of narrative logic, which is that narratives require opposing narratives to function effectively. Freedom needs oppression, order needs chaos, illuminated people need an elite and purity needs corruption. Without a diametrical opposite, the self cannot be visualised as righteous. The identity of the group depends on the construction of a normative contrast figure that defines and amplifies its virtues through negation. This binary structure is central to the emotional and psychological dynamics of social relativity.
In the Iran-Israel case, Israel constructs its legitimation of attacking Iran through the narrative of the antagonist’s ambitions to develop and arm itself with nuclear weapons, supposedly threatening the total existence of the Israeli state. This is embedded in the overall narrative of omnipresent threats Israel has to face, as it claims the ultimate goal of its neighbouring and other states of the Levant, Sub-Anatolia and Persia is to fully destroy and eradicate Israel. By facing this narrative threat, Israel legitimises itself to destabilise these regions over the past centuries through several strategies, such as the settlement projects in Gaza or the West Bank, the infiltration and actions by their central intelligence agency, for example, in Lebanon or Iran and its consistent violation of international law (therefore, legitimacy is necessary) through military operations in this region; for example, after the fall of the Assad government in the South Syria. As already mentioned, narratives are the emotional indoctrination to mobilise the general public; they are not the explanation of geopolitical operations as their nature solely emerges from structural intentions. Consequently, participating in this emotional debate, either by offering extensive support to the Israeli narrative or through overwhelming emotional reactions to Israeli foreign policy marked by hate and anger, will just maintain the status quo on a structural level. The result is a maintenance of the current situation with no accessibility to actual change, as the hierarchical structures are settled by the acknowledgement of the narratives, and, furthermore, as the emotional debates force societies’ perceptions into siding either with the antagonist or protagonist, making a debate for compromises quite difficult. Accordingly, I analyse monopolistic mechanisms, which are fundamental theoretical concepts in global state relations and, therefore, represent the next logical step to deconstruct this conflict.
Monopolistic Imperialism
The Iran-Israel conflict must be deconstructed into the various technocratic mechanisms that affect it in order to neutralise emotions. This process of genuine knowledge production is not only the most effective approach to an optimal solution process, but also protects one from getting drawn into the emotional manipulation that the actors aim to provoke. Therefore, the power rivalry between two actors must be viewed from a rational perspective. A state is not an entity that is naturally striving for an increase in power (the ability to act upon other state actors to achieve its own goals), but a processual structure of interdependencies. Therefore, aiming for a monopolistic, or at least a dominant, position does not stem from expansive or dominant intentions, but from the necessity to establish and secure one’s position within an interdependent field of tension. As power is not a possession but a relative value, interdependent actors need each other to be powerful; they are interconnected and have a mutual dependency. The underlying motive is the stabilisation of a status quo, namely a field of tension in which the actor receives, or has received, resonance. For this reason, the actor seeks to consolidate resources and influence (often gathering influence through resources) to become dependent itself. He binds others to him to secure his position in this web, in the geopolitical realm, through partnerships, trade agreements or military safeguards. Paradoxically, the more strongly an actor binds others to himself, the more dependent he becomes on the continued existence of this web of relations. In sociology, thinkers like Norbert Elias describe this as a constraint of interdependence, highlighting this structural necessity to maintain the balance of mutual expectations while avoiding an imbalance in interests. Several approaches offer explanations for the origin of this pursuit of balance, for example, resonance theory, realism or constructivism. All of them have the aspect in common that they attribute a normative compulsion to act to the state: to be recognised and acknowledged as a social identity. Thus, it is not only about resources in the quantitative sense, but also about responsiveness and recognition within the international community, both of which can be understood as qualitative resources themselves. A state must, therefore, constantly recalibrate, create new advantages or at least meet expectations in order to maintain its structure. The loss of resonance is associated with a loss of control; that is, the disruption of the fundament that constitutes its position. A monopoly position, thus, functions as a preventive safeguard against the loss of power within an asymmetric, yet inherently unstable, balance.
In the case of Iran and Israel, we can observe two different events within this theoretical framework of an interdependent web of tensions. On the larger scale, the USA relies on maintaining a strong partnership and mutual dependency with Israel to exert influence over resources, as well as the quality and quantity of resonance that comes along with their partnership in this region. This implies, conversely, that the USA are dependent on Israel’s geopolitical objectives to prevent any form of tension that potentially could harm its privileged position.. According to this assumption, even unilateral actions by Israel in geopolitical affairs are included, as they cause a loss of resonance for the USA (for example, the media portrayal of the role of the USA in the diplomatic process). On the other hand, the regional situation of Israel is embedded in the field of tension: being dependent on the USA through a strong partnership and military protection, while still aiming to consolidate and concentrate its ability to create dependencies (or avoid being dependent) on a regional level. In fact, consolidating one’s position in such an interrelationship is a natural goal of every state. In conclusion, this deconstructs the Israeli narrative of being threatened by their surrounding states, as this dynamic field of tensions can be witnessed everywhere where interdependent interests contrast with each other. Great examples are the European states, in which a peaceful coexistence was achieved only around 80 years ago. The development of their coexistence cannot be explained by an alignment of all of their interests, but by the strengthening of interdependent relational ties. While this is only possible due to a pacification of the actors, the form of conflicts transitioned from military conflicts and warfare to psychological warfare and control. While this would be a topic for another analysis, I solely concentrate on Israel’s situation, and in general, the dynamics of the Levante, Sub-Anatolia and Persia, where this process of pacification has not yet proceeded, which means the way of pursuing state interests remains through warfare.
The practical implementation of these theoretical concepts can be traced back to the very beginning, to the first conceptual approaches of a Jewish state. Scholars and political strategists implemented them in various advisories, most notably in what has been a critical work, “The Iron Wall” by Ze’ev Jabotinsky. His ideas are still considered essential by Israel’s current Prime Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu. Its core proposition is that the establishment of a Jewish state in Arabia is only possible through strong military dominance and the corruption of surrounding Arab states. Jabotinsky argues that the Arab population would never voluntarily give up its sovereignty claims, which is why a dominant military force is necessary to enforce that. Furthermore, he stresses that it is pointless to wait for the goodwill of the adversary (for example, their capitulation). In the absence of effective military superiority, efforts should be made to ensure that the opponent can no longer function as a politically capable actor. These approaches highly correlate with monopoly logic. Beyond military strength, the suggested measures include: promoting political fragmentation, co-opting parts of the opposition, obstructing sovereignty and deploying narratives aimed at symbolic delegitimisation in the international public sphere. The destabilisation of the region is, as a consequential result, a structural objective of Israeli foreign policy. Establishing a monopolistic position is necessary to control external influence and to safeguard the state’s existential position within a field of geopolitical tension. In this context, Iran emerges as Israel’s primary adversary, as it is — aside from Türkiye — the least controllable counterforce in the region. The significance of this is grounded in the very theoretical assumptions outlined above. Iran, for its part, is also expanding its influence and is actively working to disrupt Israel’s growing dominance and regional control, primarily through financial and military support for Israel’s opponents. This also includes Iran’s nuclear program, which highlights the aforementioned structural logic: if Iran was to develop or acquire nuclear weapons, the current divergence in technological warfare (as Israel possesses nuclear weapons) would equalise — something Israel perceives as an existential threat and seeks to prevent.
However, the purpose here is not to engage in that specific narrative. Rather, what is essential for understanding the ongoing trajectory of this geopolitical tension is to understand why Iran is the primary adversary. Despite several attempts to render it available to Iran, it has not become accessible to Israel. This makes Iran not only a structural but also a normative threat. In order to formulate any strategic advice, it becomes crucial to consider the basic sociogenetic structure of Iran, as this aspect sets a fundamental layer of the conflict (and its pathways).
Strategic View: The Sociogenesis of Iran
The early influences on the sociogenesis of the Persian people were shaped by challenging geography and limited natural resources. Mountains, deserts and scarce farmland made nomadic life nearly impossible. As a result, people settled in fixed locations, where communities became closely connected, especially through shared water systems like qanats. This physical immobility created strong interdependencies between regions, which required centralised coordination early on. Over time, control over essential resources became a source of regional conflicts over power, and slowly concentrated in the hands of a few. These resource monopolies reduced the independence of the ruling class, namely the warrior aristocracy. This class, which was initially autonomous, became increasingly pacified, not through imposition alone, but through their integration into a tightly bound web of dependencies anchored in control over critical resources. Their power was not taken by force, but absorbed through structural entanglements that left little room for autonomy. This process led to a broader pattern of pacification and rationalisation. What began as external pressures, such as the need to cooperate over resources, gradually turned into internalised expectations and self-discipline. Social behaviour became shaped by increasingly stable patterns of interdependence. At the same time, Iran’s location on major trade routes gave rise to a powerful merchant class. Their influence was based not on lineage or land, but on financial capital and trade. This created a tension between the traditional warrior aristocracy and the emerging urban elite. To manage these interdependent interests, a strong central authority became essential. The monarchy was not only a tool of power but also a coordinator, holding together a complex and unequal society by providing structure, continuity and a shared point of reference.
The sociogenetic development of a society is a complex process that produces endless chains of causal relationships. A complete sociogenetic analysis is neither feasible within this article nor necessary to highlight the key developments. The long-standing tradition of centralised authority, forged through early patterns of resource management and social coordination, has contributed to a strong role of the state as both guardian and organiser of national coherence. The deep entanglement of society and central power has shaped a collective expectation of state-led order. This has reinforced a culture of political self-consciousness and national pride, where the state is not simply seen as an administrator, but as the symbolic anchor of sovereignty and identity, especially in relation to external pressures. The result is a political structure marked by vertical integration, strategic self-reliance and a strong awareness of Iran’s distinct position within regional and global dynamics. In contrast to Iran, the political development of Arab societies was shaped by a very different environment. The open and arid landscapes of the Arabian Peninsula supported nomadic lifestyles, loose tribal structures and horizontal social relations. Instead of permanent settlements, mobility and kinship were central and authority was often temporary, based on personal charisma, tribal consensus, or religious influence, rather than institutional power. This form of social organisation did not lead to lasting central administrations. Political order often emerged through charismatic leadership or religious legitimacy, such as during the rise of the Caliphates. However, these central structures were repeatedly challenged by reassessing local loyalties (whether tribal, familial or sectarian). As a result, there was less development towards long-term centralisation. Unlike in Iran, strong bureaucracies rarely developed. Many Arab states remained vulnerable to fragmentation, as loyalty to local or sectarian groups often outweighed identification with the state. This historic pattern continues to influence the political landscape of the region today, where centralised governance still competes with deep-rooted communal and tribal affiliations.
Thus, the structural divergence between the Arab states and Iran is the main factor for the strategic necessity for Israel to directly confront Iran. Unlike the Arab neighbouring states of Israel, Iran’s society was shaped by a strong sociogenetic process that enforces the centralisation of power and, therefore, developed characteristics like a strong central authority, stability and the homogeneity of identity. Attempting to fragment the Iranian society or its sovereignty are unlikely to work; this approach has been taken by the central intelligence of Great Britain and the USA in the 1950s by staging a coup against the democratically elected Prime Minister, Mohammed Mossadegh. As a result, the installed Shah established a power policy favoring the West (especially Great Britain and the USA) but was essentially repressive against its people. Ultimately, this led to the Islamic Revolution in 1979, as the policies of the Shah were contrary to the cultural core of the Iranian people. In fact, the Iranian people viewed the Shah as a vassal of the USA and Great Britain, not only from a normative perspective, but especially due to his economic policymaking, so that the most contrary political force, namely the Islamic clerics, came to be seen as the most desired alternative.
In conclusion, those indicators, both the theoretical idea of getting a monopolistic position within an interconnected web of interdependencies and the sociogenetic development of Iran, which led to conditions that allowed them to develop this global power position, enlighten the ongoing conflict between Israel and Iran from a structural viewpoint. Now, from this perspective, these dynamics open up several possible pathways, enabling us to make some strategic assumptions.
Strategic Scenarios for the Iran-Israel Conflict
Following this structural analysis, there are three possible scenarios looking forward. The first is an open military conflict, similar to the one recently witnessed. This could either take the form of a large-scale offensive or unfold in several waves of warfare. In this scenario, Israel’s strike on Iran represents only the first wave in a longer series of intensifying escalations. Both parties could continue to provoke and challenge each other until the level of aggression becomes so intense that it reaches a point of irreversibility. At this point, a withdrawal equals a defeat on both a normative and a resource level. The second scenario follows a similar logic but plays out in favour of Israel through the internal fragmentation of Iran. This would involve a strategic weakening of Iran’s political and societal cohesion, particularly a break between the population and the state, with a focus on religious leadership. Much like in the 1950s, efforts could be made to divide society, instrumentalise opposition groups and mobilise populist forces in order to steer Iran down a path that no longer directly conflicts with Israel’s strategic goals. This scenario would only be possible with the involvement of other central intelligence forces, as this strategy requires immense capacities. The third and last scenario lies in strengthening the interdependent ties between the two states. Agreements such as the 2015 Nuclear Deal, which Iran adhered too closely, are examples of how external dependencies can evolve into internal constraints over time. These foreign obligations, created through diplomatic and economic dependencies, will gradually transform into self-imposed limitations, resulting in what can be defined as rationalisation of foreign policy. In this view, the pursuit of impulse-driven or ideologically charged confrontation becomes less viable, as states become more tied in mutual responsibilities. This rationalisation process fosters pacification and depoliticisation through structured cooperation.
From this angle, the third scenario appears to be the most desirable, as it points toward a long-term pacification achieved through more profound interdependence. However, such a process requires a foundational tension in which relatively equal partners stand opposite one another. As mentioned earlier, and more precisely elaborated in my analysis International Power Disruptions: The Case of the USA and China — the structural given monarchy’s ability to pacify the old (warrior) aristocracy stemmed from the rise of a strong merchant class, as their status and capacities than depends on the goodwill of the monarch. The resulting dependencies led to a balance of power and, in turn, a form of structural pacification. This kind of power relation also appeared in modern European history, such as in the case of Germany after World War II. The question of German reunification only came into serious focus with the intensification of the Cold War. Before that, countries like France still viewed a unified Germany as a security risk. Yet it was precisely this resurgence, both materially and normatively, that laid the groundwork for the long-term cooperation that would come to define Franco-German relations.
For Israel, a strong Iran is both a relative security threat and a challenge to its hegemonic position. As long as Israel remains the stronger actor, it has little incentive to pursue meaningful cooperation, especially if it still sees opportunities to fragment or dominate Iran. This logic helps explain Israel’s rejection of the nuclear agreement, despite widespread approval in the West. While the deal reduced the threat of an Iranian atomic bomb, it also allowed Iran to enrich uranium for energy purposes, thereby gaining economic and technological ground. Even such minor advancements slowly narrow the power gap. Israel’s position is further reinforced by its deep mutual dependencies with the USA, particularly in terms of military and economic support. While some form of pacification may emerge over time, the absence of a balanced power dynamic (or external pressure from stronger global actors) means both Iran and Israel are likely to continue seeking ways to undermine each other’s position. Within such dynamics, actions like the most recent joint strikes by the USA and Israel serve not only as military operations but also as tools of psychological warfare. They set the tone of the relationship and communicate dominance. Regardless of whether Iran’s nuclear ambitions have actually been damaged, the symbolic nature of these attacks is undeniable: a message that Israel can act without consequence or international outcry. This demonstration of immunity underscores both Israel’s military advantage and its narrative superiority. The relative helplessness of other states – perhaps all of them are fully aware of the structural dynamics at play – only further amplifying Israel’s dominant position and signals how the ongoing dynamic between the two nations is likely to evolve.
