ETHIOPIA TIGRAY CONFLICT ESCALATES AS EU PLEDGES AID

The Ethiopia Tigray conflict has reignited with significant intensity since the final week of September 2026, threatening to unravel the fragile peace agreement signed in November 2022 after a two-year civil war that killed an estimated 600.000 people. The Tigray People's Liberation Front (hereinafter: TPLF) has seized airports, launched cross-border offensives into the neighbouring Afar and Amhara regions and declared itself in a "full-blown war" with the federal government in Addis Ababa. Internet connectivity across northern Ethiopia has been severely disrupted, drawing comparisons to the near-total communications blackout imposed on Tigray during the 2020–2022 civil war (Dawn).

Chronology Of Escalation: From Tigray To Afar

Fears of renewed large-scale conflict first surfaced publicly around 24 September 2026, when reports emerged of fresh clashes between TPLF fighters and the Ethiopian National Defense Force (hereinafter: ENDF) in the Tigray region. By 25 September, Ethiopian federal forces were battling overnight to repel a TPLF assault in the Afar region, according to a humanitarian source cited by multiple outlets. Online connectivity monitors recorded a significant internet disruption across northern Ethiopia on the same day, raising immediate concerns about information access and humanitarian coordination (DW).

By 26 September, the TPLF had seized several strategic towns and local airports in the Tigray region, with the ENDF claiming hundreds of fighters killed in the engagements. The fighting then shifted further south and east. By 28 September, the TPLF had taken the town of Erebti and advanced toward Afdeera, deepening its push into Afar. At least 150.000 people are feared displaced in Afar alone as a result of the offensive (Euronews). Separately, France 24 reported that Ethiopian federal forces subsequently claimed to have seized a key city in the Tigray region, indicating that ground control remained contested and fluid throughout the period.

The Djibouti Corridor And Strategic Stakes

The TPLF's advance into Afar carries significant strategic weight beyond the immediate military contest. The Afar region hosts the corridor linking Addis Ababa to the port of Djibouti, through which nearly all of Ethiopia's international trade flows. By pushing toward Afdeera, TPLF forces are positioning themselves to exert potential leverage over the federal government's access to this critical trade route. Ethiopia is a landlocked state, and its dependence on the Djibouti corridor makes any sustained rebel presence in Afar an acute economic and logistical pressure point (Euronews).

Diplomatic Accusations And Neighbouring States

As fighting intensified, Ethiopia's military leadership moved to attribute external responsibility for the TPLF's resurgence. Field Marshal Birhanu Jula, chief of the general staff of the ENDF, on 26 September, accused Eritrea of mobilising financial support for the TPLF. By 28 September, the accusations had broadened: Addis Ababa formally accused Sudan and Egypt, in addition to Eritrea, of backing armed groups fighting federal forces in the north (Arab News). The accusations represent a notable diplomatic escalation, implicating three neighbouring states simultaneously in what the federal government frames as an externally supported insurgency. Eritrea, which fought alongside Ethiopian federal forces during the 2020–2022 civil war, has not publicly responded to the latest allegations as of the time of reporting.

Sudan's military rejected the accusations firmly. The Sudanese army dismissed Field Marshal Jula's claims as baseless and called for any bilateral disputes to be resolved through official diplomatic channels rather than public accusation (Anadolu Agency). Khartoum also issued a counter-allegation, stating that support for the Rapid Support Forces (hereinafter: RSF) paramilitary, Sudan's own armed adversary in its ongoing civil conflict, was flowing from Ethiopian territory. The mutual recriminations between Addis Ababa and Khartoum reflect the degree to which the two states' separate internal conflicts have become entangled along their shared border.

Regional Spillover Risks

An analyst at the International Crisis Group warned that renewed fighting in northern Ethiopia could spread beyond Tigray and destabilise the wider Horn of Africa. The warning, issued around 25 September, noted that old adversaries were forming new alliances and that the conflict risked entering a qualitatively more dangerous phase than the 2020–2022 war. The involvement, alleged or actual, of Eritrea, Sudan and Egypt would transform what began as an internal Ethiopian conflict into a multi-state confrontation with no established mediation framework currently in place. Essydo has previously reported on the formation of a broader rebel alliance against Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed's government, which provides additional context for the current escalation (Essydo).

Humanitarian Situation And EU Response

The humanitarian consequences of the renewed Ethiopia-Tigray conflict are already severe and are expected to worsen. Displacement in Afar alone has reached at least 150.000 people, and the internet disruption across northern Ethiopia is hampering the ability of aid organisations to assess and respond to needs on the ground. Locals in Tigray have expressed fears of a repeat of the supplies blockade that accompanied the 2020–2022 civil war, during which the region was almost entirely cut off from external assistance for extended periods (Dawn).

On 28 September 2026, the European Commission announced a 61€ million humanitarian aid package for Ethiopia. The funding is directed at the most vulnerable people affected by conflict, displacement, disease outbreaks and climate-related hazards, including those linked to the El Niño weather pattern. The Commission's press release described the situation in northern Ethiopia as rapidly deteriorating (European Commission). The package addresses overlapping crises: the renewed conflict compounds pre-existing vulnerabilities from climate shocks and disease, meaning humanitarian needs extend beyond the immediate conflict zone in Tigray and Afar.

Concluding Outlook

As of 28 September 2026, the military situation on the ground remains fluid. The ENDF has claimed the recapture of at least one key town in Tigray, while the TPLF continues to hold positions in Afar and maintains its declaration of full-scale war. The 2022 Pretoria peace agreement, which formally ended the previous civil war, has not been publicly declared void by either party, but the scale and geographic spread of the current fighting render its operative status uncertain. No formal mediation process has been announced by regional bodies, including the African Union (hereinafter: AU), which brokered the 2022 agreement.

The diplomatic dimension adds a further layer of unresolved tension. Ethiopia's accusations against Sudan, Eritrea and Egypt remain unsubstantiated by independently verified evidence in the available sources, and all three states have either denied involvement or not yet responded. Sudan's counter-allegation regarding RSF support from Ethiopian territory similarly awaits verification. The convergence of active internal conflicts in both Ethiopia and Sudan, combined with Egypt's longstanding dispute with Ethiopia over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam, means that the diplomatic environment in the Horn of Africa is unusually fraught.

If we also take the humanitarian situation in Somalia into account, we can see a fast-spreading threat of regional deterioration. All involved states struggle with their own conflicts and wars, while having little to no resources and/or structural foreign support. Therefore, it might be that foreign forces, or Egypt as a regional force, intervene soon to establish their influence in the region, which could create long-term dependencies. To follow this and many other risk spots in the world from a continous, strategic and analytical perspective, subscribe to our Global Risk Report.