THE BELT AND ROAD INITIATIVE

One of the very core developments in today’s economic and geopolitical reality is the continuously growing influence and expansion of the People’s Republic of China, on several critical markets, resources and infrastructure, which constitutes its most essential pillar in international power relations. Power is here to be defined according to Max Weber’s assumption to proceed one’s own will and goal-setting, regardless of the influence of other players; it is to be viewed as a power of enforcement and as a power of obstruction, therefore has a relative nature.

The increase of China’s power logically leads to a decrease in the power of other global powers, which, logically, view this development as a threat. China’s goal-setting and initiatives are, at least in European and neo-European media, as such nations mostly dominated the economic and geopolitical dynamics over the past centuries, portrayed as dangerous, morally illegitimate or denounced in another way. While these dynamics have been examined from different perspectives in several of our analyses (see: The USA Curse and International Power Disruptions: The Case of the USA and China), in this analysis, we are examining the Belt and Road Initiative (hereinafter: BRI) as a strategic policy itself. It is China’s primary economic (consequently also political) initiative to further expand, strengthen and maintain its international power position.

To do so, the article will be centered around the three questions of: Why?, What? and How?. While the first question allows us to understand the normative argumentation and the framework within which the BRI finds its place, the second and third questions focus on the description of the initiative itself.

Normative, Strategic And Geopolitical Logic Of The BRI

The BRI cannot be reduced to an infrastructure programme, nor can it be framed as a neutral economic policy strategy. Its significance lies within the geopolitical power architecture of the 21st century, and especially through the Chinese lens of the web of international power dynamics. Instead of military alliances, threats and interventions, or explicit political demands, China builds connectivity – hard & digital infrastructure – and allows dependencies to emerge organically. China frames its foreign policy around a principle of non-interference, insisting that external pressure is both illegitimate and symptomatic of insecurity. Yet, paradoxically, it constructs one of the most far-reaching systems of influence the international order has ever seen. This contradiction is not incidental.

It is the conceptual entry point for understanding the Belt and Road Initiative itself: a state that rejects socio-political intervention as a matter of doctrine, yet practices it through economic interdependence rather than political supervision over partner states. This logic contrasts the hegemonic strategy of the United States of America (hereinafter: USA) and other dominant (powerful) European and neo-European states, as their focus lies on creating political dependencies and establishing a structure within which they influence the internal politics of less powerful states in a self-beneficial manner.

For China, the sovereignty of a nation and its people to develop freely and, e. g., close to their cultural core, weighs more than the (neo-)European narrative of so-called absolute rights, which are used to justify their geopolitical decision-making (often denounced for double standards). This logic enhances China’s attractiveness as an international partner, particularly for nations that lack access to economic partnerships with European or neo-European nations or refuse to comply with their political conditions.

The deeper motivation behind the Belt and Road Initiative is therefore twofold. Internally, China seeks stability through growth, access to markets, resources and predictable transport routes. Externally, it seeks to shape the geopolitical environment without directly confronting existing power constellations. The BRI offers a mechanism to do both: it secures China’s economic future while subtly shifting the global center of gravity - completely unconfrontational. By turning connectivity into a strategic instrument, China advances its interests without violating its own normative narrative – at least not explicitly.

Understanding this dynamic is essential. Without it, the BRI appears contradictory; with it, the initiative becomes coherent: a strategy that transforms the world not by imposing political models, but by assembling the material conditions under which others must operate.

What Is The Belt And Road Initiative

The Belt and Road Initiative, conceived by China in 2013, is far more than a conventional infrastructure programme. It is a globally scaled system of economic, geopolitical and normative architecture that seeks to reshape the structure of world connectivity on China’s terms. To understand its importance, one must grasp not only its physical infrastructure but also its financial intensity, institutional logic and strategic geography.

Scope And Strategic Vision

At its core, the BRI organises itself around two complementary axes: the Silk Road Economic Belt, which runs through Eurasia by land, and the 21st-Century Maritime Silk Road, a sea-based network. This dual structure reflects China’s ambition to link its economy to Europe, Africa and beyond, not only via railways and roads, but also via ports, pipelines and digital corridors. The physical components include high-speed rail, highways, seaports, energy pipelines, smart-city infrastructure and telecommunications. Importantly, the BRI is not static; it evolves as China’s strategic priorities shift. Over time, newer domains become more dominant: digital infrastructure (5G, fiber-optic cables), green energy and resource extraction now occupy central roles within BRI’s project pipeline. China’s interests even extend to the Arctic.

Financial Magnitude And Growth Trends

According to the Green Finance & Development Center, 2024 saw its highest level of engagement ever: 70,7$ billion in construction contracts and 51$ billion in direct investments. By mid-2025 (first half), that momentum accelerated: 66,2$ billion in new construction contracts and 57,1$ billion in new investments, marking the highest six-month total in BRI history. Cumulatively, since its launch, the BRI’s engagement has surpassed 1,3$ trillion, underlining how deeply China has embedded itself in global infrastructure networks.

Moreover, with investments in the financial infrastructure of other nations, such as Kazakhstan, China is also building dependencies of foreign stock exchanges and, consequently, international capital markets. Additionally, the expansion of commodities exchanges in China aims to gain resource pricing power, making future BRI investments more cost-efficient. Finally, through fewer restrictions on the domestic stock market, financing of the BRI is increasingly carried by foreign capital.

Sectoral Priorities And Strategic Shifts

Although historically, transport and connectivity have formed the bulk of BRI projects, the initiative’s emphasis has shifted over time. As of H1 2025, energy constitutes a striking portion of new commitment: 42$ billion went into energy-sector projects, a 100% increase from the same period in 2024. Within that, green energy is not marginal: wind, solar and waste-to-energy projects captured almost 9,7$ billion, corresponding to roughly 11,9 GW of installed capacity in the half-year.

At the same time, traditional energy (oil and gas) remains central. Investments in processing facilities surged, especially in Africa, underscoring that the BRI remains a vehicle for securing access to natural resources. Simultaneously, metals and mining have become pivotal: in H1 2025, nearly 24,9$ billion flowed into mineral processing and extraction, primarily through investments rather than mere contracts. Technology and manufacturing are also ascending in priority: high-tech investments (such as batteries, hydrogen, solar PV) reached 23,2$ billion in the same period.

Geographic Patterns Of Engagement

Geographically, the BRI’s footprint shows both continuity and evolution. In H1 2025, Africa and Central Asia emerged as the leading destinations, with Chinese commitments reaching 39$ billion in Africa and 25$ billion in Central Asia. The choice of those regions is not coincidental: they are resource-rich and critical for China’s long-term geoeconomic strategy. While Sub-Anatolian states remain important, access to those markets is much more difficult than to African and Central Asian markets.

Financial Risks And Sovereign Debt Dynamics

The BRI’s scale brings enormous financial risk – not only for the borrower states but for China itself. According to a report by the Lowy Institute, in 2025, the poorest 75 nations collectively face 22$ billion in debt repayments to China, forming a large portion of the total 35$ billion due that year. This marks a turning point: some debtor states are moving from net receivers to net payers. As Radio Free Asia notes, China has, in some cases, transitioned “from capital provider to chief debt collector,” as repayments now exceed new lending. These dynamics illustrate a crucial BRI paradox: while the initiative spreads infrastructure, it simultaneously amplifies financial vulnerability – both in partner states and for China itself, which now bears the burden of managing a sprawling network of outstanding credit.

How China Implements And Leverages The BRI

Understanding how China operationalises the BRI is essential to decode its broader strategy. Implementation is multifaceted: financial architecture, power projection, norm-setting and geopolitical leverage work in tandem.

Financial Engineering And Capital Levers

China’s deployment of capital under the BRI relies heavily on policy banks, namely the China Development Bank and the Export-Import Bank of China. These banks extend large, long-term and relatively concessional loans, binding recipient nations in multi-decade repayment cycles. But this is not merely aid: many projects are structured as hybrid investments, combining financing, equity and commercial terms. Public-private partnerships are common, allowing China to spread risk and embed Chinese state-owned enterprises in local economies.

Additionally, China channels support via multilateral vehicles: the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (hereinafter: AIIB) serves both as a financier and a legitimising institution. Its sustainable development bonds and concessional windows increase China’s leverage while presenting the Belt and Road Initiative as supporting global development. Through these intertwined channels, China ensures that lending remains under its strategic direction without over-exposing its budget or appearing overly hegemonic.

Infrastructure As A Geopolitical Lever

Infrastructure built under the Belt and Road Initiative frequently serves dual-use strategic objectives: commercial connectivity, as well as sovereignty leverage. Ports built under the BRI, for instance, are not purely trade hubs. They may offer China logistical footholds, repair capabilities or influence over maritime routes. Railways and road networks built through BRI investments tie partner states into China-centric supply chains, making them economically interdependent.

China also standardises technology. Through its infrastructure projects, it exports Chinese standards in telecommunications, data management and digital governance. This soft-power export is not accidental: it shapes partner states’ regulatory regimes and aligns them more closely with China’s model of governance.

Sectoral Pivot: Energy, Green Transition, Resources

A clear shift in recent years shows how China is recalibrating the BRI toward energy security and resource leverage.

• Energy projects: With 42$ billion allocated in the first half of 2025, China is doubling down on oil, gas and green energy simultaneously. This secures long-term resource flows while also building politically strategic energy infrastructure abroad.
• Green energy: Wind, solar, and waste-to-energy projects receive increasing attention, reflecting China’s attempt to brand the BRI as aligned with global sustainability goals.
• Mining and minerals: The nearly 24,9$ billion investment in metals and mining underscores a raw-materials strategy: to control not just infrastructure but the very resources powering China’s industrial base.
• High-tech manufacturing: By investing in battery plants, hydrogen facilities and advanced solar photovoltaics, China is extending the BRI into future industries. These sectors are not incidental—they are central to China’s ambition of technological leadership.

Debt Diplomacy And Risk Management

China’s financial leverage under the Belt and Road Initiative comes with significant risk — and China does not ignore it.

• When debt pressures emerge, especially from less-developed BRI countries, China has at times offered debt restructuring or concessions. The AIIB’s special fund window, to which China contributed 300$ million, is one such mechanism. (AIIB)
• But this support is selective. Reports indicate that while China has historically bailed out some indebted BRI states, it is increasingly cautious, especially as its own exposure grows. The shift from net creditor to net debt collector is not incidental—it reflects a recalibration of risk and leverage. (Radio Free Asia)
• Simultaneously, by financing projects with future revenue streams (e. g., energy plants, ports), China ensures that debt repayment is embedded within economically productive infrastructure, reducing the risk of pure default.

Commentary

The Belt and Road Initiative must be understood within a broader shift in the global power architecture (The international order is no longer defined by a single, stabilising center, but by competing models of connectivity and influence.). In this environment, the BRI represents a distinct mode of power projection – one that does not rely on explicit domination, but on the quiet reconfiguration of material and institutional conditions.

China does not simply construct infrastructure. It embeds norms within it. By exporting railways, ports and digital corridors, it also exports a developmental narrative: stability as a prerequisite for progress, sovereignty as a fundamental principle and connectivity as the mechanism through which growth is achieved. These norms offer an alternative to European and neo-European frameworks of governance and assistance.

In many states, Chinese-built infrastructure becomes a symbol of modernity articulated through Chinese logic: efficient, centralised and oriented toward continuity rather than reform. Institutional architecture reinforces this dynamic. The Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank presents itself as a multilateral instrument, yet its governance structure reflects a clear strategic intention. It legitimises China’s role as a development provider while preserving its autonomy to define the terms under which cooperation unfolds. Influence emerges not from conditionality, but from the gravitational pull of capital, scale, and logistical integration.

This dynamic, on the other hand, resembles the logic of monopolisation: systems become dependent not through coercion, but through rational participation. Over time, such participation creates structural asymmetries that shape national choices and limit alternatives. Yet this same process contains the seeds of systemic fragility. When connectivity centralises around a single actor, resilience becomes conditional on that actor’s stability, priorities and internal path. What sustains the BRI is its strategic fluidity. It avoids rigid institutional commitments and adapts to shifting political and economic conditions. This flexibility enables its persistence, but it also raises a broader question: whether asymmetric interdependence can constitute the foundation of a stable global order, or whether it merely relocates vulnerability from one hegemonic structure to another.