The Yarlung Zangbo-Brahmaputra River is a vital transboundary river system, sustaining over 114 million people across China, India and Bangladesh and supporting agriculture, fisheries, hydropower and drinking water. Originating in the Tibetan Plateau, the river holds immense ecological, economic and cultural significance. However, it has also become a source of geopolitical tension, reflecting broader South Asian rivalries. The river’s management is complicated by territorial disputes, particularly between China and India, where unresolved border conflicts heighten mistrust. China’s hydropower ambitions, including proposed mega-dams at the Great Bend, one of the deepest and most remote gorges in the world, making it a site of immense geographical and ecological significance, raise concerns about downstream water security, flooding and agricultural disruptions, especially in the face of climate change. For downstream nations like India and Bangladesh, the absence of a water-sharing agreement further exacerbates vulnerabilities. This article examines the river’s strategic importance, the geopolitical tensions it fuels and the hydropower ambitions driving China’s actions. It also explores the geopolitical implications for downstream nations and proposes policy solutions, including trilateral agreements, enhanced cooperation between India and Bangladesh, data sharing and climate-resilient infrastructure.
The Yarlung Zangbo River and Its Strategic Importance
The Yarlung Zangbo River, originating in the Tibetan Plateau, often referred to as the “Water Tower of Asia”, is a critical transboundary river system. Flowing eastward through China, the river makes a U-turn at the Great Bend before entering India as the Brahmaputra River. It continues through Bangladesh, where it converges with the Ganges to form the expansive Sundarbans Delta, one of the largest river deltas in the world. The river traverses diverse ecosystems, sustaining a wide range of flora and fauna. Its basin is among the most densely populated regions globally, providing essential resources to over 114 million people. The Yarlung Zangbo-Brahmaputra system plays a critical role in supporting agriculture, fisheries, hydropower development and trade. The river irrigates vast agricultural lands in India and Bangladesh, with the Brahmaputra basin contributing significantly to rice, tea and jute production. For instance, Assam in India, which relies heavily on the river, produces 60% of India’s tea, a 2€ billion industry, whereas Bangladesh depends on the river for rice cultivation and agriculture, which employs over 40% of its workforce and contributes 12-15% of its Gross Domestic Product (hereinafter: GDP).
The river also serves as a transportation and trade lifeline, particularly in India and Bangladesh. Inland waterways like National Waterway 2 in India and the Ganges-Brahmaputra-Meghan river system in Bangladesh facilitate trade, reducing transportation costs and boosting local economies. Additionally, the river’s cultural and spiritual importance drives tourism, with festivals like Bihu in India and Tibetan pilgrimages drawing visitors and contributing to regional economies. In fact, beyond its economic importance, the river holds immense cultural and spiritual significance. In Tibet, the Yarlung Zangbo is revered as sacred, symbolising purity and life. In India, the Brahmaputra River is deeply intertwined with cultural and religious traditions, and it is celebrated in festivals and folklore. Similarly, in Bangladesh, the river is integral to the identity, livelihoods and resilience of its people.
Geopolitical Tensions and Territorial Disputes
The Yarlung Zangbo-Brahmaputra River flows through a region rife with territorial and geopolitical disputes, particularly between China and India, where unresolved border issues and strategic competition exacerbate tensions. One major point of contention is Arunachal Pradesh, a northeastern Indian state through which the Brahmaputra enters India. India considers Arunachal Pradesh an integral part of its territory, but China claims it as “Southern Tibet”, citing historical assertions that the region was part of Tibet before the era of British invasion. The border was defined by the McMahon Line, drawn during the Simla Convention of 1914, an agreement between British India and Tibet, which China refused to recognise. India, however, regards the McMahon Line as the legal boundary, reinforcing its sovereignty over the region. The dispute escalated during the 1962 Sino-Indian War, when China briefly occupied parts of Arunachal Pradesh before withdrawing behind the McMahon Line and declaring a unilateral ceasefire. Since then, the region has remained a flashpoint, with China claiming 90.000 square kilometres of territory and objecting to Indian leaders visiting the state. The controversy is further intensified by Tawang, a significant district in Arunachal Pradesh that is home to the Tawang Monastery, one of the largest centres of Tibetan Buddhism. Tawang holds cultural and religious importance for both Tibetans and Buddhists worldwide, and China views its control over the area as vital to its broader strategy of maintaining influence over Tibetan Buddhism.
Strategically, Arunachal Pradesh is critical for both nations. For India, it serves as a defensive buffer zone between its northeastern states and China, while for China, asserting its claim over Arunachal Pradesh aligns with its desire to consolidate control over Tibet and strengthen its position along the Himalayan border. The region’s rugged terrain and proximity to Tibet have led both nations to ramp up military deployments and infrastructure development, increasing the risk of confrontations. A notable flashpoint occurred in the Galwan Valley in 2020, where clashes between Indian and Chinese forces resulted in casualties on both sides. This incident heightened mistrust and led to a significant escalation in military deployments along the Line of Actual Control (hereinafter: LAC), the de facto border between the two nations. Both have since accelerated infrastructure development in the border regions, for instance, China has built roads, railways and military installations near the LAC, while India has strengthened its border infrastructure to counter these developments. This competitive build-up has deepened mutual suspicion, creating a security dilemma in which both nations’ actions to safeguard their interests further escalate tensions. Moreover, the militarisation of the LAC has also been accompanied by economic and diplomatic measures. India has imposed restrictions on Chinese investments, banned major Chinese apps and reoriented its military focus from Pakistan to China. These broader shifts reflect the increasingly strained relationship between the two nations, with the Brahmaputra dispute serving as both a symptom and driver of their geopolitical rivalry.
China’s Hydropower Ambitions
China has prioritised the utilisation of its river systems to achieve energy independence, with hydropower playing a central role in its renewable energy strategy. The Asian nation accounts for nearly 30% of the world’s installed hydropower capacity, with the Three Gorges Dam holding the title of the largest hydropower project globally. Among China’s hydropower ambitions, the Great Bend of the Yarlung Zangbo River has emerged as a key focus due to its immense hydropower potential. The geography of the Great Bend, characterised by steep gradients and high tectonic activity, makes it one of the most hydropower-rich areas in the world. This aligns with Beijing’s broader objectives outlined in its 14th Five-Year Plan, which emphasises infrastructure development, renewable energy expansion and strengthening China’s regional and global influence. The proposed dam at the Great Bend would be China’s most ambitious hydropower project to date, with an estimated cost exceeding one trillion yuan (137€ billion). It is expected to generate over 300 billion kilowatt-hours of electricity annually, sufficient to power approximately 300 million people.
However, the project faces significant engineering and environmental challenges. The Great Bend is located in a seismically active region, characterised by frequent earthquakes and tectonic instability. The risk of glacial lake outburst floods, exacerbated by climate change, adds to the project’s complexity. Despite these challenges, Beijing has promoted the project as part of its renewable energy strategy, emphasising its potential contributions to global climate goals and regional development. However, these claims have been met with scepticism, as China has not formalised any water-sharing agreements with downstream nations.
Geopolitical Implications
Water has emerged as a critical geopolitical tool in Asia, particularly as many major rivers, including the Yarlung Zangbo, originate in the Tibetan Plateau. This control raises concerns about the potential for “water weaponisation”, where water could be used as leverage during periods of political tension. For instance, any unilateral action by China to restrict or release water could lead to devastating floods or water shortages downstream. From a political science perspective, this dynamic represents a classic case of hydro-hegemony, where an upstream nation leverages its geographical dominance over shared water resources to exert power. China’s actions reinforce its regional dominance while complicating diplomatic relations with its neighbours. This growing tension underscores the importance of transboundary water management in international relations, where upstream-downstream dependencies intersect with geopolitical rivalry.
As the downstream neighbour most directly affected by China’s hydropower ambitions, India has expressed significant and growing concerns about the potential impacts of China’s dam-building activities on the Brahmaputra River. The river is a lifeline for India’s northeastern states, playing a crucial role in supporting agriculture, drinking water supplies and hydropower generation. Any alteration in the river’s natural flow could have far-reaching consequences for water availability, agricultural productivity, ecosystems and the overall livelihoods of millions of people in the region. One of the most significant risks associated with China’s hydropower projects is the potential for sudden water releases from upstream reservoirs. During periods of high discharge or conflict, such actions could result in flooding India’s border areas, particularly in Assam and Arunachal Pradesh, which are already highly vulnerable to floods. Seasonal flooding in these regions is a recurring problem, often displacing millions of people and causing extensive damage to infrastructure, agriculture and ecosystems. The construction of large dams, such as the proposed Great Bend mega-dam, could amplify these risks by increasing the volume of water that could be suddenly released during emergencies or disputes. The risks are further exacerbated by the region’s vulnerability to extreme weather events driven by climate change. Erratic rainfall patterns, glacial melt from the Himalayas and rising temperatures are contributing to more intense floods and droughts, making the northeastern region increasingly fragile. Combined with the potential for upstream disruptions caused by Chinese dam-building, this creates a double jeopardy for India, where climate-induced challenges intersect with geopolitical tensions.
In response to these growing challenges, New Delhi has accelerated its efforts to strengthen its hydropower and water management infrastructure in the northeastern states, particularly in Arunachal Pradesh. India’s focus has been on run-of-river hydropower projects, which generate electricity without creating large reservoirs, thereby minimising environmental and social impacts. Additionally, water storage facilities are being developed to ensure water availability during periods of reduced flow and to mitigate the risks of sudden flood surges caused by upstream water releases. India has also heavily invested in flood monitoring systems and early warning mechanisms to better prepare for and mitigate the impacts of floods. Technologies such as satellite-based remote sensing, real-time hydrological data collection and predictive modelling have been deployed to improve disaster preparedness. These measures aim to provide downstream communities with timely alerts about potential floods, giving them a critical window to evacuate or safeguard resources. To monitor and respond to Chinese activities, India has enhanced its border infrastructure, building roads, bridges and military installations in the northeastern provinces. This has a dual purpose: to ensure better connectivity and disaster response capabilities in remote regions and to counterbalance China’s extensive infrastructure development on its side of the border in Tibet.
Bangladesh, as the lowest riparian state, faces a unique and precarious set of challenges related to the Brahmaputra River’s management. As a predominantly agrarian economy, Bangladesh’s dependence on stable water flows from the Brahmaputra is immense, and disruptions could have devastating consequences across multiple sectors. Any upstream disruption, such as reduced water flow caused by dam construction or water diversion, would lead to drought-like conditions, severely impacting crop yields and food security for millions of people. In addition to reduced flow, changes in sedimentation patterns caused by upstream dams could degrade the fertility of farmland, further threatening agricultural productivity. Conversely, the sudden release of water from upstream reservoirs, particularly during the monsoon season, could exacerbate flooding in Bangladesh. The country is already highly prone to seasonal floods, with approximately 20-30% of its land submerged annually during the monsoons. Uncoordinated water releases by upstream nations could lead to catastrophic flooding, displacing millions, destroying crops and causing long-term economic and social damage.
Additionally, Bangladesh faces a geopolitical dilemma in managing its water security concerns, because it depends on India for bilateral cooperation on transboundary rivers, including the Brahmaputra. The two countries share 54 rivers, and their water-sharing negotiations are critical for Bangladesh’s long-term resource management. However, India’s upstream projects on the Brahmaputra, including dams and water diversion schemes, have raised concerns in Dhaka about reduced water flow and flooding risks. Existing frameworks, such as the India-Bangladesh Joint Rivers Commission (hereinafter: JRC), have made progress in fostering dialogue but have struggled to address the complexities of the Brahmaputra due to competing national priorities and a lack of binding agreements. On the other hand, China’s Belt and Road Initiative (hereinafter: BRI) has made Bangladesh increasingly reliant on Beijing for investments in infrastructure, energy and trade. China is a major development partner, having financed critical projects such as the Padma Bridge, highways and power plants. However, this economic dependence complicates Bangladesh’s ability to assert its water security concerns, especially as China continues to push forward with its hydropower ambitions on the Yarlung Zangbo. This dual reliance puts Dhaka in a precarious position, where it must navigate its relationships with powerful upstream nations while advocating for its water security. The lack of a trilateral framework between China, India, and Bangladesh further exacerbates these challenges, leaving Dhaka to rely on bilateral negotiations that often fail to address the broader implications of upstream activities.
Policy Suggestions for Managing the Yarlung Zangbo-Brahmaputra Disputes
1. Institutionalising a Trilateral Water-Sharing Agreement
A legally binding trilateral agreement between China, India and Bangladesh is essential. Balancing the interests of these three nations is challenging but achievable through neutral mediation and creating win-win solutions. Neutral international organisations, such as the United Nations or the World Bank, can play a crucial role in ensuring that the agreement is based on equitable principles rather than the power dynamics of the region. These organisations bring technical expertise, facilitate trust-building and provide enforcement mechanisms to ensure compliance. To incentivise China’s cooperation, economic and strategic benefits must be highlighted. For instance, China could be offered preferential trade agreements or development partnerships with India and Bangladesh. Joint research initiatives and technological collaboration on water management could also appeal to China’s interest, given its advanced capabilities, while fostering regional goodwill. Additionally, the agreement should emphasize how regulating water use and sharing data could reduce the risk of floods and other downstream impacts, benefitting China’s domestic stability and international relations. For India and Bangladesh, the emphasis should be on strengthening their bilateral cooperation to increase their collective bargaining power. By presenting a united front, supported by neutral mediators, they can negotiate more effectively with China. Both nations should also recognise the benefits of enhanced data sharing, flood control measures and joint hydropower development, which would improve water security and economic opportunities for both nations.
2. Promoting Multilateral Engagement
Multilateral platforms such as the UN Water Convention or ASEAN could play a pivotal role in facilitating discussions and fostering agreements on sustainable transboundary water governance in the region. These platforms provide a neutral and globally recognised framework for addressing disputes, establishing norms for equitable water sharing and promoting cooperation among riparian nations. By leveraging such mechanisms, states affected by China’s river management policies can collectively advocate for more inclusive, transparent and sustainable practices in managing shared water resources. A multilateral framework that balances the needs of upstream and downstream nations offers a win-win solution. For China, it ensures continued development and regional stability while enhancing its global reputation, whereas for India and Bangladesh, it provides water security and a platform for addressing shared vulnerabilities. By focusing on cooperation rather than conflict, such an agreement could transform the Brahmaputra River from a source of tension into a model for sustainable transboundary water governance.
3. Enhancing Data Sharing and Transparency
A robust, real-time joint river monitoring system with independent oversight could play a transformative role in reducing mistrust and mitigating risks between riparian nations like China, India and Bangladesh. Such a system would ensure the continuous collection and sharing of accurate data on river conditions, providing all stakeholders with a transparent understanding of water flow, reservoir levels, sedimentation and other critical hydrological factors. This transparency is essential for building trust between nations, especially in regions such as the Yarlung Zangbo-Brahmaputra Basin, where unilateral actions, like dam construction and water diversion, can create significant uncertainty and exacerbate geopolitical tensions. For China, a joint monitoring system offers several advantages. It would reduce regional tensions by addressing the mistrust of downstream nations, ensuring a stable environment for broader economic and geopolitical goals. Access to shared hydrological data would also improve the efficiency of China’s dam operations, helping to optimise hydropower generation and mitigate flood risks. Furthermore, participation in such a system would enhance China’s global reputation as a responsible leader in sustainable water governance, while avoiding international criticism over its unilateral policies. To achieve this, a phased approach is essential. Initial steps could include bilateral confidence-building measures, such as limited data-sharing agreements during critical periods like monsoons, followed by the establishment of pilot monitoring stations overseen by a neutral third party, such as the United Nations or the World Bank. These steps would allow trust to gradually build, paving the way for a full-scale, real-time monitoring network. Additionally, economic incentives, such as collaborative flood management projects or joint hydropower ventures, could make participation more attractive to China by demonstrating shared benefits.
4. Investing in Climate-Resilient Infrastructure
Downstream nations like India and Bangladesh must prioritise the development of climate-resilient infrastructure to safeguard their populations and economies from the growing risks posed by upstream disruptions and climate-induced challenges. The combination of unilateral actions by upstream nations, such as China’s dam-building on the Yarlung Zangbo, and the accelerating impacts of climate change, including erratic rainfall patterns, rising sea levels and glacial melt, has made these measures desirable and essential. Investing in climate-resilient infrastructure, such as advanced flood control systems, drought-resistant irrigation networks, desalination plants and early warning systems, would provide greater protection against these risks. Such infrastructure can mitigate the devastating impacts of floods and water shortages while ensuring the stability of critical sectors like farming and fisheries, which sustain millions of livelihoods. Additionally, these measures could help urban areas adapt to rising water demands caused by population growth and industrialisation, ensuring long-term water security. By prioritising these investments, India and Bangladesh would protect millions of lives and build resilience in their economies and ecosystems, reducing their vulnerability to both upstream activities and the escalating impacts of climate change.
Conclusion
The Yarlung Zangbo-Brahmaputra River is a vital lifeline for millions, yet its management increasingly reflects the broader geopolitical rivalries in South Asia. While China’s hydropower ambitions align with its domestic goals, they pose significant risks for downstream nations. Without institutionalised cooperation and sustainable water-sharing practices, unilateral actions could exacerbate regional instability. A coordinated approach, balancing development with equity and sustainability, is essential to transform the Brahmaputra into a source of shared prosperity rather than conflict. The lack of a unified approach to managing the Brahmaputra is not just an environmental or economic issue; rather it represents a security concern with the potential to destabilise the entire region. Uncoordinated actions by any of the riparian nations could lead to water shortages, agricultural disruptions, forced migrations and even interstate conflicts, particularly as water becomes an increasingly scarce resource in the face of population growth and climate change.
