SAHEL NATIONS WITHDRAW FROM ICC

The contemporary geopolitical landscape's relationship between a state’s internal governance and its commitment to international legal frameworks, such as the International Criminal Court (hereinafter: ICC), represents a critical dynamic. This interaction is currently being reconfigured within the Sahel, where the governments of several nations are pursuing political trajectories that diverge from established international norms. This conceptual reorientation manifests itself in two distinct yet related phenomena: the withdrawal of states from international institutions and the implementation of domestic constitutional reforms. Both are indicative of a movement towards reasserted national sovereignty, often under the leadership of new political and military cadres. This progression challenges traditional institutionalist perspectives on global governance and raises structural questions regarding the future political architecture of the region. The following report will address these events with the precision and structured reasoning required for an objective analysis, focusing on the factual components of these developments.

Key Developments: ICC Withdrawal And Guinea's Referendum

The recent geopolitical developments in the Sahel region, a political space in which the security and stability of the constituent nations has recently faced institutional friction, have been defined by a sequence of notable political decisions. These events, reported in late September 2025, include the joint withdrawal of three states from an international legal institution, alongside the formalisation of a new constitution in a fourth.

Joint Withdrawal From The International Criminal Court

In a joint statement, the military governments of Niger, Mali and Burkina Faso announced their collective withdrawal from the ICC. The three governments came into power through military takeovers between the years 2020 and 2023. The statement from the three nations presented the decision as an assertion of their sovereignty, asserting that the ICC was an “instrument of neocolonial repression in the hands of imperialism.” According to a report by Al Jazeera, the three states accused the court of what they termed “selective justice” and criticised it for being unable to prosecute war crimes, crimes against humanity, crimes of aggression and genocide with the necessary institutional rigour. The military governments stated their intention to establish "indigenous mechanisms for the consolidation of peace and justice." The withdrawal from the ICC will become effective one year after the official decision is submitted to the General Secretariat of the United Nations. This decision follows previous moves by these same governments, which have included a joint withdrawal from the Economic Community of West African States (hereinafter: ECOWAS) and a reduction in defence cooperation with European and neo-European states, while simultaneously increasing their ties with the state of Russia. It is important to note that the ICC has had an ongoing investigation in Mali since 2013 regarding alleged war crimes.

Guinea's Constitutional Referendum

In a separate development, the government of Guinea, led by its interim President General Mamady Doumbouya, has passed a new constitution by a referendum. The national plebiscite, which took place in late September 2025, was overseen by a new electoral body that was handpicked by the interim President’s government. According to reports from the Associated Press and Africanews, official results indicate that 89,38% of voters supported the new constitution, with a reported voter turnout of over 86%.

The new constitution extends presidential terms from five to seven years and permits members of the junta, including General Mamady Doumbouya, to be eligible to run for the presidency. It also establishes a new Senate, with one-third of its members appointed by the President. The Prime Minister of Guinea, Amadou Oury Bah, stated that the result represents a “mandate of trust” and a step towards a transition to civilian rule. However, opposition leader Faya Millimono rejected the results, citing allegations of voter suppression and pre-marked ballots. Rights groups have also stated that the government suppressed dissent by banning over 50 political parties and suspending opposition activities in the lead up to the vote. This is the latest of the military takeovers and constitutional changes in the Sahel that has taken place in the recent past.

Implications For The Sahel's Future

The recent developments in the Sahel region, specifically the actions undertaken by the governments of Niger, Mali, Burkina Faso and Guinea, signify a notable reorientation of political and institutional trajectories within the region. These events, taken together, suggest a pattern of consolidating governmental authority by both reducing external accountability and removing domestic structural barriers to power. The withdrawal from the International Criminal Court (ICC) by Niger, Mali and Burkina Faso, framed as a means of reasserting sovereignty, is an institutional move that is likely to have significant implications for regional security and justice frameworks. This action may serve to further distance these states from international legal norms and could potentially encourage other states to re-evaluate their own commitments to similar international bodies. The rationale provided—that of seeking indigenous solutions for justice—presents a complex institutional challenge. A critical question for the future is whether these governments will be able to successfully establish credible and effective national institutions to address war crimes and human rights violations, thereby fulfilling the stated aim of their withdrawal. The success or failure of such efforts will likely influence the perceptions of other states regarding the utility of international legal frameworks.

Further, the constitutional reform in Guinea under the leadership of General Mamady Doumbouya offers a clear illustration of how domestic legal mechanisms are being adapted to entrench military-led governments. By extending the presidential term and permitting junta members to run for office, the new constitution establishes a formal, legal pathway for the current interim government to transition into a long-term, civilian-fronted rule. This institutional shift, while presented as a step towards civilian governance by the current government, creates a scenario where political power remains consolidated within the same cadre. One possible trajectory is that this model of constitutional re-engineering may become a template for other military-led governments in the region seeking to legitimise their authority. Conversely, this move could also increase internal friction and galvanise opposition movements, particularly if the reforms are perceived as fundamentally undemocratic by the society. The consolidation of internal power and the rejection of external accountability suggests a complex and evolving political landscape in the Sahel. The path forward for these states is likely to be defined by a series of ongoing internal and external negotiations, the outcomes of which will have lasting effects on the political stability and institutional character of the entire region.