With also the last days of 2023 behind us, another chapter in the history books is now complete, and another chapter begins. To start this new year, a look at the geopolitical calendar will reveal that we can expect many significant developments in 2024. In this article, the main events and expected trends will be discussed, including some predictions on how certain situations will develop.

The Russo-Ukrainian War & NATO

On February 24, the war in Ukraine will be two years old. As one of the more intense military conflicts in recent years, this political move by Russia has had a profound effect on international relations. Due to the large-scale nature of this war, we can expect a higher drive by Russia to produce more tangible results. The war continues to burden all included parties economically with little changes in the last couple of months in the overall situation. A certain status quo, in which the invaded Eastern Ukrainian territories are confidently defended by Russian forces, is becoming more and more apparent. Although this can partially be seen as a success from the Russian perspective and a significant defeat by Ukraine, the fact that this has been a rather gradual development has already become a transitional reality and was not the intended goal of the Russian government when the invasion started, we must expect a more intensified move by Russia to gain more important territories to the North or disconnect Ukraine fully from the Black Sea. The reason behind this is that Russia cannot start a consolidation phase of the gained territories without framing the operation as an outright success in order to upkeep Russian morale and legitimise the operation domestically. Right now, the territorial gains are considerable but not convincing in the light of economic and political damage.

Also, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) will carry out the biggest military exercise in its history between February and March this year. Among all regions within the available territories of its member states, the exercise will be carried out in Germany, Poland and the Baltic states, all regions which are either important (Germany) or very close (Poland and Baltics) to Russia. Naturally, this will be perceived as a major provocation. Within a situation of military conflict and hostile relations with NATO states, the Russian government will need to show strength towards NATO to prevent negative sentiments among the Russian population. Accordingly, producing more tangible results in the Ukraine war could counteract NATO’s provocations. Finally, presidential elections will be held in Russia in March – another reason to increase military pressure and create legitimacy for the current rule through successful advances.

BRICS: A New Identity?

This year, Russia assumed the presidency in the intergovernmental organisation BRICS. Formerly intended to function as an economic platform, the BRICS organisation has gradually built a particular political awareness and standing over the last couple of years. It is becoming more and more of a counterweight to the G7 organisation by deepening its areas of cooperation, producing political strategies, and proactively shaping global political discourse. Initially comprising Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa, the group has invited Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates to join. All of the nations agreed to join this increasingly powerful group in August 2023 and are now part of BRICS. With the expansion, there is a certain ideational restructuring within the organisation, which will be the focus this year. With the largely extended group of members, the organisation will necessarily re-evaluate the norms, values, principles, goals and plans of the group. Not only do the new members bring their own identities to the table, but their interests are also very diverse. Under the Russian presidency in this organisation, we can expect a tendency towards a deepening of political cooperation. To predict that military cooperation will be a topic this year would be too much – for now. But in 2024, Russia has an interest in quickly integrating the new members structurally but also normatively. We might see more around the narrative of political and social cooperation, as well as a clearer demarcation from G7 and NATO. Especially there is the BRICS summit in October this year, where we might see this tendency towards extended cooperation beyond the economic realm, where normative narratives will likely dominate the discourse.

Elections: Right Wingers Up Front

Earlier, we touched upon the Russian presidential elections, which will be held in March this year. Here, there are no surprises to be expected. Not only has Vladimir Putin shown great consistency in winning elections and shadow-governing the Russian nation over the last decades, but the war in Ukraine generates enough fear that a regime change is nearly impossible to imagine in Russia at the moment. Also, the anticipated developments above will feed into the heightened popularity of the current President of the Russian Federation.

In Türkiye, however, there might be some changes, as there are local elections this year in March. Determining who will govern the municipalities, the local elections have a profound effect on local development, giving opposition parties the chance to win sympathy for the next presidential elections. Last time, in 2019, the ruling party in Türkiye lost in all three metropolitan areas to the opposition party, dealing a heavy blow to the generally stable rule of Recep Erdoğan. However, as the opposition has less qualitative manpower, becomes increasingly fragmented and has difficulties managing through the ongoing economic crisis, the ruling party might achieve a comeback in İstanbul and Ankara. With the heavy defeat of the major opposing parties that cooperated last year in the presidential election, the voters have lost confidence in their respective parties and in the cooperative approaches among those opposing parties. The ruling party can be expected to at least regain the metropole of İstanbul and further bolster its grip on local politics. Even though the city has seen some considerable improvements over the last term under the leadership of the opposition party, the voters’ confidence might not be enough to extend the current term. Moreover, due to the devastating earthquake last year, many people from those regions, which are generally more supportive of the current government, moved to İstanbul, adding to the likelihood of the ruling party winning. With the regained power, the President will likely strengthen its grip on municipal policymaking to prepare for the next presidential election.  

Next, there will be parliamentary elections in Europe in June. Although this election is unlikely to be quite a crucial one, it can be the starting point of a trend change in the world’s biggest semi-supranational organisation. With increased right-wing tendencies in Germany, France, Poland, Italy, the Netherlands and Hungary, the parliamentary election might result in more representatives from this political camp – if the voter turnout remains at least stable. However, there is a high chance of declining participation rates as the right-wing agendas in Europe are characterised by a high degree of scepticism towards the European Union institutions. Mainly, the refugee policy and the economic burden on the fiscal budgets of the members in the context of the Ukraine war are the hot topics that right-wing parties of Europe suggest solutions to, which are often quite radical and in conflict with European core values. The ongoing inflationary wave is another factor that is utilised to gain voters’ support. If the European Parliament is to assume a more right-wing orientation, the functionality of the EU institutions might be endangered. Caused by the growing distrust and discontent in Europe, a right-wing parliamentary would increase decentralisation pressures and might even trigger disintegration. Currently, liberal and social-democratic parties have a slight majority in the European Parliament, which makes the upcoming election, at least for them, quite a significant one. Losing more support would force them into more compromise, deepening their already ongoing identity problem. With increasing wealth, the working class as a disadvantaged group is becoming a thing of the past. The liberal and social-democratic camps across Europe are becoming more centrist as there is less inequality to work against. Summarising, the upcoming elections will not result in a massive majority of one camp over the other, but it might reveal a lot about the societal development in Europe for the next couple of years. Either way, the left spectrum will have to reinvent itself to remain relevant. The right spectrum, on the other hand, could endanger the pan-European idea of returning to more nationalistic and decentral politics.

Finally, there are also presidential elections in the United States of America in November. After the current government assumed power in 2020, it quickly lost much sympathy with the indigenous people. High inflation rates, a plummeting stock market, a fragile housing market and failing local banks have put much pressure on the economy. The promised infrastructural projects have not yet been started and also the high employment rates could not counteract the dissatisfaction. Although the current ruler of the nation has implemented a very successful and favourable foreign policy from an international standpoint, the population prefers a more offensive foreign policy strategy. As many current polls conclude, the population of the United States of America is dissatisfied with the current state of affairs, which lowers the chances of the incumbent President who pledged to stand for election this year. His opponent will be the predecessor of this office, who lost him at the last elections in 2020. His political stance is heavily business-oriented and embraces an offensive foreign policy. Although the latter will not aid the international political climate and endanger cooperative politics, his general policy stance does precisely address the current concerns of the indigenous. Therefore, a regime change can be expected this year in this nation. However, this right-wing candidate has been under much legal and media pressure by the current government. There is a chance that the bundled resources of the government might be used to sabotage his candidacy, undermining the oligarchic nature of the political system and pushing it towards a more authoritarian mode of governance.

Palestine and Israel

Unlike most other Presidents of the United States of America, the former President, Donald Trump, who is expected to win the upcoming election, was not held in high regard in Israel. The two nations are culturally deeply intertwined and entertain very close relationships across all policy dimensions. Under the current government, there is much support for the ambitions of Israel to gain territories of Palestine and consolidate its expansionary advances. As there is a considerable chance of the less cooperative candidate winning the elections in the United States of America, Israel’s loyal partner, time pressure might come up to intensify efforts to win territories of Palestine. Without the media help from overseas, Israel will have massive issues containing the already raging international uproar against its military actions. Adding to that, the deteriorating situation in Ukraine, another relevant partner of Israel, could further accelerate the military advances of Israel in Gaza. Ukraine constitutes an important foreign policy bastion. The government is cooperative and supportive towards Israel due to close cultural connections and massive financial and military support by Israel. Accordingly, Israel does leverage this position to strengthen its relationship with Europe, practically defending its outer border with Russia. However, as Ukraine becomes weaker, leaving Israel less room to operate there and the threat of losing influence on politics in North America, Israel might significantly intensify efforts to gain lands in Palestine. Also, the domestic societal rifts have not been overcome and might flame up again this year, adding to the radicalisation and irrationalisation of the ongoing conflict with Palestine. Normally, the most favourable way would be for Israel to structure its offensives more cautiously to achieve a lasting consolidation of past successes, but with the uncertainties described above, Israel might abandon this approach to seek a quick success.

It will be interesting to follow those topics and see how these described developments will ultimately unfold. Surely, some quite unexpected events will shape the courses of action in the political realm this year and maybe leave a mark in history. Based on what has happened so far, the assessments above remain the most likely, yet surely not the most desirable ones. It might really be the only thing the non-devletist state system is better at than its superior devletist brother, and that is predictability. However, the advanced stateman will choose the uncertainty of discovery over the certainty of misery at any time.